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Abstract 
Tanzanian government has been implementing decentralisation policy based on its theoretical 
benefits of improving public services delivery. This study provides empirical examination of the 
implementation of health sector decentralisation, showing how interactions of fiscal, 
administrative and political decentralisation have had improved access to reproductive health 
services. A qualitative research design was adopted in which single case study was employed. 
Data were collected through using in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, observations 
and documentary analysis. Forty seven key informant participants and fourteen focus group 
discussions with different backgrounds and perspectives, observation of health facilities and 
analysis of fifty two key policy documents provide data base for the research. The findings 
suggest that to some extent decentralisation have granted local authorities with some fiscal, 
administrative and political power for health service delivery. However, its implementation was 
manipulated by central government acts, holding decentralised powers which jeopardise the 
benefits of decentralisation The scant evidence shows that the impact of decentralisation is far 
from reality as much of the efforts have been to improve democratic without considering the 
supportive environment under which health service delivery can be enhanced. The supportive 
environment such working referral system, skilled personnel is lacking; hence the efforts of 
decentralisation to improve reproductive health service delivery are intended to fail. It is 
therefore, unfair to charge decentralisation for inefficiencies performance of health system due to 
the presence of capacity shortfalls, increased financial dependence and weak institutional 
arrangements that obstruct service delivery. The findings also emphasise on significance of 
considering all dimensions of decentralisation process when investigating its effects on service 
delivery. This is because there is an additional positive result coming from the interaction of two 
or more decentralisation dimensions on health outcomes. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER 
1.1. The re-revival of decentralisation 
Decentralisation has been practiced in many countries across the globe for many decades. Since 
1917, African countries have experimented with decentralisation of responsibilities from the 
central government to sub-national level (Ribot, 2002). Democratisation movements of the 1990s 
led to the revitalisation efforts towards decentralisation. The enthusiasm for decentralisation was 
grounded in the argument that it can improve public service delivery through matching public 
resources with local needs (Cabral, 2011, Langran, 2011, Conyers, 2007, Robinson, 2007, Green 
and Collins, 1994).International organisations, in particular the World Bank, have praised 
decentralisation efforts as a means of reducing inefficiencies of the central authorities which 
were linked with various forms of corruption, patronage, fraud and mismanagement of public 
resources (Collins et al., 2002, Litvack et al., 1998, World-Bank, 2000a). In Africa, 
decentralisation was therefore seen as a means to disempower central authorities that lack 
incentives to respond to the local needs (Shah, 1998).  
 
Decentralisation of health systems is the common organisational change under health sector 
reform. The forms of decentralisation that are pursued include deconcentration, delegation and 
devolution (Mills, 1990). However, devolution is the common form of decentralisation 
frequently opted by many governments as means to deliver public health services. It entails the 
transfer of decision-making, planning (political), budgeting (financial), management, and 
resource allocation (administrative), of health care services from the central authorities to local 
government authorities (Mills, 1990). It is argued that by devolving power, authority, services 
and resources to the lower levels of government and involving local communities in planning, a 
sense of local ownership and participation is established thus leading to more sustainable health 
systems (World-Bank, 1993). However, devolution is not an all-or-nothing proposal central 
authorities might retain some of the responsibilities(Wunch, 2001), for example, purchasing 
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drugs, commodities including contraceptives, to negotiate for better prices, while local 
authorities retain functions for the management of personnel and service delivery.  
 
The basic argument for health sector decentralisation is that local governments are better placed 
to respond to local needs (Beall, 2005). The logic is that by making the delivery of health 
services part of local administrators‘ responsibilities, they are allowed greater flexibility, 
efficiency, and accountability in resource use. Local control also enhances the potential for 
community involvement and accountability. When preferences for public goods differ across 
localities, decentralisation can allow benefit gains to be realised by providing local decision 
makers with the autonomy to alter the supply of public goods to better meet specific preferences 
(Ensor and Ronoh, 2005). These preferences are also more likely to be revealed by planners who 
are closer, and presumably, more accountable to constituents than centralised planners (Akin et 
al., 2004). Local control may also help cultivate community participation and improve 
accountability in health care delivery. In addition, since public health needs differ across 
communities, decentralisation can allow for better matching of the resources with the local 
situations. This way, local choices are more likely to be realised (Hutchinson and LaFond, 2004, 
Ensor and Ronoh, 2005).  
 
An important question, though, is; what evidence exists that this is the reality? It is one thing to 
theorise decentralisation might present opportunities to improve community participation, 
accountability, and ultimately health outcomes. But does this fact materialise? The current study 
aims to provide the empirical evidence towards answering this question by examining what is 
happening on the ground.  
 
1.2 The link between decentralisation and reproductive health 
Prior to the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in 1994, many 
countries had focused on population policies and programs for reduction of fertility. Health 
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reforms were challenged by the narrow focus on family planning services (Dixon-Mueller, 
1993). This approach failed to recognise interpersonal dynamics between service providers and 
clients, and between decentralisation managers and service providers (Hardee and Yount, 1995). 
The ICPD-Program of Action (POA) adopted marks a shift towards recognising women‘s health 
rights, including the rights to control over their bodies, to privacy with an emphasis on privacy to 
access right information and choices (Aitken, 1999). Countries were called on to shift their focus 
from activities that effect population growth to more people-centred reproductive health rights 
and health needs. Governments pledged universal access to comprehensive reproductive health 
care including family planning information and services for women, men and adolescents by 
year 2015. It was suggested that RHS should be provided within the framework of Primary 
Health Care (PHC) (Lubben et al., 2002, Aitken, 1998).  
 
Theoretically, the ICPD agenda and decentralisation have a lot in common (Nanda, 2000). Both 
are reform initiatives and conceptually share concerns regarding user participation, equity and 
PHC development (Langer et al., 2000). The ICPD recommends that governments promote 
community participation in the delivery of reproductive health services (RHS) by employing 
strategies such as decentralisation (Hardee and Smith, 2000). It is argued that the ICPD agenda 
cannot be effectively implemented without the existence of well-functioning services at all levels 
(Krasovec and Shaw, 2000). The risk is that, while decentralisation efforts focus on prevailing 
issues like re-organisation of services or financing, specific technical efforts for reproductive 
health can be neglected. Some of the successful vertical programs such as family planning could 
be compromised (Lubben et al., 2002). 
 
The ICPD-POA calls for a multi-sectoral approach demands for the substantial human and 
financial resources. This has been a challenge as many of African health systems as most of the 
health sectors are extremely underfunded (Merrick, 1999). In addition to their obligations to the 
ICPD, most of the countries are simultaneously implementing health reforms that need 
investments in physical infrastructure and human resources. In addition, many of these countries 
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are facing the additional burden of the impact of the HIV/AIDS (Campbell White et al., 2006, 
Greene and Merrick, 2005). 
 
Following the ICPD, most of the countries readjusted their population policies and family 
planning programs to reflect the ICPD objectives (Ravindran and Helen, 2005). However, most 
of this is merely rhetoric as neither governments nor international organisations have shown 
commitment to reproductive health which means that progress towards universal access to 
reproductive health has been slower than expected (Lozano et al., 2011). This is part due, to 
insufficient resources allocated for reproductive health interventions. Although, since the 2000s, 
overall funding for health care has increased in most countries, there are still imbalances in 
external donor expenditures across health sector programs. Funding and attention to RH has been 
reduced due to shift of donor‘s priorities towards disease treatment such HIV/AIDS, Malaria and 
Tuberculosis (Avelino et al., 2013). This shift has affected reproductive health services provided 
by both public and private sector institutions (Ravindran, 2005). For instance between 2002 and 
2006, 53% of all health aid provided directly to developing countries was dedicated to the 
control and treatment of the HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis. The remaining assistance, 
about $2.25 per capita per year, is spent on all other health services, including family planning 
and maternal and child health (Avelino et al., 2013). 
 
One of the shortcomings of healthcare systems is that many of them are unable to meet health 
needs of the entire population in particular those related to sexual and reproductive health. The 
primary concern in many public health systems is the existence of disparities in access to, and 
utilisation of health services and information, as well as imbalances in the available services and 
lack of responsiveness to women‘s expectations (Merrick, 2005). Reproductive health related 
problems have continued to be a major public health problem in many of the developing 
countries, accounting for 40% of the total global disease burden. Pregnancies and the 
consequences of childbirth remain the leading causes of death and disability among women 
(Lozano et al., 2012). Many women lack the means to prevent unwanted pregnancies, as well as 
the ability to prevent, and/or address the complications related to pregnancy. 
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Under decentralisation, local governments are playing a key role in setting health priorities and 
allocating health resources. This is likely to have had an impact on the delivery of the 
reproductive health care services. The design and implementation of both reproductive health 
and decentralisation reforms are likely to present both barriers and opportunities, or the one or 
the other, because of the way services were delivered prior to reform and after the reform 
(Campbell White et al., 2006). Though this subject has been debated in various studies including 
(Krasovec and Shaw, 2000, Birungi et al., 2006, Ramanathan et al., 2004, Mishtal, 2010, Berer, 
2003), there is still little information on the relative progress of the countries that are 
implementing these two agendas, especially in light of potential synergies and conflicts between 
them. It has been noted that little is known about how decentralisation and health sector reforms 
are impacting on health service delivery (Berer, 2002).  
 
The theoretical benefits of decentralisation are well established. However, large gaps exist with 
regard to the empirical evidence about the impact of decentralisation, in particular concerning its 
effects on reproductive health outcomes (WHO, 2004). The question of whether decentralisation 
can deliver the ICPD goals without adverse effects on reproductive health services is a major 
concern (Kaufman, 2000, Kaufman, 2002, Standing, 2002). However, there is little evidence 
concerning the effect of decentralisation on reproductive health. The relative lack of literature on 
this subject is due to the lack of specific tools for analysis, poor documentation of the reform 
initiatives and absence of mechanisms to monitor the impacts on health outcomes (Standing, 
2002). Thus, analyses of the interactions between the decentralisation and ICPD initiatives are 
needed to improve the documentation and monitoring processes and outcomes. It is clear that 
very little progress has been made with respect to fulfilling the ICPD goals, in particular in 
Africa. In relation to Tanzania specifically, the key question is; how have decentralisations 
obstructed or facilitated the realisation of the ICPD goals ratified by Tanzanian government? 
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1.3 Tanzania’s health sector decentralisation 
Tanzania had taken a series of policy measures with the objective of improving service delivery. 
Decentralisation means the transfer of power for decision making, functional responsibilities and 
resources from central authorities to the local government authorities (LGAs) Decentralisation is 
pursued due to its potential benefits to enhance good governance, promote socio-economic 
development and reduction of poverty (URT, 1998c). The form of decentralisation adopted by 
the Tanzanian Government is ―decentralisation by devolution‖ (D by D) (URT, 1998:13). 
 
The Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MoHSW) is one of the earliest sectors that took 
initiatives to implement decentralisation. The MoHSW started to devolve many of the non-core 
health functions to the LGAs in 1997, before the launching of the Local Government Reform 
(LGRP) in 2000 which granted district councils the power and authority to manage local health 
facilities and allocate local funds for council health staff salaries, and purchase of supplies and 
equipment. The MoHSW headquarters is responsible for making and monitoring health policies. 
However, the thrust of the government in every change made since independence has been 
equity in the provision of health services. 
 
The National Health Policy (1990; revised 2003) highlighted the need for decentralisation in the 
health sector. The devolved power is aimed at improving transparency, accountability and 
legitimacy of the local health service through increased user participation in decision making. To 
support greater community participation, the MoHSW created governance structures both at 
council and community levels. Council Health Services Boards (CHSBs) were established at 
council level while Health Facility Committees (HFCs) were set up at lower levels. Council 
hospitals provide health services under supervision of CHSBs while health centres and 
dispensaries are supervised and managed by HFCs. Both were established as democratic organs 
with legal status to oversee the provision of health services (URT, 2001b). It was expected that 
committees and boards would lead to an increase in user representation and accountability. The 
thesis investigates whether decentralisation is creating institutional arrangements that transfer 
power and resources to downwardly accountable local actors who can deliver local services 
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efficiently. It will also pinpoint the extent to which local decision-making and resources are 
likely to respond to local health needs. 
1.4 Rationale and contribution of the research 
The rationale for this study emanates from the researcher‘s interest to examine whether, and 
how, the current decentralisation process has been implemented and its effect on public health 
service delivery. The provision of quality health care has continued to be one of the health 
system challenges in developing countries. A critical question is; what type of reforms should 
developing countries undertake in order to improve health service delivery and thereby boost the 
health status of the population? Decentralisation of authority to local government is one of the 
reforms within wider pubic reforms aimed at improving service delivery. Despite the fact that 
most countries pursue decentralisation with goals other than political and technical gains and 
improvement of service delivery, this has been one of the justifications for decentralisation 
provided by experts. 
 
The implementation of decentralisation in Tanzania is slow and thus unable to bring about the 
expected outcomes, despite the political will of the government expressed in policy documents. 
After various attempts in the past by the government to reform the health system, overall 
reproductive health indicators remain low, although there are some little improvements. One of 
the reasons for this failure is inadequate implementation of pro-poor policies. This begs the 
question; where does the problem lie? Is it at policy or implementation level? Or, is it a content 
problem? Understanding the policy process is as important as evaluating the content of the 
policies when judging the outcomes (Gilson et al., 1994). The current study analyses various 
subjects related to policy process, linking decentralisation policy formulation to its 
implementation at both national and local levels. Thus, the study has a practical purpose to 
inform the implementation status of health decentralisation policy in Tanzania.  
 
The study is also relevant from an academic perspective and it will contribute to the three key 
issues in the literature. The first relates to theoretical and empirical debate about decentralisation. 
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Even though there is general consensus that health sector decentralisation should be carried out 
by devolving political, administrative and financial aspects, there is limited evidence about 
where it has worked. Secondly, it will contribute to the literature that links decentralisation and 
its impacts on service delivery. Despite a great body of literature on the impact of 
decentralisation on government growth and macro-economic stability, only a few studies have 
evaluated the effects of decentralisation on health service delivery, let alone reproductive health.  
Thirdly, the existing studies on decentralisation have analysed the impact of decentralisation on 
public service with regard to one dimension only (fiscal or political or administrative), rather 
than all three concurrently. While this approach has the advantage of presenting a more focused 
and detailed view, it tends to fall short in evaluating the effect of the decentralisation process as 
whole on a particular service. Analysing the interaction of all three dimensions of 
decentralisation in the same study may be able to produce stronger evidence about the 
relationship between decentralisation and access to health services and hence provide a stronger 
basis for providing policy advice in the future. 
1.5 Research objectives 
The general objective of this study was to understand the impact of decentralisation on health 
services delivery, in particular on reproductive health. 
1.5.1 Specific objectives of the study were to: 
(i) understand the implementation process of health sector decentralisation; 
(ii) analyse actors‘ knowledge of decentralisation and how it impacts on implementation; and 
(iii) assess the impact of three dimensions of decentralisation on access to and utilisation of 
reproductive health services. 
1.5.2 Research questions 
Specifically, the study sought to answer the following questions: 
(i) What approaches and actions were taken to implement health sector decentralisation? 
(ii) How does the actors‘ knowledge of decentralisation affect its implementation? 
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(iii) How do the three dimensions of decentralisation affect health services delivery especially 
reproductive health service? 
 
1.5.3 Sub-question 
(i) How did national and local actors view the effect of decentralisation on reproductive 
health services delivery? 
(i) To what extent do decentralisation principles inform the design and implementation of 
reproductive health policies? 
(iii) What do council indicators on reproductive health services explain about the relationship 
between decentralisation and services delivery? 
 
Both questions and sub-questions guided the research process. These questions were used in the 
development of the various research tools, including guides for the in-depth interviews and focus 
group discussions as well to formulate themes for analysing documents. Lastly, the questions 
assisted in the process of analysing data and writing the thesis. 
 
1.6 Preliminary arguments 
This thesis is built on several assumptions. Firstly, that decentralisation is not an end in itself and 
not a panacea for health system problems, but a work in progress in reaching better health 
outcomes including improved reproductive health services and accountability for better quality 
of health of Tanzanians. This implies that decentralisation can be an important way of catalysing 
meaningful change process aimed at improving health outcomes including those of the 
reproductive health.  
 
Secondly, improved health service delivery is based on a triangulation of the policy process, 
institutions and finances. However, institutional actors take a significant role in filling the policy 
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and financial gaps in attending health service delivery through local government authorities.  The 
reasons why institutional actors are important are; (i) local actors such as councils play key role 
in service delivery; (ii) local institutions‘ demands for accountability from the different actors, 
when tapped, can deliver positive outcomes. 
 
Based on these assumptions, I argued that the causes of the prevailing problems of the health 
sector, with respect to improved health outcomes for which the decentralisation policy is 
designed, lie in the nature of the policy and its design. I argue that there is a democratic deficit in 
the policy process and health sector in particular. Therefore, decentralisation has been more 
readily captured by the elites and it expands their ideas and interests through public policies. This 
means that the alliance of health bureaucrats and professionals, donors, political and NGO 
professionals influences policy goals and strategies by manipulating the democratic deficit of the 
government. As a result, when a policy is implemented, it replicates these interests, ideas and 
unequal power relations which lead to continued marginalisation of the intended beneficiaries.  
 
These arguments are developed based on three grounds namely, policy process, policy actors and 
policy context. In other words, the impact of the decentralisation reform, or more precisely, the 
benefits of decentralisation, depend on the nature of the processes through which policies are 
formulated and implemented, the nature of the key actors who make and implement the 
decisions, and the socio-political context in which policies are formulated and implemented. 
 
1.7. Definition of key concepts 
In developing the study, the following key concepts were defined as follows to guide the study 
process:  
Devolution: In this study democratic decentralisation/devolution refers to an act in which the 
central levels of government transfer some authority and resources to the elected local councils 
or local governments that are then downwardly accountable to the citizens within their 
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jurisdiction or geographical locations. The local residents elect their own leaders named 
councillors, through regular elections and these representatives exercise the oversight role of the 
council bureaucrats. 
Actor: denotes a person, a group of people or organisation that performs any kind of action in 
relation to the public policies. In the health care system, three sets of actors have been identified 
namely; state actors, service providers and service users (WHO, 2000). In this thesis, the WHO 
categories of actors are used to study the decentralisation process in rural Tanzania.  
Context: refers to variables in the social, political, economic, national and local setting which 
have a significant impact on decentralisation and reproductive health service delivery. 
Capacity: refers to the skills of the actors in the formulation, adoption and implementation of the 
decentralisation policy. 
Participation: refers to meaningful involvement and contribution of the policy makers, service 
providers, and service users to translate decentralisation policy objectives into practices. 
Accountability: refers to the ability of citizens to sanction leaders and service providers in case 
of abuse. This includes the responsibility of the elected or appointed leaders to act in the interest 
of the local populations rather than other groups such as central bureaucrats.  
Policy process: refers to the process by which the decentralisation policy was designed, the 
nature of stakeholder involvement and the way content was formulated. It also involves the 
translation of the decentralisation policies and plans into reality in producing the desired 
outcomes envisioned in the policy implementation. 
 
1.8 Structure of the thesis 
This study is presented in eight chapters. Chapter 1 provides a general introduction to the study 
and presents a brief introduction to the research problem. The discussion then moves to locate 
the research problem in the global situation and links it to the Tanzanian context. A key 
argument supporting decentralisation reform is that it can improve public service delivery by 
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matching resources with local needs. Lastly, the chapter discusses the aims and objectives of the 
study and ends with an introduction of the key concepts that are relevant to the research problem. 
 
Chapter 2 discusses the relevant literature of health system decentralisation. Specifically, the 
chapter lays down the basis for the analytical framework to examine decentralisation and its 
impact on health service delivery in the subsequent chapter. It begins with a discussion of the 
policy processes in relation to decentralisation. Thereafter relevant literature on fiscal, 
administrative and political decentralisation is presented, as well as its impact on health service 
delivery, with a focus on reproductive health. Finally, a conceptual framework for examining the 
relationship between decentralisation and its impact is presented. The study adapted a service 
delivery framework from the World Bank that incorporates accountability in the analysis of 
changes in health care-delivery resulting from decentralisation. 
 
Chapter 3 presents the contextual factors that affect the health system in Tanzania. In doing so, 
a historical background is provided of the health system reforms and how decentralisation fits 
into the current reform to provide a clear link between the past and current reforms. The chapter 
also discusses the setting of the health services delivery system: its structure, the function of the 
line ministries, the national health budget, human resources and the role of heath governance in 
the provision of health services. The chapter then summarises the selected reproductive health 
indictors to understand the current status. Then, the relationship between decentralisation and its 
impact on reproductive health delivery is presented.  
Chapter 4 presents the research methodology that was employed to generate answers to the 
research questions of the study. The chapter explains the study site, research design, methods and 
procedures for data collection and analysis. Ethical clearance to carry out this study was obtained 
from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS). In Tanzania the ethical clearance was 
granted by the National Institute for Medical Research (NIMRI). The clearance letters are 
attached as appendices. The trustworthiness of the data collected through the qualitative case 
study research design is presented. 
13 
 
Chapter 5 presents the status of the implementation of health decentralisation in Tanzania. It 
examine the ways in which knowledge of various policy actors from national and local policy 
makers, council managers, service providers and users of the objectives of decentralisation affect 
its implementation. The chapter is organised into three main sections; a brief overview of public 
policy-making process in Tanzania is provided at the beginning in order to enable the reader to 
link the policy objectives to the practice in the subsequent chapters. The second section presents 
views of national and local actors in the objectives of decentralisation policy. And the third 
section presents discussion of the findings and the conclusion.  
Chapter 6 presents an analysis of fiscal, administrative and political decentralisation and its 
effect on health services. The study found that, decentralisation has been happened. Council 
health managers had some discretionary powers for planning and budgeting, but financial control 
remains centralised. Because of inadequate funds allocated to the health sector, reproductive 
health interventions suffered, as they have to compete with other interventions. With regard to 
administrative decentralisation, councils have limited power over council health personnel. 
Furthermore, a lack of skilled healthcare personnel has been one of the barriers to communities 
to access services. Political decentralisation found that health services have been implemented 
through non-participatory processes, as health committees and elected councillors had limited 
power to influence health planning priorities. The findings presented criticise the planning 
process from a technical perspective. It was evident that the absence of adequate information on 
many sexual and reproductive health problems resulted in an underestimation of the disease 
burden caused by reproductive health conditions. The lack of data to establish the disease burden 
caused by reproductive health conditions has made RHS intervention invisible in health plans. 
These aspects marginalise benefits of decentralisation to improve health care delivery, as well as 
the ability to respond to local health needs.  
 
Chapter 7 focuses on the district case base analysis, illustration the important changes brought 
by the three dimensions of decentralisation. The chapter first presents a description of key 
reproductive health indicators of the studied council, followed by views of national and local 
stakeholders on the effect of the fiscal, administrative and political decentralisation on health 
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care delivery including those RHS. Then, analysis of the impact of decentralisation is presented, 
followed by discussion and conclusion.  
 
Chapter 8 is the conclusion to the study which provides a summary of the previous chapters and 
elaborates on all the key points that has emerged from the study. This chapter focuses on two 
main areas: firstly it offers a critical examination of the three dimensions of decentralisation in 
Tanzania. Secondly it examines the impact of decentralisation on reproductive health by giving 
some reflections on prospects of decentralisation. And also briefly examines challenges for the 
implementation of the health sector decentralisation  
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Abbreviation for chapter 2 
CG  Central government  
GDP  Gross domestic product 
HIV/AIDS Human Immunodeficiency Virus/ Acquired Immune-deficiency Syndrome 
HSR   Health system reforms 
ICPD-POA  International Conference on Population and Development -Program of Action  
ICPD   International Conference on Population and Development  
LGAs  Local government authorities  
MoH  Ministry of Health  
MoHSW Ministry of Health and Social Welfare  
NBS   National Bureau of Statistics  
NGOs   Non-government organisations  
PHC  Primary Health Care  
PMO-RALG Prime Minister‘s Office for Regional and Local Government  
POA  Program of action  
PRS  Poverty reduction strategies 
RH  Reproductive health  
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund 
UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund 
URT   United Republic of Tanzania  
WB   World Bank  
WHO  World Health Organisation 
ZNFPC  Zimbabwe's National Family Planning Council  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
Literature on decentralisation and its effect on socio-economic variables are enormous. This 
chapter looks at the existing literature about the relationship between decentralisation and service 
delivery, with a focus on reproductive health care. More precisely, the chapter lays the 
foundation for the analytical framework to examine the above relationship in the subsequent 
chapters. The chapter starts with a discussion about theoretical frameworks for analysing public 
policy processes. Then it discusses general literature on decentralisation and services delivery, 
followed by specific literature on fiscal, political and administrative decentralisation and their 
effects on access and utilisation of reproductive health services. 
 
The literature reviewed has noted that, decentralisation brought challenges and opportunities for 
health services delivery. However the outcomes depend on the policy design and political 
incentives for the central elites and their relations with local actors. In developing countries, 
decentralisation has been driven by political motivations rather than its theoretical benefits. It 
was found that decentralisation has been used to reinforce a coalition of central bureaucrats with 
local elites to strengthen power, instead of executing pro-poor polices. Moreover, institutional 
weaknesses and fiscal restrictions have limited the success of decentralisation. Limited evidence 
shows that decentralisation has expanded resources for health service delivery, in particular 
reproductive health services. Thus, the argument drawn from this chapter is that accountability is 
undermined by decentralisation processes; hence its impact on health service delivery is 
compromised.  
 
This chapter is divided into three main sections based on the following aspects. The first section 
analyses public policy processes in relation to formulation and implementation. The section 
discusses concepts and forms of decentralisation and how it is related to the service delivery in 
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particular health services. The third section presents frameworks available in the literature for 
analysing decentralisation reforms and a conceptual framework that guides this study.  
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2.2 The Policy process 
The policy process refers to the ways in which policies are originated, formulated, negotiated, 
communicated, implemented and evaluated in different socio-economic environments(Buse et 
al., 2005). It involves interactions of actors who are influenced by the political, economic and 
historical contexts in which policies are formulated and implemented (Walt, 1996, Sutton, 1990). 
In the literature there is no single definition of policy; authors have given various explanations 
which will be discussed below. However, policy passes through four different stages (Sabatier, 
1999). 
 
A traditional mode looks at policy as linear with a causal-effect relationship(Sabatier, 1990). 
Kingdon (1984:22) defines policy as a ‗set of interrelated decisions taken by political actors or 
groups of actors concerning social goals and the means of achieving them. On the other hand 
Hammer & Berman (1995) define policy from the perspective of its content while Baker (1996) 
and Walt &Gilson (1994) define policy as the interplay between institutions, interests and ideas 
involving a number of decisions made through consensus. Last but not least, Dye (2004:18) 
argues that public policy is whatever government chooses ‗to do or not to do‘. It is a ‗purposive 
course of action followed by an actor in dealing with a problem or matter of concern‘ (Anderson, 
2006:8).  
 
The policy process involves a series of activities or processes that occur within the political 
system hence it requires participation, coordination and negotiation among actors (Hammer and 
Berman, 1995, Kingdon, 1984). A policy can be found in the form of declaration of goals, made 
through authoritative decisions or budget speeches to deal with a given problem (Baker, 1996, 
Gilson and Walt, 1994, Sapru, 2004).The consequence of the policy process is that policy 
making happens in identifiable stages that can be examined separately (Anderson, 2006). There 
are five mentioned stages of public policy processes: policy agenda, policy formulation, policy 
adoption, policy implementation and policy evaluation (Anderson, 2006, Walt, 1996). These are 
illustrated in the table 2-1. 
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 2-1: Five stages of the policy process  
Policy  
agenda 
Policy  
Formulation 
Policy adoption  Policy  
implementation  
Policy  
evaluation  
Problem that 
receives public 
officials’ 
attention 
Development of 
acceptable action 
for the public issues  
Development 
of policy 
proposal  
Translation of policy 
into practice by 
government  
Efforts by government 
to determine policy 
effectiveness  
Source: Anderson, 2006 
 
Dye (2004) suggested six stages of the policy process :(i) problem identification (ii) agenda 
setting (iii) formulation, (iv) policy legislation (v) policy implementation and (vi) evaluation. In 
understanding policy outcomes literature, policy contents, political and technical factors are 
important (Agyepong and Adjei, 2008, Grindle and Thomas, 1991, Gilson et al., 1994). 
Arguably, on analysing the changes of a given policy, three approaches have been suggested to 
understand the dimensions of policy change. These include the policy cycle approach, the 
organisational approach and the policy change and learning model (Sapru, 2004). One of the 
mentioned reasons for policy change could be changes that have occurred in previous policies. 
Usually, new policy comes from existing policies or emerges from on-going programs.  
Therefore, a policy change occurs in the context of policy succession and in a domain between 
innovation and maintenance and policy termination (Hogwood and Peters, 1983). It is important 
to understand policy analysis from the perspectives of what policies are, why government 
pursues such policies and what their outcomes are (Ramji, 2009). Policy analysis is usually about 
‗who gets what‘ in policies and more importantly, ‗why‘ and ‗what‘ difference does it makes 
(Dye, 2004). 
 
The literature identified a number of typologies in reference to public policy which can be either 
procedural or substantive Anderson (2006); Dye (2004). Likewise, literature offers a number of 
analytical approaches to study public policy process Anderson (2006); Dye (2004); Sapru, 2004). 
In public administration, Dye (2004) has proposed eight different analytical models to study 
policy: the institutional model, the process model, the rationale model, the incremental model, 
the group theory, the elite model, the public choice model and game theory(Dye, 2004). Both 
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operational research and system analysis could view it as synonymous for policy analysis. Under 
these settings policy analysis includes: identification of objectives, specification of alternatives, 
recommendations on policy actions, monitoring of policy outcomes and the evaluation of policy 
performance (Sapru, 2004). However, the commonly used analytical framework to explain 
policy process is through its five stages: agenda setting, policy formulation, adoption, 
implementation and evaluation (Anderson, 2006, Walt, 1996). 
 
2.2.1 Agenda setting 
Agenda setting explains how a problem becomes an agenda, well-articulated by several factors 
(Walt and Gilson, 1994, Kingdon, 2003, Sapru, 2004, Buse et al., 2005). When an issue and/or 
problem have received high feasibility, high legitimacy and high support it can become a policy 
agenda (Kingdon, 2003). Agenda setting is influenced by three independent streams of activities: 
(i) problem stream, (ii) policy stream and (iii) political stream. Each stream has its own process 
and a ‗policy window‘ that allows some issue and problem to receive government 
attention(Kingdon, 2003).Then the agenda turns into an issue for debate and enters into the 
second phase of the policy process that is policy formulation.  
 
2.2.2 Policy formulation 
Public policies are formulated to address a certain problem (Walt, 1996). Policy formulation 
involves identification of various characteristics and dimensions of the societal problem that 
stimulate government actions (Anderson, 2006). The process seeks relevant and acceptable 
action in dealing with problems that are on the public agenda. Policy formulation is more of a 
political process which is guided by special groups of policy formulators (parliamentarians, 
government agencies, legislators or interest groups) which Dye (2004) refers to as policy ‗think 
tanks‘  
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Actors who are involved in drafting the policy paperwork can facilitate other processes like the 
adoption of policy. There is a possibility that an issue will never leave agenda setting due to the 
influence of some of the actors that want to maintain the status quo (Ramji, 2009). Thus, 
lobbying coalition building is important during selection of policy proposals (Kingdon, 1995) 
and policy networks become an important element in describing the relationship of participants 
(Marsh, 1998). Functional activities are then blended into policy adoption whereby a policy plan, 
legitimacy and budget allocation are developed to create a program to address a given problem 
(Burgess, 2004). 
 
Policy formulation is technical processes, which involve a number of activities, such as deciding 
on what to do about the problem and drafting administrative and legal measures, to facilitate 
policy adoption and implementation according to the agreed values. Anderson (2006) proposes 
several questions which policy makers should be able to answer: Is the proposal technically 
sound? Is it directed at the causes of the problem? To what extent will it resolve or lessen the 
problem? Are its budgetary costs reasonable? Is the proposal politically acceptable? Can it win 
the needed support of legislature or other public officials? If the proposal becomes law, will it be 
acceptable to the public? 
2.2.3 Policy adoption 
Policy adoption is also called the decision-making process. It gives the direction and content to 
policy action undertaken by public officials. A policy decision involves actions made by specific 
officials who can accept or reject suggested policy alternatives (Dye, 2004). For this reason, the 
unbiased and practical decisions of policy makers are important when the draft of policy is 
presented for comments before final approval. The process involves identification of problems, 
seeking possible alternatives and making selection of an alternative action (Dye, 2004). 
Comments from relevant experts and people involved during the development of policy are 
important in securing appropriate legal and other guidance including compliance with existing 
government laws. Thus policy proposals can be approved or disapproved, or referred for further 
discussion and future actions (Sapru, 2004). 
22 
 
2.2.4 Policy implementation 
After adoption, implementation forms another important stage that involves putting policies into 
practice. It involves planned activities and strategies that should be clearly defined (Dye, 2004). 
Walt and Gilson (1994) regard implementation as a management and administrative affair in 
which the status measured by the extent to which policy action have achieved the stated 
objectives (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993, Sabatier, 1986). The implementation process 
therefore, determines the success and/or failure of the policy. However, evidence shows that 
policy outcomes are comparatively different from policy intention (Grindle and Thomas, 1991).  
 
In developing countries, policy implementation is characterised by numerous weaknesses and 
failures (Falcone, 1980). For instance policy elites usually initiate a policy agenda and formulate 
health policies without recognising important problems (WHO, 1998b, Green et al., 2001). As a 
result many health problems do not enter into the policy agenda (Lee et al., 1998). In some 
countries, policymakers might deny the existence of serious health problems or the multiple 
factors determining them (Hogwood& Gunn, 1984). 
 
Implementation issues and challenge 
Policy implementation passes through a number of barriers, usually resulting from lack of pre-
conditions which might enable effective implementation (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). Sabatier 
(1991) suggests five pre-conditions for the successful policy implementation: clear policy 
directives, sound managerial and technical skills, active support by officials, policy not affected 
by new policies set by government and the socio-economic conditions of the citizens (Sabatier, 
1991). It is also suggested that for public policy to be real, two conditions must be met. Firstly, 
policy should be able to cause the effect but secondly it should be carried out as intended (Ramji, 
2009). The first deals with the policy design, while the latter focuses on policy implementation. 
Normally policies are developed within the highest bureaucratic institutional levels with a 
number of the coordination points. Thus, the way in which policy is implemented in each 
responsible institution is important for its achievements.  
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Policy implementation passes through a number of processes, and organised by various 
institutions. Therefore, how policy is implemented in each responsible institution is important in 
the realisation of its objectives. Since policies are usually carried out through a ladder of 
bureaucratic agencies and coordination points they are likely to be exposed to implementation 
failures (Ratanawijitrasin et al., 2001). The common identified policy implementation failures in 
Africa include inconsistent policy objectives, weak institutional capacity, poor economic 
conditions, poor sector development and the poor information sharing among the layers of 
government (Leighton, 1996, Ayuk and Maroua, 2007).  
 
It is suggested that policy performance evaluation should examine the results of the policy 
content and implementation. When policy fails to achieve its goals, the failure could result from 
either poor design or the way in which policy was implemented (WHO, 1998a, Ramji, 2009). 
Failure to detect which of the two factors led to poor policy performance makes it difficult to 
judge whether a particular policy is ineffective or not. Analysing how policy was designed and 
implemented generates evidence that is important in determining outcomes (Ratanawijitrasin et 
al., 2001). Although performance is vital, yet, in itself, it is not sufficient to understand if policy 
achieve what were intended to accomplish (Shiffman and Wu, 2003).  
 
In developing countries like Tanzania, the relationship and interaction between policy makers 
and executives influence the implementation process considerably and might change policy goals 
and outcomes (Juma and Clark, 1995, Mukandala, 1992, Ayuk and Maroua, 2007). Thus, for the 
successful implementation of policy; context plays a key role in shaping policy outcomes 
(Collins et al., 2003, Reich, 1995, Reichenbach, 2002, Frenk, 1995, Saltman, 1997). Contextual 
factors that influence the implementation of health decentralisation policy include: (i) political 
and bureaucratic commitments, (ii) Capacity,(iii) existence of effective channels of community 
participation and accountability, and (iv) local control over resources to facilitate appropriate use 
of resources to match with local health needs (Saltman and Bankauskaite, 2006). 
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Policy implementation is not straight forward; there are challenges that affect successful 
implementation of policies. For the case of the health decentralisation some of the challenges it 
include such as:(i) mismatch between authority and responsibilities (ii) tensions and conflicts 
among the objectives (iii) capacity gaps (iv) tensions between vertical and horizontal integration 
and (v) political and process dimensions (Brinkerhoff and Leighton, 2002). In Brazil Collins et 
al., (2000) has identified three major challenges to enable a successful decentralisation process  
namely  the policy making process, equity and the role of the state (Collins et al., 2000). In Nepal 
it was noted that lack of adequate legislation, poor human resource management, weak financial 
sources, lack of incentive system and lack of competencies at lower level undermine the 
implementation of health sector decentralisation (Collins et al., 2003). In Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Gilson and Travis (1997) have identified pre-conditions for effective implementation of the 
health decentralisation. These are summarised in table 2-2. However, these conditions are rarely 
met in most developing countries. 
 
Table 2-2: Factors facilitating health system decentralisation  
Factor  Comments  
Consensus building Highlights the importance of surveying the terrain and identifying 
factors in terms of the opponents and proponents of the reform. 
Regulatory framework Legislation and clear guidelines defining roles and responsibilities 
are useful. 
Policy champions Establishing implementation units to drive the HSR process enables 
focus and dedicated attention to implementation. 
Phasing and piloting A gradual and deliberately well-planned approach, with incremental 
scaling-up as capacity develops. 
Restructuring This is often an overlooked process, but it is important to restructure 
and re-define roles for the levels to avoid confusion about their 
respective new roles. 
Capacity building Must be appropriate to provide context to and equip officials at all 
levels with wide skills for their new roles. Lack of management 
capacity undermines implementation. 
Source: Gilson and Travis (1997). 
 
Mills et al., (1990), Green (2001), Bossert (1998) and Collins et al., (2003) are of the view that 
for the successful implementation of health decentralisation demands strong central-local 
relations and inter-sectoral coordination. However, in Uganda it was noted that no change was 
made in terms of inter-sectoral collaboration after health decentralisation. This was because 
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decentralisation has occurred beyond the health sector; therefore local authorities did not 
prioritised health services (Gilson and Travis, 1997). In Kenya decentralisation occurred across 
all sectors but resources were retained at the central government. This undermined the ability of 
local government authorities to implement health decentralisation(Ndavi et al., 2009).  
 
Whatever the form of decentralisation is adopted, the national level continues to play a key 
coordination role. Thus, the roles and responsibilities of each level should be clearly defined 
(Mills, 1994, Gilson and Travis, 1997). Kawonga (2003) suggests that the choices of local 
governments are frequently more influenced by local context, personal characteristics and lack of 
incentives than the content of the decentralisation policy. For example in Zambia it was noted 
that districts did not adequately implement the essential health packages because the cost of the 
package exceeded resources available at the district level(Kawonga, 2005). 
 
The argument stressed in this thesis is that the process by which health sector decentralisation 
policy was formulated and implemented is equally important in determining health outcomes. 
The study is more process oriented, seeking to analyse not only the effect, but also the process of 
how decentralisation of the health sector was carried out in order to generate  lessons out of the 
experiences to illustrate improved health outcomes in this case reproductive health. It attempts to 
ask questions such as: who decide for health sector decentralisation? Where did the idea come 
from and who were involved in designing? Were service users represented in different decision-
making levels? How did decentralisation impact on local accountability? 
 
2.3 Decentralisation and health system reforms 
Decentralisation has become a major component of health sector reform in many developing 
countries within the framework of overall decentralisation of the public sector. The key reason 
for decentralisation is to improve the implementation of government development programs and 
rectify inefficiencies of centralised public sector management(Rondinelli et al., 1983, Cheema et 
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al., 1983, Rondinelli, 1981, Conyers, 1981). The central argument is that it will allow greater 
local participation, which if there is a good collaboration and co-ordination between different 
levels government that are responsible for the health care delivery (JICA, 2008).  
 
A similar argument was put forward with regard to health sector decentralisation. It was noted 
that health services were highly centralised, inefficient and unresponsive to the needs of clients, 
were biased in terms of hospital care, and primarily benefited the better off group (Saltman, 
2008, Saltman and Bankauskaite, 2006, Mills et al., 2001). Basically, decentralisation was 
chosen as a way to address these systemic inefficiencies and improve responsiveness, (Menon, 
2006, Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006).  
 
The case of Tanzania, decentralisation is implemented with the similar vision; to enhance 
efficiency in fulfilling development programs and public services delivery that were under the 
control of central government. Central government ministries controlled decision-making and 
resource allocation (both financial and human), directing local government authorities through 
Regional Administrations. This did not bring the required outcomes and the LGAs were 
abolished in 1972, resulting in reduction and poor provision of social services. LGAs were re-
introduced in 1984 and the government adopted a Policy Paper on Local Government Reform in 
1998 which put in focus the policy of ―decentralisation by devolution‖ (D-by-D) The aim was to 
improve the quality of public service delivery, particularly to the poor by involving the people in 
decision making so as to promote good governance and reduce poverty. 
 
2.3.1 Conceptualisation of decentralisation 
While the definitions of decentralisation vary widely, the core meaning of decentralisation is the 
transfer of authorities and responsibilities or dispersal of power in public planning, management, 
decision-making and resources for public service delivery from the national government to sub-
national levels (Conyers, 1981, Rondinelli, 1981, Cheema et al., 1983). Decentralisation and 
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centralisation are viewed as movements between two poles. Both central and local inputs are 
indispensable in any public health system to achieve the balance and direction in which a 
particular country decides to move. As decentralisation deal with power relationships at different 
levels of government (Olowu and Wunsch, 2004). It is important to consider the political 
environment before execution of decentralisation to avoid ineffective implementation (Green and 
Collins, 1994). Rondinelli et al. (1983) and Mills et al. (1990) identified four main forms of 
decentralisation in health delivery system as presented in table 2-3. 
 
Table 2-3: Forms of decentralisation according to public administration typology  
Deconcentration  
 
Administrative responsibilities transferred to locally 
based office/s of the central Ministry of Health, within the health system 
Delegation  Management responsibility transferred to a semi-autonomous entity 
outside the central government, for example health board, to improve 
efficiency and cost-containment in public organisations  
Devolution  Political and administrative authority for health transferred to local 
authorities such as municipality or local council 
Privatisation  Contractual agreements established between the public and private sector; 
either profit or not-for-profit, for delivery of the health service, but 
government exercises regulatory function. The aim is to improve 
efficiency by encouraging user participation. 
Source: Mills et al., 1990. 
 
Although the above classification of decentralisation is used frequently, it has been subjected to 
some criticism.  In practice, more than one form of decentralisation co-exists within a health 
system of a country, such as devolution of service delivery to local authorities,  accompanied by 
delegation of functions to management boards and committees (Brinkerhoff, 2003, George, 
2003, Boon, 2008, Kessy et al., 2008). It has also been questioned whether de-concentration, 
delegation or privatisation should be included as forms of decentralisation as they are not true 
form of decentralisation (World-Bank, 2000a). De-concentration is seen more as an 
administrative intervention and does not shift any decision-making power to the local level 
(Saltman et al., 2007), while privatisation implies public sector give away the role of service 
provision to private providers rather than decentralising powers to the management level 
(Mayeh, Undated). Privatisation transfers responsibilities outside the government and private 
firms are involved, thus it is deceptive to be included as a form of decentralisation (Saltman et 
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al., 2007, Semali et al., 2005, Manor, 1999). Privatisation is not considered as a form of 
decentralisation in this study. 
 
In some cases, genuine decentralisation has occurred, as in Bolivia, where responsibilities and 
resources were devolved to elected municipal governments (World Bank., 2004). Therefore in 
analysing decentralisation it is important to be precise about which form of decentralisation is 
taking place and to ask what has been decentralised, how much and to what extent. Depending 
on the form of decentralisation that is implemented, it has the potential to increase power 
sharing, address the needs of local population, and decrease regional inequities (Wunch, 2001, 
Ribot and Agrawal, 1999). In this study, devolution is analysed as a form of decentralisation in 
which powers and authority for reproductive health delivery is transferred to local government 
authorities. Devolution is opted for because it is a policy guide for the local service delivery that 
has been implemented in the Tanzanian health system. The local government authorities have 
been given a legal mandate for the delivery of primary health care (Ngware, 2000).  
 
2.3.2 Decentralisation and service delivery: theory and evidence 
An argument commonly cited in the literature about decentralisation and its impact on service 
delivery propounds the theoretical benefit of decentralisation is that it brings decision makers 
and decision making processes closer to the people. The explanation given about the benefits of 
decentralisation is found in conjunction with Tiebout (1956) and Musgrave (1959) arguing local 
decision-makers have access to better access to information on local conditions than central 
authorities, hence they can plan and offer services according to local needs and preferences. In 
turn, this is expected to improve efficiency and quality of services provided to the population 
(Beall, 2005, Beall, 2009). 
 
Economists like Oates (1972) argue that decentralisation brings spill-over effect from public 
services through models which local authorities can adapt, while the central government 
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produces a common level of public goods for the entire population (Oates, 1972). Locally 
adapted policymaking and implementation encourage micro-accountability, and lead to greater 
efficiency of public management as a result of improved coordination and shorter decision-
making hierarchies, better mobilisation and use of the public resources (Collins et al., 2002). In 
addition, local authorities can provide public goods at a lower cost since decentralisation 
promotes accountability and reduces corruption (Baltaci and Yilmaz, 2006). Decentralisation is 
seen as a solution to the local problems by employing participatory ways while searching for the 
resolutions (Rondinelli and Nellis, 1986). 
 
Generally, decentralisation theorists and policy makers support decentralisation for the following 
reasons:: (i) improving allocative efficiency by better matching of public services to local 
preferences, and (ii) productive efficiency through increasing accountability of local people 
hence decreasing level of bureaucracy and better knowledge of local needs (Crook and 
Sverrisson, 2001a). The efficiency is achieved when services address the needs of the population 
appropriately (Robinson, 2007, George, 2003). It is argued that efficiency gains in service 
delivery have to be examined from the accountability perspective (Treisman, 2000). On the other 
hand, Rondinelli and Nellis (1986) argue that central authorities rarely have incentives to 
perceive citizens as their patrons. It is through political and administrative accountability that 
citizens hold government to account (Rondinelli and Nellis, 1986). Political accountability is 
when elected representatives account to their electorates, while administrative accountability is 
realised when managers and leaders achieve their targets (George, 2003). 
 
The arguments that decentralisation promotes efficiency assume that decentralisation occurs 
within an institutional environment that offers political, administrative and financial authority to 
local authorities along with effective mechanisms of local accountability and central oversight 
(World-Bank, 2001). It is appealed that decentralisation aids to remove institutional and 
administrative barriers, thus enhance successful services delivery (Rondinelli et al., 1983). 
Decentralisation also produces a system of governance that is more effective and accountable to 
local people (Blair, 2000, Manor, 1999, Rondinelli et al., 1989).The benefits of decentralisation 
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depend on dimensions and forms of decentralisation that are found in practice(Olowu, 2001a, 
Olowu, 2001b).For example, under de-concentration, it could be easy for the central authority to 
ensure that national priorities are realised. Under devolution or delegation it may be necessary 
for the national government to order local authorities to allocate a portion of their budget to a 
type of service. As a result of such an order, national priorities can compromise local priorities. 
This can result in the local authority providing minimal services that are not accessible to the 
population. In this case, a concern is to define the type of services than can best be organised and 
provided by central and/or local authorities (Robinson, 2007). 
 
2.3 3 Decentralisation as a vehicle of the improved health service delivery 
Apart from the fact that decentralisation of the health sector is not an intentional process (World-
Bank, 2000b). It is however driven by the theoretical benefits unveiled empirically through the 
improvement of  health services delivery (Saltman, 2008). In the health system, decentralisation 
is motivated both fort the technical and political reasons. For political reasons, decentralisation is 
seen as a means to democratise governments and ensure greater community participation and 
accountability in health care delivery. For technical reasons, decentralisation is promoted for its 
ability to improve management, efficiency, quality, and equity (Mills et al., 2001). Generally, 
decentralisation aims at improving all aspects of health system performance (Cassels, 1995, 
Cassels and Janovsky, 1996, Reich, 1995). 
 
Decentralisation in the health service is advocated as a means of offering opportunities for 
enhancing community participation and increasing accountability of health care delivery (Ahmad 
et al., 2005, Conyers, 2007). It is assumed that, by bringing the decision making process closer to 
users, decentralisation will increase public sector accountability and responsiveness (Mills, 1994, 
Khemani, 2004, George, 2003, Blair, 2000). Local participation can be effected, either directly 
where service users are involved, or through representation. User representation is taken as a 
mechanism to make decentralised institutions more effective through responsiveness and 
accountability (Ribot and Agrawal, 1999). Government is responsive through endorsing policies 
that respond to citizens‘ needs and is also accountable in such a way that citizens may sanction 
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government in case of abuse (George, 2003). Giving power to local institutions that are not 
accountable to service users cannot produce positive outcomes. Similarly, having local 
authorities without power and capacities cannot improve the delivery of public services (Ribot 
and Agrawal, 1999). 
 
Mills (1990) argued that, for each decentralisation advantage, there is also a disadvantage, as 
presented in Table 2-4. There is no blueprint for whether decentralisation or the centralised 
model is the appropriate structure for service delivery.  
Table 2-4: Advantage and disadvantages of decentralisation  
Rationale  Advantages  Disadvantage 
Efficacy Local leaders are better informed 
about local problems and can 
make better decisions 
Little empirical support and reason to believe that central 
authorities have better technical information on efficacy at 
lower level 
Quality  Greater accountability may lead 
local leaders to improve quality 
Consumers may not necessarily express quality concerns to 
local leaders 
Financial 
soundness  
Local leaders may be more aware 
of the trade-offs and fiscal 
constraints 
Local leaders may be subject to pressures to increase 
inefficiency and may pass deficits on to higher administrative 
levels 
Local 
choices & 
priorities  
In democratic localities, 
decentralisation can allow more 
local choice and priority setting 
A local elite may dominate local decision making and make 
choices that are not in the public interest 
Equity  Local leaders can better target 
resources to vulnerable groups  
On a national level, decentralisation may limit the ability to 
redistribute resources from richer localities to poorer 
localities 
Efficiency  Local leaders can better target 
resources to vulnerable groups 
Local leaders may be subject to pressures to increase 
inefficiency, including patronage among others  
Source: Mills (1990:15) 
 
The way in which the benefits of health care decentralisation can be realised, and the impact of 
different types of decentralisation, are not well articulated in the literature (Litvack and Seddon, 
1999). The health services provisions are highly distinguished at different levels (primary, 
secondary and tertiary), and are made up of various components of healthcare services, such as 
planning, promotion, training and supervision. This makes it difficult to understand the 
decentralisation effects on those services. DeMello (2004) analysis of the Latin American 
countries has argued that the decentralisation of health care is more complex than other sectors 
because the dis-economies of scale tend to discourage local authorities from providing costly 
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curative health services. He further argues that the spill-over effects tend to discourage the sub-
national provision of preventive health care (DeMello, 2004). 
 
Arguably health sector decentralisation has becoming appealing to donors, policy makers and 
researchers because of the numerous theoretical benefits which include: 
(i) A less unified health service that is better tailored to local preferences, 
(ii) Improved implementation of health programmes. That is, day-to-day oversight and 
evaluation, which are necessary for implementation, are more likely to succeed under 
local accountability, 
(iii)Reduced inequalities between urban and rural areas and between accessible and excluded 
regions. This is believed to occur due to the closeness and responsiveness of rural local 
authorities and providers to the needs of rural people, 
(iv) Lower cost due to better targeted programmes. This argument assumes that local service 
providers would tend to have better information about the local communities to better 
allocate resources to target the poorer income groups, and 
(v) Greater community involvement and higher chance of sustainability(Mills, 1994:24). 
 
Kim‘s (2008) evaluation study on decentralisation and its impact on public service delivery, 
acknowledged that decentralisation itself does not increase effectiveness in service provision. 
Effectiveness depends on the quality of human capital and the institutions that provide public 
services. It was found that successful decentralisation benefits from centralised governance that 
promote decentralisation at the centre can undermine the establishment of sound local 
government by depriving it of the central government funds and staff that are needed to support 
local reforms (Kim, 2008). For instance, LGAs may have some degree of fiscal decentralisation 
with regard to planning and budgeting for the health services, but if they do not have the 
autonomy to manage their human resources including the ability or hire and fire personnel they 
may be unable to tailor services to local preferences in an efficient manner  
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2.3.4 Evidence of the impact of fiscal, administrative and political decentralisation on 
health outcomes 
There is little empirical evidence that countries with more decentralised systems have achieved 
better health outcomes. A Limited number of studies have confirmed the proposed benefits of 
decentralisation for health service delivery. But health sector decentralisation and its impact on 
the management of service delivery has been hardly evaluated (DeMello, 2004). In the case of 
Africa there is very limited evidence about the impact of decentralisation on health service 
delivery let alone on reproductive health services delivery. The little available evidence is found 
to be limited in terms of quality, quantity and equity of service (Conyers, 2007). 
In Tanzania, a number of decentralisation studies have been carried out, but many of them focus 
on specific dimensions of decentralisation such as the fiscal aspects (Boex, 2003, Boex, 2008, 
Fjeldstad and Semboja, 2000, Fjeldstad et al., 2004, Fjeldstad, 2004), political devolution (Kessy 
and McCourt, 2010, Chaligha, 2008, Mollel, 2010) and local government discretion and 
accountability (Mubyazi et al., 2007, Boon, 2008, Maluka et al., 2010a, COWI, 2007, Venugopal 
and Yilmaz, 2010, Borghi et al., 2011, Mshana et al., 2007). A few researchers have examined 
the relationship between the process of decentralisation the process and its effect on health 
service delivery for example (JICA, 2008, Gilson et al., 1994, Hutchinson, 2002). Although these 
studies highlight the impact of decentralisation on health services delivery in general no one 
focused on reproductive health services delivery. In addition, no attention was paid to the 
interplay between the three dimensions of decentralisation and how it produces health outcomes.  
 
Fiscal decentralisation 
In rural China, Yee (2001) examined the relationship between several indicators of healthcare 
performance: the number of doctors per 10 000 people, mortality rates, hospital beds per 10 000 
people, and local healthcare expenditures and various measures of decentralisation using a data 
panel of 29 Chinese provinces for the period 1980 to 1993. Among the indicators used was fiscal 
decentralisation, which relied on the ratio of local government expenditure to central government 
expenditure, and the ratio of local government expenditure to total government expenditure. The 
regression analysis, based on either fixed effect or random effect estimations, showed that fiscal 
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decentralisation had been beneficial to health service delivery in terms of reducing mortality 
rates and increasing local expenditure on health care (Yee, 2001). 
 
However, this finding is misleading in terms of the variables used to measure health 
performance, as doctors per 10 000 people, hospital beds per 10 000 people and local healthcare 
expenditure are not variables measuring health outcomes, but variables for measuring health 
investment (Chen, 2004).He used the provincial panel datasets from 1995 to 2000 to estimate the 
effects of fiscal decentralisation on healthcare performance by measuring health indicator input, 
that is doctors per 1 000 people and hospital beds per 1 000 people. When health outcome 
indicators such as average death rate, incidence of infections and mortality from infection were 
used it was found that decentralisation is harmful to health status (Chen, 2004). The county-level 
study using panel data showed that fiscal decentralisation lowers the mortality rate(Uchimura 
and Jütting, 2007). Another study measured the impact of fiscal decentralisation on health status 
using provincial panel datasets from 31 provinces of China from 2002 to 2006 showed that fiscal 
decentralisation is detrimental to health status, but good for health equality(Yan, 2009). 
 
Robalino, Picazo and Voetberg (2001) developed a cross-country study focusing on the impact 
of fiscal decentralisation on infant mortality rates over the period 1970 to 1995, using panel data 
of low- and high-income countries. The analysis was based on how the local government 
spending on the central government transfers funds to child interventions. The study found that 
decentralisation was associated with lower infant mortality rates. Interestingly, the marginal 
benefit from decentralisation was found to be greater at low-income levels. However, they found 
that the share of the public expenditure managed by local authority correlated with their 
administrative capacity. Therefore, when local authorities have stronger administrative capacity, 
fiscal decentralisation is likely to improve health outcomes (Robalino et al., 2001). 
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The effectiveness of fiscal decentralisation depends on other factors, like local accountability. 
Evidence from Klemani‘s (2004) study of 30 local governments in Nigeria found that the design 
of the intergovernmental fiscal relations had an important effect on local accountability, and 
ultimately on health outcomes. It was found that the personnel of public health facilities were not 
paid, which led to poor quality of services due to high absenteeism and lower drug availability. 
Klemani (2004) further argues that the situation was not explained exclusively by the lack of 
financial resources available for local health services, but rather the lack of local accountability 
for those resources (Khemani, 2004). The key message in this study is that conditional transfers, 
which were the main source of local health spending, may damage local accountability, since the 
public do not hold local officials accountable for those resources.  
 
Administrative decentralisation 
Administrative decentralisation deals directly with the powers of local managers and officials 
who are responsible for delivering services. This includes issues such as personnel, service 
facilities, general management, and other discretionary administrative matters. Thus 
administrative decentralisation requires the least systemic change. The analysis of the 
administrative shift of power from central to local authorities is difficult, since a number of 
elements need to be taken into account (Saavedra, 2010). Bossert‘s (1998) is of the view that 
decision space model analyses a given range of power to the local government over various 
functions such as services organisation, civil services access, rules and governance. The 
difference about how local governments provide service is the autonomy given to manage its 
human resources for them to tailor services to respond to the local choices (Huff-Rousselle, 
2001). 
 
In most African countries, administrative performance is poor due to capacity limits. Bossert and 
Beauvais (2002) analyse effects of increased ‗decision space‘ in Ghana, Zambia, Uganda and 
Philippines. They found that decentralisation allows moderate choices over expenditure, fees, 
contracting and targeting. In many countries, local government authorities are given some 
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administrative authority but central government usually controls personnel salaries. In Colombia, 
Bossert et al (2000) found that increased administrative decentralisation increased health 
expenditure per capita and the utilisation of health services. 
 
Jacks‘s (2002) study in the Philippines found that increased administrative responsibility was not 
accompanied by adequate funding hence decentralisation led to deterioration of in the quality of 
service delivery. It is claimed that administrative decentralisation by itself may not be sufficient 
to generate the expected results. A study of Brazilian municipalities found that administrative 
decentralisation can lead to improved results when it is accompanied by good governance 
(Mobarak et al., 2006) 
 
Political decentralisation 
Political decentralisation, on the other hand, is known for its ability in improving health service 
delivery, since it brings local accountability. This takes place where citizens have the means to 
provide their input in local decision-making processes and the ability to hold decision makers 
accountable (Klemani, 2004). Any form of decentralisation introduces a new accountability 
relationship between central and local policy makers, while shifting existing relationships 
between citizens and politicians (Reich, 1995). Such accountability mechanisms are critical for 
improving local service delivery, as they affect the incentives facing service providers. It has 
been argued that the incentives for local authorities to improve service delivery are likely to 
improve if they can raise their own revenue through local taxes, rather than depending on central 
authority (Cabral, 2011). Central dependence undermines local government‘s accountability, and 
hence affects service provision. Therefore, for improved local accountability through the 
political process, local elections may be a useful tool for citizens to hold politicians to account. 
In Nigeria it was found that voters in local elections reward the politicians who bring local 
income growth and punish those who fail to do so (Khemani, 2001). In India it was found that an 
increase in the allocation of nurses in rural districts was associated with a higher turnout in local 
elections.  
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In African countries, Ndegwa (2002) found that political decentralisation is a widespread 
element of the decentralisation process, but not well renowned. Although many countries have 
elected local structures, the fairness and freedom of the electoral process are usually 
compromised. Likewise, participation beyond elections and downward accountability are low 
(Ndegwa, 2002). Ndegwa used indexes for measuring the degree of political, administrative and 
fiscal decentralisation in 30 African countries. His findings show that, although all countries 
have local governance structures, central authorities continue to dictate local affairs. He 
concludes by arguing that decentralisation in Africa has been widespread but not deep seated 
(Ndegwa, 2002) 
 
Generally, there are very few cases documenting a positive link between decentralisation and 
health service delivery in Africa. Mehrotra‘s (2006) cross-country study indicated that the 
decentralisation of primary health services to locally elected heath committees in Benin, Guinea 
and Mali, and to local government in Mozambique, increased access to affordable health 
services, which contributed to improvements in immunisation rates and infant mortality. The 
impact was associated with the nature of decentralisation process where power and resources 
were truly transferred to the LGAs (Mehrotra, 2006). Conyers‘s (2007) analyse experience of 
decentralisation in sub-Saharan Africa. The results show that decentralisation has brought 
unsatisfactory and slight progress in improvement of quality of services provided through LGAs 
to local citizens. In Uganda decentralisation involve all government sectors, council managers 
assumed that health services were already funded, hence they allocated funds to other priorities 
(Hutchinson et al., 2001).  
 
With respect to reproductive health, McIntyre and Klugman (2003) suggest that, under a given 
sufficient decision space, local health managers can be able to prioritise Sexual and Reproductive 
Health Services (SRH). Sri Lanka presents a successful story whereby of there was a decrease in 
maternal mortality and an improvement in women‘s health after decentralisation(McIntyre and 
Klugman, 2003). However, it took about forty years for the full decentralisation of power to the 
LGAs. In Latin America SRH was well established in local authorities due to technical support 
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for local decision making that was provided by SRH advocates. The participation of civil society 
organisations in decision-making in Bolivia, Mexico, Peru and Guatemala increased the visibility 
of SRH programs (Policy Project, 2000). Following the devolution of primary health services to 
municipalities in Chile, resources were made available for maternal health, which led to an 
increase in service coverage. In Bolivia, Maceira (2001, cited in Ravindran, 2005) found that 
decentralisation increased social participation in decision making, hence creating successful 
results for sexual and reproductive health. Noticeable was an increase in facility deliveries, from 
13% to 57%, and in contraceptive prevalence from 1% to 27%. The positive experience in Latin 
America was driven by social movements geared to transform fragmented SRH (Ravindran, 
2005). 
 
In many African countries decentralisation of reproductive health services has not been 
successful. Zimbabwe‘s experience demonstrates that decentralisation can harm already well-
functioning SRH programs. It has been noted that, in the early 1990s, Zimbabwe‘s National 
Family Planning Council (ZNFPC) was strong and had the best contraceptive logistics system in 
the world, giving Zimbabwe the highest contraceptive prevalence rate in Africa. When 
decentralisation was implemented in the 1990s, the role of ZNFPC, as being in charge of the 
entire family planning (FP) system, was taken over by local authorities. The process distracted 
attention from the FP and contraceptive management information systems (Rogers, 2000). In 
addition, supervision was disrupted, as experienced provincial nursing officers who were in 
charge of family planning logistics at the provincial level and supervisors of the district family 
planning workers were replaced by district health officers. It was observed that district health 
officers had other priorities; hence they were not able to carry out supervision of the family 
planning workers. As a result, the supervision of the family planning services was inadequate 
(Rogers, 2000) and resulted in poor quality of services. Stocks of family planning commodities 
also were not available locally. Thus the utilisation of ante-natal care did not increase as 
expected after decentralisation. 
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Decentralisation in itself does not improve the efficiency, equity and effectiveness of SRH 
(Lakshminarayanan, 2003a, Nanda, 2002, Langer et al., 2000, Ranjani and Barbara, 2004). In 
Ghana, decentralisation made mandatory the provision of SRH in all health departments but it 
did not improve SRH delivery due to inadequate supplies of equipment and service 
protocols‘(Birungi et al., 2006:6). The Ghanaian experience suggests that decentralisation 
improves district decentralisation; however, before decentralisation, vertical loyalties were 
difficult to break down (Agyepong, 1999).  In rural China, Jing (2004) found that RH was 
missing components of the health reforms (Jing, 2004). Lakshminarayanan‘s (2003) study in the 
Philippines shows that local authorities were not adequately prepared to deliver family planning 
services. Similarly, it was found that the poorest districts suffered more from decentralisation 
due to insufficient resources transferred and limitations to in the generation of their own income. 
In Mongolia, SRH lost momentum after the implementation of health reform due to reform 
tensions between national and local governments. This led to a reverse in the previous gains 
made in SRH (Hill et al., 2006). In Poland, the implementation of reform led to the elimination 
of contraceptive subsidies, the privatisation of health care and an increase in bribes to poorly 
paid healthcare providers, which created new challenges for women to access health services 
(Mishtal, 2010). 
 
Overall, the impacts of decentralisation on service provision in terms of responsiveness and 
improvements in access to service delivery are inconclusive. Very few studies show positive 
outcomes of decentralised service delivery. Faguet‘s (2000) study in Bolivia found that as a 
result of decentralisation, these changes were strongly and positively related to real local needs, 
supporting the argument of allocative efficiency(Faguet, 2000). The findings of the World Bank 
(1995) study in Colombia suggest that the allocation of resources by local governments was 
more consistent with community preferences than allocations from the central government. 
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2.4 Framework for analysing decentralisation and its impact on service delivery 
This section provides a framework for the relationship between decentralisation and service 
delivery by discussing its elements. It examines the process and implications of health services 
delivery at local levels. Different elements of decentralisation from previous sections are used to 
construct a simple framework that is used in analysing health sector decentralisation in Tanzania. 
 
2.4.1 Principal-agent framework 
One of the dominant frameworks used in analysing decentralisation is the principal-agent 
approach, sometimes known as agency theory. Bossert (1998) came out with the ‗decision‘ space 
model to examine the relationship between forms of decentralisation, process and outcomes. The 
framework suggests a ‗principal‘ hold specific objectives, and ‗agents‘ who are required to 
execute activities to achieve the principals‘ objectives. It includes various functions and activities 
in which LGAs (the agents) have control and the degree of choice they are allowed by the central 
government (the principal). 
 
The crucial element of the principal-agent theory is the ‗agency relationship‘, which depends on 
power discretion and information flows between principals and agents (Hiskey, 2010). Mewes 
(2011) links the principal-agent theory to the top-down and bottom-up approaches. Local 
governments are agents, exercising power on behalf of the central government (principal). In the 
bottom-up model, the ultimate principals are the citizens or service users, while politicians, as 
the representatives of the policy makers, are agents. In turn, local government bureaucrats are 
responsible for executing service delivery functions as agents of local political leaders (Mewes, 
2011). The challenge with this relationship is how central authorities can support the interests of 
the LGAs in such a way that they are in line with the national goals that wish to accomplish 
(Batley, 2004, Bossert and Beauvais, 2002, Bossert, 1998, Brinkerhoff and Azfar, 2006). 
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The performance of the LGAs in executing their new functions is dependent on how much 
discretion (decision space) is available and the powers actually exercised in practice. The model 
analyses various functions that are decentralised, such as finance, human resources, and 
governance and then ranks each function, the degree of decision space allowed at the local level 
as narrow, moderate or wide (Bossert, 1998). Thus, it allows an assessment of decision-making 
authority per function. For instance, some countries choose to decentralise health service 
delivery, but not the power to allocate resources. This selective transfer may impact on the 
LGAs‘ ability to deliver health services (Kawonga et al., 2005).  
 
Hiskey (2010) supports the use of the principal-agent approach in analysing decentralisation to 
explain changes that have occurred. The argument is that, when decentralisation takes the form 
of devolution, there is an alteration of principal-agent relationships, where principals 
theoretically gain more leverage over agents who are directly responsible for service provision‖ 
(Hiskey, 2010:30). He stresses that using the principal-agent perspective in analysing 
decentralisation helps to explain the ‗trade-offs‘ between different actors and the changes that 
decentralisation might carry with it, given the new responsibilities of the actors involved.  
 
In this study the decision space as argued by Bossert (1998) was used to analyse the three most 
important elements of decentralisation which are (i) the amount of choice transferred from 
central government to LGAs, (ii) the choices local officials make with their increased choice and 
(iii) the effect these choices might have on the health system performance. Those elements are 
analysed through decision space mapping (table 2-5).  
 
The public administration typologies were used to describe forms of decentralisation, while the 
principal-agent framework was used to examine the degree of power and choices that are given 
to the LGAs. The central ministries (principal) grant the agents (LGAs) power and resources to 
implement decentralisation. The principal believes that LGAs have a mandate from the central 
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government because they can obtain information about their local activities, which the principal 
does not have (Bossert and Beauvais, 2002). 
 
The decision space also evaluates the LGAs‘ characteristics that influence policy decision-
making and implementation. Thereafter, it determines whether LGA officials are innovative in 
making choices that are different from those directed by the CG, or those that have arisen from 
their locality. Finally, it evaluates whether local choices have improved decentralisation 
performance. The framework acknowledges that LGAs have their own preferences and choice of 
activities and expenditures to be undertaken to respond to the local needs, which differ from 
central needs. LGAs may not always make decisions in accordance with the central mandate, but 
seek to accomplish policy objectives through sets of strategies to control and influence their 
decisions (Bossert et al., 2000). Thus, the central authorities can impose incentives and sanctions, 
monitor, report; carry out inspections and performance reviews as mechanisms to influence local 
decisions (Bossert et al., 2003b, Bossert et al., 2000). 
Table 2-5: Bossert’s Framework for Mapping Decision Space  
Category  Function  Indicators  
Service 
organisation 
 Prioritisation of service  
 Service package 
 Insurance plan 
Defining priorities of local health needs 
Choice of service package 
Choice of how to design community insurance 
plans 
Finance   Source of revenues  
 
 Allocation expenditures 
 
 Income from the fees 
Intergovernmental transfer as % of total health 
expenditure 
% of the LGAs spending as a total of public 
health spending 
Range of price that LGAs are allowed to set  
Human 
resources 
 Salaries  
 Civil services  
Setting of personnel salaries  
Hiring and firing of the LGAs staffs 
Governance   Health boards 
 Facility committees  
 Community participation and 
accountability  
Size and composition of the boards 
Size and composition of the health committees 
Means and role of communities participation  
Source: Modified from the Bossert (1998) conceptualisation of decision space. 
 
However, the framework has been criticised because of its focus on the vertical relationship 
between central and local government, which makes it difficult to analyse multiple principal-
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agents at different levels of service delivery (Bossert, 1998; Batley, 2004). Nevertheless, the 
model can be modified to suit different contexts (Bossert and Mitchell, 2011, Bossert, 1998). The 
framework was used just to map decentralisation functions, as it cannot measure the final 
outcomes. The next sub-section provides details of other frameworks that are useful in measuring 
decentralisation outcomes. 
 
2.4.2 Conceptualising the relationship between decentralisation and its impact 
This section presents the analysis of the causal relationship between decentralisation and its 
impact on health services delivery based on the literature established in previous sections. The 
term impact refers to the immediate effect of a health programme, process or policy, while 
outcome refers to an ultimate effect (Scott-Samuel et al., 2005).The Oxford Advanced Learner‘s 
Dictionary defines impact as ‗powerful effect‘ (Wehmeier, 2000:649), while outcome refers to 
‗results or effect‘ (Wehmeier, 2000:899). These definitions make the two terms interchangeable. 
However, usage varies among disciplines; those in health research tend to use the two terms 
namely impact and outcome in the evaluation of non-health matters (Green and Kreuter, 1991.).  
 
However, Börzel (2000) distinguishes impact from outcome. Impact is the effect of the policy on 
the socio-economic environment, while outcome is the effect of the policy measures on the 
behaviour of the targeted actors (Börzel, 2000:3). As this study analyses decentralisation and its 
impact on health services delivery, Börzel (2003) definition is more useful. However, the 
meaning of outcome is modified to include the term impact. Thus, in this study, impact refers to 
the effect of decentralisation on the fiscal, administrative and political environment, which 
ultimately affects health services. This definition allows a focus on national and local levels to 
understand the dynamics of the three dimensions of decentralisation on service delivery. 
 
Theoretically, the relationship between decentralisation and its impact can be understood by 
examining its dimensions and impact over selected health outcomes. Figure 2.1 shows an 
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upstream pipeline in the production of a certain health outcome. It starts with input, such as 
finance management and decision making (political power) in setting health service priorities. 
These inputs allow the production of services through hiring and managing personnel such as 
doctors and nurses, the purchasing of equipment and supplies that are needed for treatment, 
providing maintenance among others. These initial inputs directly help to provide some of the 
intermediate outputs of services, such as new family planning acceptance, access to facility 
delivery, antenatal and postnatal care, to mention but a few. At the end of the pipeline it leads to 
improved health status of the population, as shown in improved reproductive health indicators 
like reduced maternal deaths. The key assumption behind the traditional service pipeline model 
is that outcome is mainly determined by input. The assumption is that there is a linear 
relationship between input and outcomes. In reality it is not only the input that produces health 
outcomes. There is the important process, i.e. institutional or government processes, through 
which the input is processed.  At the same time there are other factors that influence final 
outcomes, like the contextual factors (socio-economic and cultural structure). Institutional 
characteristics also influence service delivery. 
This study proposes the use of intermediate outputs to measure access to reproductive health 
services rather than final outcomes. In most countries, including Tanzania, intermediate outputs 
are at the centre of the public health services problems. In this case of reproductive health care, 
access variables include availability of skilled personnel, and access to facilities for antenatal and 
postnatal care and birth attended by skilled personnel among others. 
 
The inherent difficulty in this model lies in its assumption that the input-output relationship is 
linear. It assumes that a given cost of a certain amount of input will produce a certain amount of 
output. Since decentralisation is a political process, it does not follow the linear path. The 
relationship between input process and output are not step-wise, but rather continuous and 
intertwined. 
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Figure 2-1: Traditional service delivery pipeline framework 
Source: Adapted from the World Health Organisation and the World Bank, 2004 
 
2.4.3 Accountability framework 
Accountability in the health care system has emerged as a means to change the history of health 
system governance. Health systems were highly centralised; decisions on public health care 
planning were top down, driven by experts in the field, and lack input from the users 
(Brinkerhoff, 2003; Brinkerhoff, 2001). The aim of accountability in public health care delivery 
is to improve health system performance towards achieving quality and equitable health care 
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services. It intends to improve the performance of health care providers, management of public 
finances and democracy in the delivery of public health (Brinkerhoff 2004).  
 
Goetz (2003) defines accountability as whether and how power holders answer for their actions 
and are sanctioned in case of abuses. She puts forward two aspects of accountability which are 
‗answerability‘ and ‗enforcement‘ (Goetz, 2003). In the context of public service delivery, 
Caseley (2003) perceives accountability more broadly by linking the above two concepts with 
‗engagement‘ and ‗responsiveness‘. Engagement is a mutual relationship between two actors in 
which demands are expressed by one actor in a transparent manner to the other. Responsiveness 
means the relationship between signals and outcomes. For Caseley (2003), responsiveness 
comprises three elements: (i) answerability- passing information and justifying decisions on the 
basis of demand expressed, (ii) enforcement-ensuring compliance with decisions, and (iii) 
organisational change- changing the way in which services are delivered (Caseley, 2003). 
 
Understanding various actors, the realms in which they get and use their power, and to whom 
and how they are accountable are necessary to understand the impact of decentralisation (Ribot 
and Agrawal, 1999). Several frameworks have been identified to study actors, power and 
accountability in a decentralised setting (Olowu, 2001c, Crook and Sverrisson, 2001b, Crook and 
Manor, 1999, Crook and Manor, 1998, Ribot and Agrawal, 1999, Ribot, 2002, WB, 2000). In 
this study, accountability framework of the World Bank (2004) was adopted to understand the 
type of accountability relationship that exists between service providers and users, which in turn 
shapes health outcomes.  
 
An actor(s) usually refers to the individuals, group of people or organisation in which their 
actions affect public policies(World-Bank, 2004). An actor has a particular identity, with a set of 
norms, values and practices that distinguishes one from another (Bovens, 2007). The difference 
between an actor and a non-actor lies in their action. If an entity is capable of influencing policy 
decisions either directly or indirectly, it can be named an actor (Buse et al., 2005). An actor can 
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be an organisation, such as state, a community, an individual, or a group of individuals such as 
professional, associations or a group of actors representing a large community that is organised 
for a certain interest or purpose. There is a mix-up between state and community actors because 
all are known as structures. When one individual acts on behalf of the state or community with 
that particular state or community then s/he becomes a state or community actor (Ramji, 2009). 
 
The World Health Organisation (2000) has specified three sets of actors in health systems, 
namely state actors, service providers and service users. The state actors include politicians, 
policymakers and other government officials. The actors in the administration of the public 
health sector are central government agencies, where the Ministry of Health (MoH) is a central 
actor in accountability relationships. These actors are accountable in terms of holding providers 
accountable and being accountable to other government agencies, such as parliament, and also 
directly to citizens(WHO, 2000). The MoH exercises broader oversight over a number of health 
sector providers, both public health delivery at various levels (central, regional, local) and private 
sector providers. This can be through regulatory, monitoring and enforcement, budget, logistics, 
quality assurance, purchasing and contracting, policy planning and regulations, etc. This 
oversight role is usually accompanied by sanctions such as the right to award contracts, the 
ability to hire or fire, and the authority to set policy regulatory and performance standards. In 
most countries, the capacity of the MoH to take control over this mandate is limited 
(Brinkerhoff, 2004). Thus, health system reform aims to strengthen or restructure organisations 
that enable the MoH to exercise accountability more effectively (Travis et al., 2002). 
 
The second set of actors is health service providers. In most countries, providers range from 
public to private, but in some countries, like Tanzania, public provision forms the largest part of 
the health care system. In developing countries, service providers, in particular insurance 
companies, pharmaceutical industries, equipment manufacturers and suppliers to mention a few 
are rarely held accountable by government, service users, professional associations or civil 
society (Mcnamara, 2006, Molyneux et al., 2012, Berlan and Shiffman, 2012). 
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The third set of actors includes service users/clients/citizens, the general public and organised 
civil society. This group can be differentiated by wealth, income, location, service or by disease 
pattern. Civil society includes professional associations, community-based groups and advocacy 
organisations (Walt and Tantivess, 2008). Service users are currently participating through user 
representation in health boards and facility health committees. 
 
Other mechanisms used include public report cards and patients‘ rights charters, but these are 
rarely used in developing countries (Molyneux et al., 2012, Berlan and Shiffman, 2012). Boards 
and committees are used to organise participatory activities for health management. These 
committees and boards can be self-elected or appointed. They are typically managed and work 
under the supervision of the Ministry of Health. Decentralisation programmes usually work with 
these committees, despite the existence of the locally elected representative local governments. 
The governing committees and boards of health facilities may be self-elected or appointed. They 
are typically managed and work under the supervision of the Ministry of Health. 
 
Accountability is a major responsibility of the MoH as a primary policy maker and overseer of 
the entire health system. However, decentralisation shifts the oversight from MoH to regional 
and local government authorities. It introduces a new relationship of accountability between 
national and local policy makers. Accountability is an important means for achieving quality and 
equitable health care services. It intends to improve the performance of health care providers, the 
management of public finance and democracy in the delivery of public health services 
(Brinkerhoff, 2004). In health systems, accountability is important for three main reasons which 
are first, accountability is claimed to mediate between citizens and their government on issues of 
cost, access, quality and distribution of health care services, second, since health care providers 
are granted significant powers over people‘s lives and well-being, accountability seeks to 
regulate for any possible abuses, and lastly health services delivery constitutes a major budgetary 
expenditure, and accountability seeks to ensure proper management, reduce corruption and 
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enhance the responsiveness of service providers and policy makers to citizens (Brinkerhoff, 
2004). 
 
Bahl et al. (2005) argues that decentralisation is introduced as a policy to offset problems caused 
by centralised governance. Thus, pressure for decentralisation can increase when the citizens are 
dissatisfied with the performance of public service delivery (Bahl et al., 2005). As argued 
elsewhere decentralisation has three dimensions, namely fiscal, administrative and political. 
Most studies have focused mainly on one dimension of decentralisation, in particular the fiscal, 
to be used as proxy for the overall process (Saavedra, 2010). On the other hand many studies 
seem to overlook the point that the political and administrative components of the 
decentralisation process are largely related to fiscal. The exclusion of one dimension from the 
analysis might lead to biased outcomes. This study assumes that each individual dimension of 
decentralisation might have a specific impact on service delivery, thus excluding one dimension 
might overstate/understate the effect of decentralisation. For example in Bolivia, municipalities 
were given more autonomy of financial resources, but all administrative decisions regarding 
personnel are taken by central authorities (World-Bank, 2005a). In Pakistan, local governments 
were given greater autonomy of administrative and political devolution, but not fiscal. Local 
governments are totally dependent on the federal government to finance social services including 
health (World-Bank, 2005b). In this situation it is difficult to judge whether Bolivia is more 
decentralised than Pakistan by considering only one dimension of decentralisation. Each 
dimension of decentralisation can have an independent impact on its own, although they can 
reinforce one other to produce an added significance. Thus, accounting for all three dimensions 
of decentralisation is important in establishing the impact of decentralisation on health service 
delivery. 
 
In judging the impact of decentralisation on health service delivery, the study suggests using the 
World Bank‘s Accountability Framework (2004) as presented in Figure 2-2 below. The 
framework shows the relationships among key actors in a decentralised system. Ahmad et al. 
(2005) suggest that understanding the relationships between central policy and local government 
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policy makers, service providers and citizen policy makers can help fully understand why 
decentralisation reforms can, and sometimes cannot, lead to better service delivery. Successful 
service delivery for people materialises when actors are linked in relationships of power and 
accountability (World-Bank, 2004:47). Service delivery can be improved by strengthening and 
balancing the actors‘ relationships. Once one actor has more power than the other(s), the 
accountability mechanisms may be disrupted, which could lead to ineffectiveness of health 
service delivery. 
 
The figure demonstrates the significance of each dimension of decentralisation in delivering 
public services. Three forms of decentralisation were identified by Rondinelli (1981) as follows; 
(i) de-concentration, (ii) delegation, and (iii) devolution which echo how policy makers, service 
providers and service users/citizens/beneficiaries are connected. Councils can have some degree 
of fiscal decentralisation, but if they do not have the autonomy to control human resources they 
cannot alter services to meet local needs more efficiently. 
 
Furthermore, where local officials are not democratically elected by citizens, accountability to 
local residents can be weak, since appointed officials are accountable to the Centre. They track 
the interests of the centre while local choices are neglected or forgotten. Where there is political 
decentralisation but councils lack basic resources and administrative autonomy to make 
decisions, the Council might lose integrity. Hence, service users would not have influence over 
the user charges levied to improve local health services. As a result, theoretical justifications of 
allocative efficiency, technical efficiency and local knowledge of choices and needs arising from 
a decentralised framework may suffer (Saavedra, 2010). 
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Figure 2-2: The  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 2-1: The framework of accountability in a decentralised system  
Adapted from World Bank Service Delivery Framework (2004) 
Demonstrates long route of accountability in a de-concentrated system; LGAs are likely 
to have limited autonomies for fiscal and administrative decision making on local expenditure 
and staffing. Service users can have indirect influence on service providers through elected 
government. 
Demonstrates a short route of accountability in form of delegation or devolved system in 
which LGAs are likely to have higher fiscal, political and administrative autonomy  
Demonstrates a direct voice of service users/beneficiaries to the service providers 
The relationship between central policy makers and service users as against local policy makers 
is that national constituencies represent a large population that is heterogeneous; thus local 
service users cannot hold national policymakers accountable. Similarly, central policy makers 
cannot tackle all the local needs and demands; as they usually follow policies that keep them in 
power. In a decentralised system of service provision, local policy makers are accountable to a 
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smaller population, which makes it easier for them to address locally perceived needs; that is, 
more direct accountability lines. 
 
Bardhan and Mookherjee (1998; 2000a; 2000b) provide a caution in this regard. They argue that 
knowledge of local needs coupled with decentralisation powers might enable increased 
efficiency in service delivery if and only if LGAs want to use that discretion for improving 
services. Otherwise decentralisation is vulnerable to elite-capture as LGA officials can form an 
alliance with central officials to hinder the gains of decentralisation.  Thus, even locally elected 
council may not realise the anticipated service delivery. Instead, they can choose to individually 
rent from resources received for delivering services (Bardhan, 2002, Bardhan and Mookherjee, 
2000a, Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000b, Bardhan and Mookherjee, 1998). 
 
2.4.4 Framing the conceptual framework for the study 
This thesis focuses more on the implementation of health decentralisation, than the initial stages 
of policy formulation. Usually, policy implementation begins after the formulation of the policy 
document, which includes the development of the working programmes by central government 
jointly with other actors that have an influence over government policies. Concentrating on 
policy implementation assists in raising questions about what happens to policies in practice after 
they have been formulated and how relationships among various policy actors shape policy 
outcomes. Figure 2-3 presents a simple framework that was developed to guide the study. It is 
deducted from the previously presented literature. 
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Figure 2-3: A simple framework for understanding decentralisation and its impact on health service delivery 
Source: Developed by author, synthesised from the literature  
 
The conceptual framework in Figure 2-3 illustrates the relationship between decentralisation and 
health outcomes. The said process includes changes in health policies that bring with them 
political, administrative and fiscal decentralisation. Decentralisation is frequently implemented 
for political and technical gains. It enhances power sharing between central and local actors, 
while improving community participation in health programs, which leads to improved local 
governance outcomes through (i) responding to the local reproductive health needs (ii) enhanced 
political, financial and administrative accountability, (iii) increasing local control over planning 
and decision-making, and (iv) strengthening accountability through greater citizen monitoring 
and observation. With regard to the framework the following are the arguments: 
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reproductive health service delivery. The decentralised power affects local decision 
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making process on issues such as resource allocation and prioritisation which ultimately 
affects resources needed to deliver reproductive health services delivery.  
(ii) For decentralisation to improve health outcomes, effective accountability mechanisms are 
important to hold officials accountable. Within discretionary power, LGAs are more 
likely to be accountable to higher levels of government (upward accountability) than to 
the citizens (downward accountability). Citizen accountability mechanisms safeguard 
against the misuse and abuse of local discretion. Thus, citizens must have the ability and 
opportunity to claim accountability and LGAs have the means and stimuli to respond to 
citizen demands for better health service delivery, in this case reproductive health. 
 
Therefore, it is against this background that this thesis attempts to generate empirical knowledge 
on how the implementation of decentralisation policy affects health care delivery by studying 
specific health interventions that is reproductive health. Comparatively little has been written 
regarding the relationship between decentralisation and the universal access to reproductive 
health by 2015. Those few studies reviewed above are inconclusive on the extent that 
decentralisation undermines or supports reproductive health services delivery.  
 
Chapter conclusion 
The literature review confirms that decentralisation has the potential to improve the functioning 
of the health system to deliver quality health service delivery. However, the reviewed literature 
shows that there is little convincing evidence to confirm that health outcomes have improved 
because of the implementation of decentralisation policy. In most studies from developing 
countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, the quality of health services has either declined or 
remained unchanged after decentralisation. In particular the review suggests that decentralisation 
of health services has not improved access and quality of RHS. Decentralisation also worsens 
health inequities and inequalities among the councils as a result of discrepancies in 
administrative capacity and ability to raise local resources. From the evidence summarised by 
Cabral (2011), the experience and impact of service delivery decentralisation in Africa has been 
disappointing, with limited evidence of the improvement of quality of health services provided. 
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There is negative, positive and inconclusive evidence that health service delivery indicators have 
improved as a result of decentralisation. The aim of the study therefore was to answer the 
following question: how has decentralisation impacted on reproductive health service delivery in 
Tanzania? In this respect, the extent to which decentralisation has increased local autonomy over 
fiscal, administrative and political factors in the health sector in Tanzania was analysed in 
relation to access to and utilisation of reproductive health services by a rural population in 
Tanzania. 
Analysing decentralisation‘s impact is difficult because studies are not comparable. The 
evaluations do not measure the same things in part because the form of decentralisation being 
implemented differs greatly. In many cases, evaluation does not state specific reason(s) for the 
decentralisation process. Nor does it state goals that are the object of the programmatic change. 
This makes evaluation even more challenging; changes as a result of decentralisation cannot be 
expected to have only positive effects. Thus, a starting point of decentralisation evaluation would 
reasonably be to assess if it had the anticipated positive effect. Any expected or unexpected 
negative effects could be appraised as study proceeds. 
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Abbreviation for Chapter 3 
ANC  Antenatal clinic 
CFS   Consolidated fund for services  
CHMT  Council health management teams 
CHSB  Council health service boards  
DDHs   District designated hospitals  
DHS  District health system  
DPs   Development partners 
ESAP   Economic and Social Action Programme 
FY   Financial year  
HBF  Health basket funding 
HFCs  Health facilities committees 
HRH   Human resources for health  
HSR   Health sector reform 
HSSP  Health sector strategic plan 
IPT  Intermittent preventive treatment  
ITNs   Insecticide treated bed net. 
LGAs   Local government authorities 
LGRP   Government reform programme 
MDAs  Ministries, departments and agencies 
MDG  Millennium development goals  
MKUKUTA MkakatiwaKukuzaUchuminaKupunguzaUmaskini Tanzania 
MMR  Maternal mortality ratio 
MNCH Maternal and new-born, child health  
MoFEA  Ministry of Finance and Economic, Affairs  
MoH  Ministry of Health  
MoHSW Ministry of Health and Social Welfare  
NBS   National Bureau of Statistics  
PER  Public expenditure review  
PHC  Primary health care 
PHSDP  Primary health service development programme 
57 
 
PMO-RALG Prime Minister‘s Office for Regional and Local Government  
PMTCT Prevention of mother to child transmission  
POPSM President‘s Office-Public Service Management  
RHMTs Regional health management teams  
TACAIDS Tanzania Commission for AIDS  
TDHS  Tanzania Demographic and Health Survey  
TFR   Total fertility rate  
URT   United Republic of Tanzania  
US$  United States of America Dollar  
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CHAPTER 3 
HEALTH SECTOR REFORMS AND DECENTRALISATION POLICY IN TANZANIA 
3.0 Introduction 
The chapter presents the important aspects of the health sector reforms which are central to the 
current study. Decentralisation reform being the major components of the HSR provides the 
context in in which the identified theoretical question can be examined. The goal of 
decentralisation in many countries is to improve health system performance and ultimately health 
outcomes. Thus, the formulation and implementation of decentralisation entails changes in the 
process of planning, resource allocation within the health sector and distribution of benefits to 
the different population groups. It is a highly political process involving policy makers, 
politicians, service providers and users, whose interests could be affected by the proposed policy 
changes (Glassman et al., 1999). These benefits are not equally shared; there are might be looser 
and winner of the decentralisation.  
 
This chapter provides a foundation for a scientific inquiry into decentralisation in the real world 
in the subsequent chapters. The historical background of health system reform and how 
decentralisation fits into it is provided. The chapter is divided into three major sections: (i) a 
brief overview of the health sector reforms with a focus on the contextual factors that led to 
decentralisation of reforms, (ii) a brief overview policies that guiding health sector and (ii) 
selected health system performance indicators. 
 
3.1 Health sector reform in developing countries 
Health sector reforms (HSR) in this study refers to the new generation of reforms introduced in 
the 1990s, a widespread movement that affected the health systems of many developing 
countries including in Africa.  However, health reforms were a result of the global 
macroeconomic and political changes that affected developing countries and can be dated back at 
least to the early 1980s. Health system refers to ‗all the activities whose primary purpose is to 
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promote, restore or maintain health‘(WHO, 2000). Generally, health sector reforms ‗refer to 
significant, purposive effort to improve performance of the health care system‘(Huntington, 
2004). In a wide variety of policy literature, health forms are defined as a ―package of policy 
measures affecting the organization, funding and management of health systems‖(Zwi and Mills, 
1995:314). Berman and Bossert (2000) cautioned that not all action to improve health sector 
performance should be labelled as health sector reform; to them, health sector reform should 
bring ‗sustained, purposeful and fundamental changes‘ in the health system (Berman and 
Bossert, 2000).  
 
However, this study acknowledges that health sector reform is not a concept that demands a 
single global definition but it is important to be aware ―what is and what is not reform‖ (Cassels 
et al., 1996). Health sector reforms include numerous activities concerning health care delivery. 
Roberts et al., (2004), identified five areas of health care to be addressed under health reforms: 
financing, payment, organisation, regulation and behaviour (Roberts et al., 2004). Basically, 
reforms initiatives can be wide in scope and involve change within several areas of health system 
structures and operations while others are rather narrowly conceived and with a more limited 
scope of change (Berman, 2002). Whatever type of reforms is implemented, it creates an effect 
in the health care system hence necessitating alterations in their implementation. HSR is an 
incremental process reflecting the social values and political processes of a country (Gilson, 
1997). It involves significant transformation of the health care systems and creation of actors 
who will defend their interests (Huntington 2004).  
 
The World Bank has been an influential institution in shaping health reform policies in African 
countries (Zwi and Mills, 1995). It suggested a shift in elements of service provision from the 
public to the private under the justification of the greater technical efficiency of the private sector 
as it encourages competition to provide services delivery (World-Bank, 1987). In addition, in its 
influential 1993 World Development Report(WDR), ―Investing in Health‖ and its 1994 
publication, ―Better Health for Africa‖, the Bank recommended to national governments to limit 
government actions in formulating policies, providing a limited package of public health 
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interventions and financing basic clinical services targeting groups, especially those who are 
incapable of paying for private care(Lee et al., 2002).Thus, HSR efforts are responding to 
resource constraints, arguing that scarce public health resources were not efficiently used 
(World-Bank, 1993).  
 
Multilateral organisations of the United Nations such as World Health Organization (WHO), 
United Nations Children‘s Fund (UNICEF) and bilateral agencies including Danish International 
Development Agency (DANIDA), Europeans Union (EU), German Technical Cooperation 
(GTZ) to mention a few, promote HSR as part of their aid assistance. These organisations work 
with national government agencies which deliver health services (Meachan, 2001). In Tanzania 
for example, DANIDA has been a key supporter of the HSR through health sector program of 
work since 1996 through basket funding mechanisms. DANIDA has supported the 
implementation the recent HSSP III (2009-2014) with USD 163.1 million as well as five 5 
technical advisors to MoHSW. 
 
The driving force for the 1990s reform varied greatly according to the following contexts: (i) 
reforms that resulted from the major political, economic, and social changes associated with 
transition from socialist to market economies; (ii) changes resulting from social movements to 
reform of the state, and (iii) reforms that are part of the structural adjustment programmes 
(Leighton, 1999). 
 
Thus, the reform packages adopted vary from one country to another and policies vary across 
and within countries themselves. Despite the variations, many countries adopted some aspects of 
the HSR as an attempt to use scarce resources more effectively in pursuit of improvements of the 
public health. The specific HSR policies implemented vary across countries but mostly include 
new methods of defining priorities, development of new financing mechanisms, delivery of basic 
health packages, integration of services and the decentralisation of decision-making (Berman, 
1995). In African and Asian countries, HSR was a part of the structural adjustment programme 
caused by severe resource crisis (Berman and Bossert, 2000). 
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With reference to Tanzania, the current health sector reform program that took effect in 1994 
aimed at improving efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of services. Indeed, it was wide 
in scope, purposeful and fundamental. The HSR aim to transform the previously vertical 
program into integrated service delivery (Oliff et al., 2003) In countries like Tanzania, they 
introduced market principles into the reforms of the primary health care sector as a reaction to 
the government failure to fund health services, without any proof of their effectiveness (Zwi and 
Mills, 1995). Hsiao also raised explicit questions about the effectiveness of using free market 
principles to structure the health sector (Hsiao, 1995:134). He saw that many countries have 
defined and undertaken health reforms without considering the facts and context but had been 
influenced by ideology(Hsiao, 1995). I shall discuss the contextual aspects of health sector 
reform in the next section. 
 
Health sector reform in Tanzania  
The first HSR in Tanzania started with the introduction of Western health care by the German 
colonial government in 1881. During their administration (1980-1919) several hospitals were 
established in Dar es Salaam, Pwani and Tanga (Clyde, 1962, Nsekela and Nhonoli, 1976). The 
colonial administration established urban biased health facilities aiming at serving their civil 
servants, military personnel, settler farmers and plantation workers. In the country side, the 
health services were operated by missionaries and were targeted to serve the missionaries and a 
few natives(Mwaffisi, 1999). 
 
A national health care system was introduced soon after gaining independence in 1961.The 
government adapted the colonial health system and this marks the beginning of the second wave 
of health reforms which was sustained up to 1972. This period overlapped with the formulation 
of the broader national development policy namely socialism guided by Arusha Declaration. The 
third health sector reform took place between 1972 and 1982, prompted by the failure of local 
government to provide social services including health (Semali et al., 2007, Semali et al., 2005, 
Semali, 2003). It also coincided with political strategies of implementing socialist political 
ideologies in which the central government assumed greater role in providing health services in 
all districts for free (Kopoka, 2000). Because of economic problems, the central government 
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failed to support district health services hence the service deteriorated (Kaijage and Tibaijuka, 
1996, Wangwe et al., 1997). Thus, failure to finance district health services was the key reason 
for the fourth HSR that took place between 1983 and 1993.  The fifth HSR, which is the concern 
of this study, was started in 1994  
 
Tanzania began a PHC strategy after the Arusha Declaration in 1967 which emphasised rural 
development. The Government re-oriented national policies to increase resource allocation to 
rural areas compared to urban areas (Jonsson, 1986). These efforts were seen in 1970s with 
extensive networks of health facilities across the country. By 1980, about 90% of the rural 
population of Tanzania was living within 10 kilometres of a health facility(Gish, 1982). Yet, the 
World Health Organisation (WHO) report for the 2000, ranked Tanzania 176th out of 191 
countries on level of health status, 140th in respect to responsiveness and 45th on fairness of 
financial contribution (WHO, 2000). Thus, the HSR were implemented to improve the sector 
performance to enhance the delivery the health services. 
 
3.1.1 The reform content 
HSR content is influenced by anticipated achievements. The driving force for the HSR differs 
from one setting to another. In developed countries HSR aimed at addressing the escalating costs 
of health care and meeting public expectations (Cassels, 1995). HSRs were aimed at increasing 
resources to provide health care. In Tanzania, the content of HSR entails significant changes in 
the systems, programs, organisations and institutions in which those reforms were to be 
implemented. Numerous policy documents including(MoH, 1994, MoH, 1995, URT, 1997b) 
identified the content of HSR as: 
(i) Ideological reforms which involved changing the role of the central government to that of 
facilitator in the provision of health services and ending the free provision of health care 
services to all, 
(ii) Organisational reforms which comprised changes in the administrative structures through 
the creation of autonomous LGAs and district health boards, support to community based 
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health care initiatives; review of the functional role of MoH with regard to planning and 
budgeting, training of workers and establishment of a new scheme of promotion, 
(iii)Managerial reforms which called for the transfer of the management of health services and 
district hospitals to LGAs, changes in recruitment process of the DMOs and establishment of 
a separate council account for health funds, 
(iv) Financial reforms which included introduction of new sources of health care financing, by 
establishing national and community health insurance scheme. Allocation of public health 
resources was based on cost-effectiveness analysis, population patterns, income distribution 
and utilisation of health services, 
(i) Public/private reforms included legalisation of private practitioners as well as 
fostering the development of the private sector and  
(ii) Health systems research reforms to generate information for evidence based 
practice, 
 
The central theme of the health sector reform in Tanzania has been decentralisation which calls 
for transfer of power from central government to LGAs
1
. The assumption is that LGAs will 
determine priorities and allocate health funds, with technical assistance from the central levels 
(see details in section 3 1.2). 
 
3.1.2 The Reform context 
In sub-Saharan Africa, health sector reform has been driven by wider macroeconomic policy and 
the implementation of structural adjustment programmes which necessitate control of public 
expenditure and changes in public and private sector institutional structures (Sahn and Bemier, 
1993). It can be argued that in SSA, HSR was promoted in a context of widespread poverty 
(Semali, 2003). In Tanzania for example, Household Budget Survey (HBS) data of 1991/92 
shows that poverty was widespread and about 38.6% of the households were living below the 
basic needs poverty line (URT, 1992). In 2000/02 the figure was 35.7% (NBS, 2002). A World 
                                                          
1
In this study it refers to district/ council which are the administrative and implementation units for public policies 
in  Tanzania 
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Bank study carried out in Tanzania (2002) shows that between 15 and 18 million, out of 43.4 
million were living below a poverty line of US$0.65 in a day of which  about 12.5 million people 
were living in abject poverty(World-Bank, 2002). Yet, user fees were introduced in 1993 in a 
context where the majority of the population could not afford health care (Gilson and Mills, 
1995). 
 
(i) Economic context 
The background above led to the poverty initiatives by African governments and donors in order 
to improve access to social services. The section below presents the state of the Tanzanian 
economy in which HSR was established. The review is divided into four timelines :(a) after 
independence (1961-1967, (b) the socialist regime (1968-1978) and (c) the home grown reform 
(1980 to 1985) and (d) the reform era (1986-1995). 
 
(a) After independence 1961-1967 
After independence in 1961, the Tanzanian Government under the leadership of President 
Nyerere committed to eliminate the three major enemies of national development; disease, 
poverty and hunger (Nyerere, 1968). The colonial economic structure was adopted and the 
revenue was derived mainly from exports of agriculture produce which contributed to more than 
50% of the gross national product (GNP). Sisal, coffee, and cotton comprised 60% of total 
foreign earnings (Bevan et al., 1988). Per capita incomes increased by 2% per year (Table 3-1), 
and the economy experienced macroeconomic stability, low inflation and a reasonable balance of 
payments. Yet, inequalities increased as the economic growth failed to realise the expectations 
and demands of the population. President Nyerere by then and the ruling party named 
Tanganyika African Union (change the name to Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) after the union 
with Afro Shiras Party from Zanzibar in in 1977), leaders came with a proposal to speed up the 
national development through the socialist ideology (see Nyerere 1968 for details) implemented 
through the adoption of the Arusha Declaration in 1967.  
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Table 3-1: Table 3-1: Macro-economic data from 1961 to 1967  
 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 
Per capita income growth %  -7.1 4.3 1.2 3.6 -0.2 9.9 1.8 
Population growth % 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.0 
Urbanisation % 4.8 4.9 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.6 5.9 
Terms of trade (1987=100) 130 124 137 142 137 137 126 
% of labour force in agriculture 92.4 92.1 91.9 91.7 91.4 91.2 90.9 
Monetary growth %  21.7 25.6 -15.2 31.8 476.7  13.1 
Inflation % 7.8 0.6 4.9 2.8 -2.4 9.3 11.5 
Gross investment % of GDP 13.7 11.6 10.7 12.0 13.9 15.1 18.9 
Sources: Bigsten, A. Danielsson, A. Is Tanzania an Emerging Economy? Data, adapted from the Income and 
investment data & World Development Indicators 1998. 
 
(b)The Arusha Declaration and after 1968-1978 
In 1967 the first national economic declaration were made, establishing the country‘s era of 
economic socialism. Leaders explicitly endorsed the socialist policy (known as Ujamaa in 
Swahili) to address inefficiencies in the country‘s economy (Nyerere, 1967). While embedded in 
Tanzanian traditional family structures. Ujamaa introduced a villagisation program whereby 
villagers from remote areas were relocated into Ujamaa villages. This was to enable them to 
access the means of production, as well as social services, including health and education, water, 
energy and improved communication. This was meant to increase the availability of productive 
inputs, the human capital and the sales prospects for agricultural production (Nyerere, 1968). The 
assumption was that national productivity and efficiency in agricultural production would 
increase, hence leading to a growth in per capita income which ultimately would increase 
national income distribution, and improved economic welfare ( Wangwe, 1993). 
 
Per capita income rose by 0.7% per year (table 3-2) but was not sustainable as the country 
experienced an oil crisis in 1973/74, the break-up of the East African Community and the war 
with Uganda. These crises consumed a large proportion of the national resources and reduced the 
ability of Government to meet its external obligations specifically servicing of the outside debt 
(Wenzel and Wiedemann, 1989). The Government suffered fiscal deficits, and started to borrow 
from local banks (Wangwe et al., 1997). Socialism was blamed for the worsening economy and 
the strategy was no longer sustainable. Financial support began to diminish as development 
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partners were hesitant to support what they saw had become an unattainable development model 
(Hyden and Karlstrom, 1993). 
 
Table 3-2: Macro-economic from 1968-1978 
 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
Per capita growth % 2.1  -0.7 3.0 0.8 2.3 0.5 -0.5 2.9 2.3 -2.7 -1.9 
Population growth % 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.1 
Urbanisation % 6.1 6.4 6.7 7.4 8.1 8.7 9.4 10.1 11.0 12.0 12.9 
Terms of trade 126 126 137 123 128 146 174 142 152 182 152 
External debt Million$   212 284 407 619 900 1170 1380 1700 1970 
 
%labour force in 
agriculture 
90.6 90.3 90.1 89.7 89.3 88.9 88.5 88.1 87.7 87.2 86.7 
 
Inflation % 14.5 15.2 3.5 4.7 7.4 9.9 17.9 23.2 6.6 11.0 6.4 
Monetary growth % 17.8 9.2 12.0 18.2 17.7 18.2 22.1 24.4 25.1 20.2 12.6 
Gross investment, 
% of GDP 
18.4 16.3 22.9 26.8 23.6 22.6 21.6 20.8 29.0 29.4 33.8 
 
Sources: Bigsten, A. Danielsson, A. Is Tanzania an Emerging Economy? Data, adapted from the Income and 
investment data & World Development Indicators 1998. 
 
(c) Recession period 1979-1985 
In 1979, Tanzania experienced a fiscal deficit associated with the war with the Uganda. Thus, by 
the early 1980s, the economic performance deteriorated continuously, despite all efforts under 
the socialist policy (Mogedal S et al., 1995). Tanzanian products failed to access international 
markets because of poor quality which did not meet international standards.  Therefore export 
earnings declined (Bevan et al. (1990). Due to collapsing world market prices, terms of trade 
deteriorated severely which led to an increase in the trade deficit, foreign capital inflows 
decreased, and overall indebtedness rose to critical levels (table 3-3).  
 
President Nyerere negotiates with International monetary fund (IFM) on loan arrangement but 
the deal failed in 1979. This led to the formulation of the home grown National Economic 
Survival Program (NESP) in 1981-82, which did not succeed. As development partners were 
more critical about the negative effects of Ujamaa on economic efficiency. By 1983 most of the 
DPs had begun to pull out which went hand in hand with a fall in the imports. As foreign aid 
decreased, foreign savings also declined (Danielson, 1996) which, in turn, directly affected 
investments in the social sector. By the mid-1980s, the crisis was so acute and the external 
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support was so small that the government had no option but to shift, albeit reluctantly to reform 
(Bigsten and Danielsson, 1999). 
 
Table 3-3: Macro-economic data from 1968 to 1978  
 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
Per capita income % 2.1 -0.7 3.0 0.8 2.3 0.5 -0.5 2.9 2.3 -2.7 -1.9 
Population growth %  3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.1 
Urbanisation % 6.1 6.4 6.7 7.4 8.1 8.7 9.4 10.1 11.0 12.0 12.9 
Terms of trade  126 126 137 123 128 146 174 142 152 182 152 
External debt-Million $   212 284 407 619 900 1170 1380 1700 1970 
% labour force in 
agriculture 
90.6 90.3 90.1 89.7 89.3 88.9 88.5 88.1 87.7 87.2 86.7 
Inflation % 14.5 15.2 3.5 4.7 7.4 9.9 17.9 23.2 6.6 11.0 6.4 
Monetary growth   % 17.8 9.2 12.0 18.2 17.7 18.2 22.1 24.4 25.1 20.2 12.6 
Gross investment, % of 
GDP 
18.4 16.3 22.9 26.8 23.6 22.6 21.6 20.8 29.0 29.4 33.8 
 
Sources: Bigsten, A. Danielsson, A. Is Tanzania an Emerging Economy? Data, adapted from the Income and 
investment data & World Development Indicators 1998. 
 
(d) The reform period 1986-1995 
The new government adopted a three-year ERP (1987/88–1989/90), the aims of which were to 
create an economic recovery through reducing inflation, re-establishing a free market and 
improving the balance of payments (Kaijage and Tibaijuka, 1996). These aimed to reach a GDP 
target growth rate of 4.5%, an inflation rate below 10%, fiscal government deficit below 13% of 
GDP, an adjustment of the exchange rate, positive real interest rates by mid-1988, an increase of 
between 30 and 80 percent in nominal producer prices for cash crops, and decontrol of domestic 
prices over a period of three years. In August 1986, the Government received 18-month standby 
credit from the IMF. In November 1986, it obtained a Multi-sector Rehabilitation Credit from the 
IDA and Development partners (Wangwe et al., 1998). 
 
In addition, Government qualified for loans under Paris Club, as it had heeded donor pressure by 
signing an agreement with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) to implement 
radical reforms between 1986 and 1989 (Moshi, 1994). It was later noted that the state of social 
sectors was critical because of under-funding, poor management and inefficiency. Government, 
World Bank and other donors agreed to establish another reform namely Economic and Social 
Action Programme (ESAP) (World Bank, 1990). The ESAP aimed to reverse the poor 
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performance of the social sector, including health, consistent with economic development. The 
reform content of include trade liberalisation, liberalisation of medical practice and restructuring 
of public administration among others. The economy reverted positively with an average annual 
GDP growth rate of 4% between 1986 and 1994 (table 3-4). Per capita incomes grew by 0.6% 
per year. However, in 1990-1995, Government obligations to restructuring reforms were poor 
which led to weak donor support. This made the IMF, World Bank, and other DPs to reduce their 
support by suspending payments for development projects (Wangwe, 2003). 
 
Table 3-4: Macro-economic data from 1986 to 1995  
 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Per capita income growth % 3.4 2.7 1.3 -0.6 3.1 -1.3 -4.1 -0.3 -0.1 0.6 
Population growth %  3.2 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.0 2.9 
Urbanisation % 18.2 18.9 19.5 20.2 20.8 21.5 22.2 22.8 23.5 24.2 
Terms of trade  141 100 107 103 93 94 85 83   
External debt Million$ 4610 5490 6010 5850 6410 6540 6620 6800 7260 743 
Interest rate spread %  10.0 11.8 12.2 14.0 18.2      
%labour force in agriculture 85.0 84.8 84.7 84.5 84.4      
Current account % of GDP -11.6  -15.5 -18.1 -17.2 -21.8 -24.5 -25.5 -24.   
Export % of GDP 9.8 14.6 13.2 8.5 8.4 15.2 18.5 20.5   
Import % of GDP 27.3 30.7 35.5 35.3 36.8 44.0 45.4 42.4   
Gross investment % of GDP 
official  
 23.5 17.4 19.3 28.2 28.5 28.9 26.7 26.4 21.2 
 
Gross investment % of GDP 
(WB 
  18.2 17.0 22.3 25.9 26.5 25.8 24.6 21.7 
Government Consumption 
% of GDP 
16.8 16.3 17.0 18.4 19.3 19.5 18.1 16.1   
Domestic saving % of GDP   1.3 1.3 0.3 -0.6 -1.6 -2.8 -2.0 0.0 
Manufacturing VA in GDP 
%  
  8.1 8.1 8.9 9.1 8.5 7.8 7.4 7.3 
Inflation % 28.1 26.2 27.1 23.0 30.6 25.2 19.8 22.5 29.3 24.2 
Monetary growth % 27.9 32.1 32.6 32.1 41.9 30.1 40.6 39.2 35.3 33.0 
Sources: Bigsten, A. Danielsson,. 
 
The data presented above shows that, in the post-independence period, 1961-1967,  there was a 
rapid increase in per capita income of 2.0% per year. In the period before the recession, 1968-
1978, there was an increase of 0.7% per year and, during the recession, 1979-1985, there was an 
annual decline of 1.5% per year. During the reform period, from 1986 onwards, per capita 
incomes increased by 0.6% per year. However, growth recovery could not be sustained due to 
infrastructural and institutional bottlenecks to support a free market economy. Regardless of 
liberalisation, it was noted by the mid-1990s that the macro-economic stabilisation policies did 
not succeed in improving social services (Wangwe et al., 1998). This is reflected in the health 
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system indicators presented in table 3-5. During the recession period only 3.1% of the GPD was 
allocated to the health sector  
 
Table 3-5: Trends in the indicators of investment in health and health status in Tanzania  
 1923-62 1961-722 1972-83 1983-92 
Health investment indicators 
Population/ Health Centre(1000s) 432 121.2 100.4 78.4 
Population/Med/ Assistant (1000s) 9.7 7.9 9.4 6.4 
Population/ Rural  Medical Aid (1000s 42.5 35.8 17.1 10.8 
GDP per capita in US dollars 12.3 25 132 74.8 
Government Expenditure on health as percent of 
total expenditure 
7.7 6.4 3.1 9.3 
Health status indicators 
Life expectancy  35 45 52 50.6 
Infant Mortality rate 160 150 135 88 
Source: Semali, 2007 
 
At the end of the 1990s, Government decided to focus programs on reducing poverty as the way 
of improvising the living conditions of Tanzanians. The idea coincided with the decision by 
international financial institutions to move to Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS) which was 
obligatory for Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) to access debt relief funds. The 
Government of Tanzania responded quickly by preparing a PRSP in order to gain access to the 
HIPC debt relief resources aiming at achieving the MDGs (Muganda, 2004). 
 
From 1995 to 2005, substantial reforms were implemented by President Benjamin Mkapa and 
numerous measures to encourage private investment both from foreign and domestic sources 
were implemented. In addition,, numerous policies were put in place to lessen the budget deficit, 
remove price controls, and privatise of state-owned companies. These changes led to an increase 
in the export of goods and services from 24.1%, in 2006, to 30.2%, in 2012. Imports of goods 
and services also increased from 35.8% to 44.5% in the same period (MoFEA, 2013a). The GDP 
increased from 14 billion Tanzanian shillings in 1999/2000 to about 32 billion Tanzanian 
shillings in 2010/2011. This matches an average annual growth rate of 7.9%, which is high 
compared to other developing Sub-Saharan Africa countries (4.4%) and OECD countries (1.9%). 
Apparently per capita GDP is still at a very low level of 824,000 current Tanzanian shillings 
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(392 current US Dollars) .The percentage of people living in poverty was 43.5 % in 2011/12 
(NBS, 2013). 
(ii) Epidemiological context 
Starting in the 1980s many developing countries started implementing intensive reforms in their 
health sectors in order to improve performance (Macrae et al., 1996). Health systems were 
under-performing and failing to reduce the burden of disease (BoD). In 1990s, the global burden 
of disease was quite high according to Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALY). Developing 
countries contributed a very high proportion of the DALY compared with their population size 
(Murray and Frenk, 2000). Sub-Saharan Africa, which had less than 9% of the world population, 
had about 21%t of BoD because of poor management, lack of resources and organizational 
failure (World Bank, 1993). 
 
The current BoD in Tanzania was assessed by the latest Tanzania Demographic Health Survey 
(TDHS) of 2010/2011. According to TDHS data of 2009/2010 the MMR has declined to 454 
deaths per 100 000 live births (NBS and Macro-ICF, 2005, NBS and ICF-Marco, 2011). This is a 
notable improvement, but maternal morbidity remains relatively high, requiring more effort to 
attain the MDG, which is 265 per 1 000 000 live births, similar to the goal used for MKUKUTA. 
HIV/AIDS still causes the highest amount of annual DALYs lost, compared to other diseases, 
with 3,276,000 of 18,189,000 total annual DALYs (URT, 2013). However, according to 
HIV/AIDS and Malaria Indicator Surveys 2010/2011, HIV prevalence slightly decreased from 
6% in 2007/2008 to 5.7% (TACAIDS, 2013). The level of HIV infection is higher in urban 
compared to rural areas (7% and 4%, respectively). Access to and coverage of the prevention of 
mother-to-child transmission and antiretroviral drugs continue to increase. About 92.4% of HIV-
positive women were receiving ARVs in 2010 an increase from 43% in 2009 (TACAIDS, 2013). 
 
The estimates of the TDHS 2010 show that TFR is 5.4 and women with no education have high 
fertility rates (6.7) compared to women with other levels of education (3.1). Fertility declines 
have been associated with increase in women‘s health, earnings and participation in paid 
employment (Canning & Schultz, 2012).The TDHS (2010) indicated that 27% of married 
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women were using modern contraceptive methods. The increase relies heavily upon cross-
sectoral investments in education, as evidenced by the way usage increases with education form 
22% of married women, with no education, to 52 % of married women, with at least secondary 
education (NBS and Marco, 2010). However, this is still far from the goal of 60% contraceptive 
prevalence rate by 2015 specified in the Maternal Neonatal and Child Health (MNCH) Strategic 
Plan 2008-2015. 
 
As maternal mortality rate stands at 454 which is still relatively high, requiring more effort to 
attain the MDGs, which is 265 per 1 000 000 live births, similar to the goal set by MKUKUTA. 
There is slow progress in the coverage of deliveries by skilled birth attendants in Tanzania, 
which increased from 43% to 51% from 2005 to 2010. Health management information system 
(HMIS) 2012 data show that 62% of deliveries took place in health facilities (MoHSW, 2013b). 
Not all health facility deliveries are attended by skilled birth attendants, despite the increase in 
the number of nurse-midwives in the country. 30% of health facilities still do not have a proper 
delivery room and adequate facilities (SARA, 2012). In rural areas, 42% of women delivered in a 
health facility, compared to 83% in urban areas. There also is a wealth gap in skilled birth 
attendance, as 93% of the women in the highest quintile had attended births, compared to only 
33% in the lowest wealth quintile (NBS and ICF-Macro, 2011). 
 
The prevalence of Malaria is the second largest cause of annual DALYs lost in Tanzania 
(1,644,000 DALYs). Efforts to reduce this burden of disease include the distribution of 
insecticide-treated bed nets (ITNs) and anti-malaria drugs. In 2010, three out of four Tanzanian 
households owned at least one mosquito net, but the percentage of households who owned an 
ITN was only 64. There is also an increasing distribution of intermittent preventive treatment 
(IPT) to protect pregnant women from malaria. The percentage of women who received the 
needed amount of IPTs (IPT-2) increased from 22%, in 2004/2005, to 30%, in 2007/2008. 
Nationwide, about 80% of pregnant women slept under mosquito nets at night but not all 
pregnant women receive IPT 2 due to low follow-up attendance in ANC (TACAIDS, 2013). 
Table 3-9 summarised key reproductive health indicators in Tanzania. 
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Table 3-6:Reproductive health indicators in Tanzania 
Total Population:  47.8 million  
Annual Population Growth rate  2.7%  
Maternal case fatality rate in health facilities 161  
Total Fertility Rate (TFR)  5.2  
ANC: pregnant women attending at least 4 times 36%) 
ANC: first visit before 16 weeks of pregnancy 43%  
Tetanus Toxoid coverage:% of pregnant women 
receiving 2nd dose of TT 
88%  
Institutional delivery rate 50%  
Skilled birth attendance: births attended by trained 
personnel 
51%  
Emergency obstetrics care (EMOC): facilities that 
provide (%) 
39% of health centres provides while hospitals 73%  
HIV Prevalence, 15-49 years  5.3% (6.2% F, 3.9% M)  
Postnatal care coverage  31%  
Contraceptive prevalence rate  27%  
ITN use among pregnant  71%  
Source: Tanzania Demographic Health Survey (TDHS, 2010), health management information system ( HMIS, 
2012) National Bureau of Statistics (NBS, 2015), Tanzania Commission for AIDS (TACAIDS,  2012) Health 
Management Information System data , Service Availability Assessments (SARA, 2012),  
 
(iii)Political context 
Tanzania has been led by a single left wing party since gaining its independence, 54 years ago. 
Despite changing leadership in five times and the introduction of multi-party democracy in 1995 
the same party Chama cha Mapinduzi has remained in power. In that respect the country has had 
no major political ideological shift and has always been promoting equity, fairness, justice and 
grassroots participation since the adoption of the Arusha Declaration.  
 
The economic, political and epidemiological contexts that prevailed from the 1960s pushed for 
the current health sector reforms in Tanzania. Government proposed ambitious reforms in the 
sector to transform the roles and responsibilities in the provision and financing of health care 
services, in order to ensure a cost-effective use of resources and emphasise priorities towards 
outcomes rather than inputs. The Social Sector Strategy adopted in October 1994 aimed to 
increase resource allocation to social sectors, including health sector, promoting high quality 
service standards and higher private sector participation.  
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3 1.2 Decentralisation in Tanzania: historical background 
The current decentralisation efforts originated from the adoption of the Local Government 
Reform Agenda in 1996. This is within the framework of the wider public service reforms and 
the liberalisation of Tanzanian economy. However, local government had undergone significant 
adjustments prior to the adoption of the local government reform paper in 1998. During the post-
colonial period there were LGAs were established, then abolished of the LGAs in 1972, and 
reintroduced in 1982. 
 
(i) Colonial era 
This can be divided into the German era (1884-1917) and British era (1917-1961). During this 
period, the British colonial administration acted politically to give power to the natives to control 
their localities through a system known as ―indirect rule‖ (Barkan et al., 1998). The British 
administration attempt to democratise the local government system by enactment of the Local 
Government Ordinance (Cap 333) of 1953 to replace the Native Authority Ordinance (Cap 72) of 
1926 introduced electoral processes at the local level (Max, 1991:24).The ‗native authorities‘ 
were established to collect local taxes and were responsible for limited services such as primary 
education, sanitation, dispensaries, and village roads. Rural health services were a legal 
responsibility of local authorities supervised by a District Medical Officer (DMO) as an agent of 
the central government. Services provided were mainly preventive health services like Maternal 
and Child Health (MCH) services. 
(ii) The First Decade of Independence 
Between 1962 and 1967, the new independent government undertook significant changes in local 
authorities by (i) replacing the administrative officers who previously head the provinces and 
districts with political appointees: regional and area commissioners; (ii) removing executive and 
judicial powers from the traditional chiefs and (iii) extending modern councils throughout the 
country to replace the native authority councils that were in place during the colonial 
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administration (Max, 1991). Besides these elected members the councils had also appointed 
members who were selected by the minister responsible for local government and did not exceed 
more than five (Max, 1991: 32). Another important landmark was the Arusha Declaration in 
1967 which introduced centralised planning and management of health care and declared free 
health services to all.  
 
(iii) Decentralisation through deconcentration (1972-1982) 
In 1972, Local Government system which had existed for a decade was replaced by ‗structural 
decentralisation‘ (Nyerere, 1972:1). Power and authority of the key functions of development 
planning, coordination, and management were consolidated at the grassroots through centrally 
appointed regional and district heads who were party appointees and/or civil servants(Oyugi, 
1998, Max, 1991).The aim was to strengthen the role of regional and district administration as 
well as to implement the policy of socialism and self-reliance (Maro and Mlay, 1979). The new 
system was aimed at giving the people decision making powers over matters affecting their 
welfare. Participation was a rallying slogan. Hence village councils were established under the 
Village Act 1975 in order to enhance grassroots participation (JENNINGS, 2008:59-60). The 
deconcentrated administrative structure did not establish mechanisms that would enable 
meaningful citizen participation as the bureaucrats tended to make decisions on behalf of the 
people (Picard, 1980:40). It turned out to be bureaucratic organisations dominated by ‗central 
government officials‘ (Maxi 1991:88), resulting to a nation of ‗peasants and bureaucrats‘ with 
bureaucrats firmly in charge (Eriksen et al., 1999). There were overlapping central and local 
government functions, poor coordination at the all levels of government, communication 
breakdown between ministries and districts, plus limited resources (Warioba, 1999). However, 
villages managed to produce corporate plans, implemented through the top-down authority from 
the region to district, and to district functional officers, including DMOs. 
 
Between 1976 and 1982, the ruling party recognised that the central government was no longer 
able to provide health services in rural areas. The Government started to re-introduce LGAs after 
the de-concentrated LGAs failed to deliver service. By 1983 the government had to decentralise 
in order to increase efficiency, community participation and management obligation(URT, 
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1983). The process was facilitated by the enactment of the two acts that was approved by the 
parliament in 1982. The aim was to provide the legitimacy to re-decentralise urban and rural 
councils(GoT, 1982a, GoT, 1982b).This was decentralisation by devolution to local government 
at district level. The Government re-established urban local authorities with less autonomy than 
the old ones since regions retained substantial influence. The power for raising local revenue was 
reduced. The CCM incorporated the re-introduction of LGAs in 1980 election manifesto. In 
1982, Government enacted two new laws, the Local Government (District Authorities) Act No. 7 
and Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act No. 8 which introduced a comprehensive system 
of local government authorities in rural and urban area (Steffensen and Mwaipopo, 2004). By 
1984 a comprehensive LGA system at district and village levels in rural areas and at municipal 
and city levels in urban areas was formulated to empower LGAs to enact by-laws, collect 
revenues and determine local budgets and plans (Eriksen et al., 1999). 
 
However, the revived local government system did not meet the expectations of the people in 
terms of efficient and effective service delivery. The local government agencies failed to 
organise participation and responsiveness to local needs. The Government commissioned studies 
to analyse government administration in all aspects including health services and to give 
suggestions regarding the best ways to achieve development goals (Ngware, 2005). One of the 
recommendations was to reform the local authorities through further decentralisation to respond 
to the existing socio-economic and global challenges. This laid down the basis for the Local 
Government Reform Programme (LGRP) in early 1990s. The process originated from the Civil 
Service Reform Program (CSRP) initiatives in 1994. The ruling party, CCM in their 1995 
Election Manifesto promised that, if elected, it would extend decentralisation The noticeable 
political reforms were the first multiparty elections for parliamentarian seats and local 
government in 1995 and 1994 respectively (Oyugi, 1998). To date, yet majority of the seats in 
the parliament and the local councils are still controlled by the CCM.  
(iv) Decentralisation devolution (1996+) 
In 1996 the government announced a decision to restructure the intergovernmental system and 
local governments in order to make local governments more effective. The power of the regions 
was to be downsized. It was hoped that decentralising the intergovernmental and local 
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government systems would lead to improvements in service delivery (Steffensen and Mwaipopo, 
2004). The government amended the Constitution to give LGAs more power. The Constitution 
states firmly that the purpose of having LGAs is ―to transfer authority to the people.‖ Article 146 
of the Constitution states that the objectives of the LGAs is to ―enhance the democratic process 
within its area of jurisdiction and to apply the democracy for facilitating the expeditious and 
faster development of the people‖(URT, 1997a). The constitution requires of LGAs ―to involve 
people in the planning and implementation of development programmes within their respective 
area‖(URT, 1997a). The decentralisation process is therefore based on the solid foundation of the 
national constitution.  
 
The local government reform agenda and policy in Tanzania is based on the Policy Paper on 
Local Government Reform of 1998. The policy paper sets out a comprehensive and ambitious 
agenda for local government reform through decentralisation by devolution. Specifically it 
envisaged decentralisation in four areas: 
(i) Political decentralisation: to devolve powers to the LGAs, setting the rules for the 
councils and their organs of the LGAs and strengthening the local government system as 
the most important local political bodies within their areas of jurisdiction; 
(ii) Financial decentralisation: to ensure LGAs has financial discretionary powers to levy 
taxes and raise local revenue, to make and approve their own budgets according to their 
own priorities reflecting local conditions and needs, while observing certain mandatory 
expenditure requirements to attain national goals and improving the inter-governmental 
fiscal transfer system for the LGAs to have adequate unconditional and other grants  
(iii) Administrative decentralisation: to allow LGAs to hire, fire, pay and oversee their 
staff by delinking LGA staff from their corresponding ministries. This was intended to 
make LGAs personnel accountable to local council rather than central ministries, 
(iv) Central -local relations means creating an enabling environment for the LGAs to 
deliver local services with full autonomy, whereas line ministries relinquished the role 
and functions of execution to take up the role of policy making, providing supportive 
services and capacity building to the LGAs, monitoring and quality assurance, and 
regulatory functions through legal control and audit of the LGAs (URT, 1998a). 
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The LGRP was launched in 2000, to enhance the implementation of decentralisation. The focus 
of LGRP was on building capacity of the LGAs, to allow them greater responsibilities to control 
their own resources and deliver public services more efficiently (URT, 2006). The intention was 
to limit the role of sector ministries so that they provide technical guidance on sectoral issues, set 
sector policies and legislative guidelines for LGAs, determine sector specific service delivery 
standards and monitor performance; and they were expected to reduce the extent to which they 
determined the composition and allocation of resources available to the LGAs (URT, 1996, 
URT, 1998a).  
 
In addition, decentralisation also aimed to empower the lower tiers of LGAs to raise and manage 
revenue and expenditure. Village Councils can, for example, make by-laws to prescribe local 
fees, charges and tariffs for the licenses or permits they issue (Fjeldstad and Semboja, 2000). In 
Section 9 (1) of the revised Finance Act (1999), direct community involvement in controlling 
public revenue and expenditure through service user committees and boards has been provided. 
The linkage of the local level planning and budget processes and the central government‘s 
Strategic Budget Allocation System has been strengthened through the Plan-Rep system and 
introduction of formula-based grant systems in 2004 has made transfers more equitable, 
predictable and efficient. But, the government‘s commitment to formula-based allocations is 
weak, with some recurrent and development allocations deviating substantially from the formula 
(MoFEA, 2010). 
 
The framework for decentralisation is well established within the legal framework of the Local 
Government Acts of 1982 and their amendments. This acts as a reference point for the 
decentralisation process which is defined in the local government reform policy of 1998. Some 
components have advanced further than others, and there are some discrepancies (JICA, 2008). 
Furthermore, reform policies have to take into consideration Tanzania‘s long-term development 
framework, Development Vision 2025 published in 1998, and the medium-term development 
framework, which is guided by Tanzania‘s poverty reduction strategy known as National 
Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP). The implementation of the LGRP was 
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phased out in June 2008. The joint Government-Donor Reviews (2002; 2004 and 2006) have 
shown considerable progress towards LGRP but very little has been achieved in terms of fiscal 
and administrative decentralisation., Government executed Phase II of the LGRP, from July 
2009 to June 2014. 
 
3.2. The Structure of the public health in Tanzania 
The public health sector in Tanzania is divided into central and local government levels. The 
central level comprises the ministerial and the regional administration. At the central level, the 
Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MOHSW) is the major organ for coordination overall of 
the national health services working in collaborations with the Prime Minister‘s Office Regional 
Administration and Local Government (PMO-RALG). The PMO-RALG is responsible for the 
LGAs health services. At the regional level, Tanzania is divided into 26 administrative regions 
which is an administrative extension of the central government authority. The Regional Medical 
Officers (RMO) is accountable to the MoHSW and PMO-RALG. At this level, heath service is 
managed by a technical team called regional health management team (RHMTs). By 2014, the 
government owned 15 regional hospitals. The RHMTs oversee regional referral hospitals, and 
monitor CHMTs. RHMTs provide technical assistance to regional facilities and local councils 
(MoHSW, 2008a). They assist the LGAs in the production of the council health plans which is 
referred as Comprehensive Council Health Plan (CCHP). They also provide advice on 
construction and rehabilitation of health facilities; assess the distribution of health facilities 
within the councils to ensure equity in access and efficient in the use of the health resources 
(MoHSW, 2008a).RHMTs works along with the administrative team called Regional 
Administrative Secretaries (RAS) in providing regional health services and supervising the 
delivery of health services in their region.  
 
At the local level there is a local government authority with 158 district-level (urban and rural) 
LGAs. An average LGA has about 250,000 residents and is managed by elected Council. This is 
the main government level responsible for the delivery of decentralised public health services in 
Tanzania. The most senior local official in the health sector is the District Medical Officer 
(DMO). The DMO is supported by the Council Health Management Team (CHMT) which is 
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comprised by the DMO and senior local public health administrators holding postgraduate 
degree. 
 
The district health system is responsible for primary health service which is made up with 
council hospital, dispensaries and health centres. These are the primary facilities that are closer 
to the communities. By 2014, Government had 63 council hospitals, 5,819dispensaries and614 
health centres(MoHSW, 2015). Dispensaries are limited to out-patient care while the health-
centres are supposed to provide in-patient health services that are referred from the 
dispensaries(URT, 1998b). However, the distinction is less clear as dispensaries have been 
improved to provide child and maternal health services. The health centres and dispensaries are 
the frontline in providing primary curative and preventative health services and are the main 
source of health services for the majority of the population, mostly in rural areas. These facilities 
operate with some degree of autonomy; but they are supervised by and fully accountable to the 
DMO for all aspects of their operations(URT, 2001d).  
 
As well as the district hospital fall under the direct responsibility of the DMO. The current 
assignment of functional responsibilities has resulted in a relatively decentralised assignment of 
health services to the district council. However, at the district council level, control of the 
planning and management of health services is somehow centralised. The DMO is the appointee 
post by the MoHSW and formally reports to the Council through the Executive Director plays a 
significant role in planning, coordinating and implementing the delivery of the district health 
services. The DMO is supported by the CHMTs and executed their task following central 
guidelines and instructions.  In order to promise the coherent in the delivery of council health 
services, the DMO and the CHMT are required to prepare a Comprehensive Council Health Plan 
(CCHP) that guides the delivery of the local health services.  
 
A system of health committees (at the district and primary health facility-level) has been set up 
to assure public participation, oversight and accountability over local health services. council 
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health services boards (CHSBs), and health facility committees (HFCs) at have been established 
as democratic organs with legal status to govern the provision of health services (URT, 2001b). 
The bylaws for their establishment specify roles of the HFCs and CHSBs. It is assumed that they 
will lead to an increase in user representation and accountability (URT, 2001c, URT, 2001b).  
 
The MOHSW works jointly with other government institutions and development partners for 
resource mobilisation. The Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs (MoFEA) manages the 
overall revenues. It allocates funds for salaries as per the approved vacancies, and releases funds 
upon the approval of health budgets. MoFEA provides the Government with advice on broad 
financial budget and defines expenditure allocations  
 
The President's Office, Public Service Management (PO-PSM) assists in matters of human 
resource management pertaining to Public Service across the entire government system. This 
includes responsibilities for personnel policies, administration and coordination of training and 
recruitment. This office plays a crucial role in human resources for health by overseeing staff 
establishment, schemes of service and promotions, and the issuing of approvals of vacancies 
against the posts available. LGAs and MDAs are responsible for placing requests with the PO-
PSM for the staff they require. The MOHSW has been assigned the role of posting staff in 
accordance with POPSM-approved vacancies(MoHSW, 2013b). 
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Figure 3-1: Technical and administrative relations in a decentralised health sector 
Source: PER, 2013. 
 
Although health governance structures are in place and CCHPs are developed annually, councils 
are not accountable to the public for spending within the health sector. This is mainly because 
the communities are often not aware of the money allocated to health care. As per government 
guidelines, community members should lodge their complaints about  CHMT practices to the 
office of the DED (MoHSW, 2010). However, in practice, the DED are often not actively 
involved in enforcing CHMT roles and responsibilities (Masau et al., 2011). 
 
3.3 Health system performance indicators 
This section summarises health system performance indicators that are most relevant to this 
study based on MoHSW of the different documents. The review aims to point out financial 
human resources for health and health governance indicators. 
MoHSW 
PMO-RALG 
DOH 
RAS 
RHMT 
LGA 
CHMT 
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3.3.1 Health financing 
Government health expenditure data show that investments in the sector have stalled in the last 
few years. Figure 3-2 shows that the health sector lags behind to other priority sector; although, 
its budget has increased from Tsh1206 billion in 2010/2011 to Tsh1209 billion in 2011/12. 
However, there was an increase of 85% for infrastructure, 65% for energy, 12% for education 
and 2.5% for water while health was 3.1% (URT, 2011a). 
 
 
Figure 3-2 Allocation to priority sectors in Tanzania 
Source: MoHSW, 2011 
 
(a)Health budget trend  
Financial trend to the health sector presented in figure 3-3 below shows that national allocation 
has increased between FY 2010/11 to FY 2011/12 then dropped in FY 2012/13 and increased in 
the FY 2013/14. However, per capita health spending as a percentage of GDP has increased from 
Tsh 11 298 (US$9.5) in 2005/2006 to Tsh 30 400 (US$19) in 2011/2012 (Masau et al., 2011).. 
However, this is below the 2011 WHO estimate of USD$40 needed for the Government to be 
able to provide a minimum package of health services to all Tanzanians. This amount  is also less 
than the national target of US$33 and lower than the regional average of US$148 (MoHSW, 
2013b).  
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Figure 3-3: Overall national health budget trend from the FY 2010/11 to 2013/14 
Source, MoHSW, 2014 
 
(b) Sources of public health funds 
The public health sector has two main sources of funding: internal and external resources. 
External resources are channelled to the health sector in three forms: general budget support, 
health basket funding and direct programme or project support. Internal sources account for 70% 
of the total health spending including tax revenues (28%), household revenues (25%) and private 
funds (3%). External sources (donors) are channelled to capital development, while recurrent 
expenditure comes from government sources (MoHSW, 2013b). Insurance funds contribute 3% 
of the total health care spending.  
 
As shown in table 3-7, Government funding as a proportion of total public funding for health has 
been decreasing. In 2007/08 government funding as a share of total public funding was 66%, but 
decreased to 63% in 2009/10, and stands at 59%, as established in the 2011/12 budget 
(MOHSW, 2012a). However, public health budget has become increasingly reliant on external 
funds, which may not be sustainable in case they withdraw funding.  
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Table 3-7 Sources of public health funding 
 2007/06 2008/09 2009/10  2010/11  2011/12  
 Actual % of 
Total 
Actual % of 
Total 
Actual  % of 
Total  
Actual  % of 
Total  
Actual  % of 
Total  
Gov Funds 378,114  66%  461,504  65%  578,793  63%  576,858  62%  710,096  67%  
Foreign Funds 
Donor basket  80,957  14%  85,401  12%  128,796  14%  126,822  14%  151,013  14%  
Non-basket  112,003  19%  154,168  22%  200,049  22%  213,979  23%  189,825  27%  
Total Foreign 
Funds  
192,960  33%  239,569  34%  328,845  36%  340,801  37%  340,839  32%  
Off-budget  5,696  1%  5,858  1%  10,784  1%  14,212  2%  10,414  0%  
GRAND TOTAL  576,770  100%  706,931  100%  918,422  100%  931,871  100%  1,061,349  100%  
Source:  PE, 2011 
(c) Health expenditure as a share of total government expenditures 
The health sector is one of the priority sectors in government allocation. Other sectors include 
education, electricity, water, transport and transportation infrastructure, agriculture, irrigation 
and job creation in the public and private sectors. The priority sectors were allocated more than 
60% of the national budget in 2010/11 that equivalent to 17% of the GDP. However, total 
government expenditures, including all sectors (figure 3-4), increased by more than 10% during 
previous budget years. On average, the education sector received most of the allocated funds 
(19%), followed by health (9%), agriculture (4%), and water (3 %) (URT, 2011). 
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Figure 3-4: Government expenditure on major sectors in billion Tanzanian shilling 
* Budget data available only (not actual expenditure) 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs  
 
Since 2001 Government intended to increase health expenditures in line with the Abuja goal of 
15% of government budget devoted to the health sector. However, government data shows that 
the Abuja commitment has not been realised. Table 3-8 shows that 12.1% of government 
spending (excluding Consolidated Fund Service) was allocated to health in 2009/10, while only 
10.4% of government budget was allocated in 2012/13. As a share of GDP, government health 
expenditures have declined from 3.0% in 2009/10 to 2.8% in 2011/12 
 
Table 3-8. Health expenditure as share of total government expenditures 
 2007/2008 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 
Health spending as share of gov budget 
excludes. CFS 
12.3%  12.1%  13.1%  11.9%  12.1%  
Health spending as share of gov budget Include. 
CFS  
11.1%  10.8%  9.9%  9.5%  9.5%  
Health spending as % of GDP  2.52%  2.67%  3.03%  2.63%  2.80%  
Source: MOHSW, 2013 
 
MKUKUTA allocation for cluster II, which included the health sector, receives fewer resources, 
as Table 3-4 shows. An analysis shows that, since their inception in 2005/2006, there has been 
uncertainty on allocations among the clusters. A larger proportion of resources are allocated to 
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support growth of the economy. Cluster II was allocated 31%, while Cluster I received 51% and 
Cluster III 8% of the total MKUKUTA funding. MKUKUTA budgets are restrictive to cost 
effective interventions thus, some components of reproductive health are not receiving any 
allocation. The HIV/AIDS and TB are prioritised which means that key reproductive health 
interventions, such as promotional services, are not favoured.  The MKUKUTA focus has been 
mainly on economic growth, and the country has indeed experienced consistent growth of around 
6%, (URT, 2009c). 
 
General government financial resources to the health sector are decreasing and public health 
budget has become increasingly reliant on foreign funds. Thus, increasing resources for the RHS 
requires the expansion of the general health budget as at current level the health sector is already 
overstretched with other competing demands such as human resource for heath, expansion of the 
facilities to mention the few. The planned resource required to deliver health reform goals 
continues to diminish, signifying resource‘s for the RHS will also decline  
 
3.3.2 Human resources for health 
Health care personnel play a significant role in service delivery. Human resources in the health 
sector are inadequate in absolute numbers and relative to the size of the population (URT, 
2009a).  According to the human resources for health (HRH) profile for 2012, there were a total 
of 64 449 health workers which corresponds to 52% of the demand using 1999 staffing norms, or 
36% of the demand using the new staffing norms (MoHSW, 2013a). Despite the national data on 
HRH showing improvements in certain cadres, the sector is facing a serious HRH crisis at all 
levels for all cadres. The shortage was significant during the 1990s following the retrenchment of 
the civil servants and the imposition of a freeze on employment which was a part of aid 
conditions. This led to the loss of one-third of the health workforce (Mæstad, 2006, CEGAA, 
2009). The shortage was also worsened by the rapid increase of  HIV/AIDS, malaria, and 
tuberculosis patients (URT, 2011b).  
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In responding to the crisis, the MOHSW formulated a strategic HRH plan (2008 to 2013). 
Included are an increase in the number of training institutions and government scholarships 
granted to students admitted to both public and private medical schools. This led to a significant 
increase in the number of graduates for different cadres (MoHSW, 2008b). Human resource 
management has been weak, with limited absorptive capacity in the system. The health sector 
can only take up some of the newly trained health workers, despite the huge shortage of health 
personnel. The workload is measured through the number of professionals per 10 000 people, as 
in Table 3-9. Generally there is an increase in all cadres expect for assistant medical officers. 
 
Table 3-9: Human resource for health per population in Tanzania 
Type of cadre*  2008 2012 
Medical officer (MO) 0.3 0.5 
Assistant medical officer (AMO) 0.4 0.4 
AMO and MO  0.7 0.9 
Nurse/midwife 2.6 4.8 
Pharmacist/pharmacy technician 0.15 0.13 
* Health worker per 10 000 population. Source: MoHSW, 2013 
 
The national data shows that there is a huge deficit for specialist doctors (58.1%) compared to 
other cadres. The shortage is triggered by poor distribution, remuneration and infrastructure. As 
well, lack of the retention schemes and international migration after training (Mshana and Petit, 
2011, Munga et al., 2014). Poor management affects the output of staff and ultimately the quality 
of services.  
Regional data also show huge disparities between rural and urban (Figure 3-3). While urban 
facilities had, 77.5% of medical personnel, the remote regions had only 22.7% as Figure 3-6 
shows. The regional averages reflect inequality in intraregional and intra-district distribution. 
The SIKIKA tracking study for the HRH (2011) found that 40% of the registered doctors were 
not practising.  Only 43% were practising in public facilities while 17% are working with NGOs, 
8% had emigrated. Country studies revealed that health workers are not attracted to work in 
remote areas. Factors that influence attraction and retention include provision of housing and 
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other essential items. The retention depends on the availability of the local resources which pose 
challenges for poor regions (Mshana and Petit, 2011). Inequitable distribution of HRH will 
persist until workable solutions are found to attract staffs to serve in less popular regions and 
councils. 
 
 
Figure 3-5 Deficit of human resources in health, by region 
Source: PMO-LARG, 2011 
 
LGAs HRH disparities are also huge in rural councils compared to urban ones, as shown in 
Figure 3-5. Urban councils have twice the number of health workers per capita compared to rural 
council. LGAs with a small number of HRH also had a small share of highly trained HRH. 
Figure 3-6 shows that LGAs lack specialist doctors, whose availability is 39%. Social welfare 
officers and assistant dental officers are far below the numbers required. Other cadres such as 
nurse-midwives, public health nurse, clinical officers, health officers, pharmacists/technicians 
and radiographers have increased by 50% but are below the 60% required. Assessments carried 
out in 2009 show that councils‘ HRH numbers are below 50% of the requirements (Munga and 
Maestad, 2009a). The health sector is facing a crisis of staff shortage which threatens operations 
to serve millions of clients in the nation. In order to prevent this, strenuous efforts by the 
government and other stakeholders in the health sector are needed to avert the current crisis. 
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Figure 3-6: Percentage of the available healthcare personnel in LGAs 
Source: MoHSW, 2011 
3.3.3 Health governance 
Governance is one of the political processes aiming at balancing of competing influences and 
demands (WHO, 2000). Governance in health systems is about developing and setting in place 
functioning rules in the institutional for policies, programmes, and activities related to fulfilling 
public health functions in order to achieve health sector objective. The rules define which actors 
play which roles, with what responsibilities, to achieve health system objectives (Brinkerhoff and 
Bossert, 2008). 
 
Decentralisation by devolution in Tanzania plays a critical role in health governance. At national 
levels, MoHSW and PMO-RALG play a key role in management, but are not always sufficient 
to translate policy in practice. Generally, roles and responsibilities in the MoHSW and its 
departments are clear and well defined in the policy and strategy documents guiding the 
management (MoH, 2003) . The relationships with other ministries, DPs and private for and not-
for-profit organisations are described in laws, regulations and other formal agreements. The 
challenge facing the MoHSW is the human resource problems, as many of the public servants 
have none of the necessary knowledge about policies and strategies; hence there is limited 
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capacity to translate concepts into practical programmes. Information is not always shared and 
collaboration between departments is not always optimum. 
 
At the regional level, RHMTs oversee regional referral hospitals, and monitor CHMTs. RHMT 
members also provide technical assistance to the regional facilities and CHMTs (MoHSW, 
2008a). They assist CHMTs in developing the Comprehensive Council Health Plans (CCHP) and 
managing health financing mechanisms within the council, as well as in developing health centre 
and dispensary plans. Specially, they provide advice on construction and rehabilitation of health 
facilities; assess the distribution of health facilities within the councils in order to avoid 
duplications and promote use of existing FBO facilities; monitor the distribution of and 
construction of additional health facilities within the councils to ensure equity of access and 
efficient use of available resources, which includes existing health facilities; and monitor the 
staffing and equipping of all health facilities (MoHSW, 2008a). 
 
At council, CHMTs prepare the comprehensive council health plan (CCHP) on an annual basis. 
The plan holds the CHMTs and their councils accountable to the central health authority and 
their constituents. CHMTs are evaluated based on the quality of the CCHPs produced. The 
analysis of the 132 councils shows that 126 (95%) councils were recommended for funding, 
while six (5%) councils were not recommended. However, this is an improvement when 
compared to the preceding year, when 19 councils were not recommended for funding (MoHSW, 
2011). This shows the importance of the RHMTs in assisting councils to improve planning and 
budgeting capacities. CHMTs, are supposed to perform both technical and administrative clinical 
supervisory duties within district hospitals, health centres and dispensaries(MoHSW, 2008a). 
 
Governance structures have been established at communities to hold providers accountable in 
health services delivery. However, the functioning of this structure is still questioned, current as 
many of them are not performing their oversight role. Only half of governance structures are 
functional and few have approved CCHPs or annual hospital plans (Masau et al., 2011). These 
compromise the important role of voicing community interests in the management of health 
facilities. 
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Although the above-mentioned structures are in place and CCHPs are developed annually, 
councils are not accountable to the public for spending within the health sector. This is mainly 
because the communities often are not aware of the money that is allocated to health care. As per 
government guidelines, community members should lodge their complaints about the CHMT 
practices to the District Executive Director (DED) office (MoHSW, 2010). However, in practice, 
DED often are not actively involved in enforcing CHMT roles and responsibilities (Masau et al., 
2011). 
 
3.4 Reproductive health performance in Tanzania: A brief overview 
Pregnancy and childbearing have been major causes of death and disability among women. In 
many parts of the world, women face a burden of ill-health linked to sexually transmitted 
infections. In low- and middle-income countries, unsafe sex is the leading risk factor for death 
and disability among women of reproductive age (20 to 49 years), which can lead to sexually 
transmitted infections, including HIV (WHO, 2014). Although many of these infections can be 
prevented and treated, women in the developing world have no access to appropriate information 
and services. Women are more vulnerable to infections for both biological and social reasons; 
they might lack the knowledge they need to protect themselves or may not be in a position to use 
it (Cook et al., 2003) Improved health outcomes have broader individual, family and societal 
benefits, including a healthier productive force and better access to resources for each child in 
smaller families (Canning and Schultz, 2012, Gribble and Voss, 2009, Cook et al., 2003). Hence, 
poor health outcomes affect opportunities for families to escape from poverty (Rights, 2012, 
Bernstein and Hansen, 2006). 
 
Global data on reproductive health is not impressive, although there has been an improvement. 
The Adding It Up report by the World Health Organisation (WHO), United Nations Population 
Fund (UNFPA) and World Bank (WB) (Sing, Darroch & Ashford, 2014) shows that sexual and 
reproductive health needs are not met in developing regions. An estimated 225 million women 
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who want to avoid a pregnancy are not using an effective contraceptive method. Since the 
Adding It Up report for 2008, the number has been virtually unchanged. Out of the 125 million 
women who give birth each year, 54 million make fewer than the minimum of four antenatal 
visits recommended by the WHO; 43 million do not deliver their babies in a health facility; 21 
million need but do not receive care for major obstetric complications; 33 million have new-
borns who need but do not receive care for health complications; and 1.5 million are living with 
HIV, more than one-third of whom are not receiving the antiretroviral care they need to prevent 
the transmission of the virus to their new-borns and to protect their own health (Singh et al., 
2014).  
 
Although data on maternal deaths shows there it decreased by 45%, from 543 000 in 1990 to 
289 000 in 2013, deaths in the developing world are still high. Of the 289 000 global maternal 
deaths, developing countries contributed 99% (286 000), compared to 2 300 deaths in the 
developed countries. Sub-Saharan Africa alone constitutes the majority of the deaths, namely 
62% (179 000), followed by Southern Asia at 24% (69 000). These two regions account for 86% 
of the global maternal mortalities (WHO, 2014). The adult lifetime risk of maternal mortality for 
SSA women is the highest, at one in 38, in comparison to one in 140 in Oceania, one in 200 in 
Southern Asia, one in 310 in South-east Asia and one in 3 700 among women in developed 
countries. The contributing factor is the poor access to and poor quality of health service (WHO, 
2014). Although the country data shows some improvements on RH indicators in particular 
maternal mortalities, yet, much of the target has not been achieved, including universal access to 
reproductive health care by 2015. The next section presents the available information against the 
selected reproductive health sector indicators. The aim is to understand the current RHS status in 
Tanzania. 
 
3.4.1 Maternal mortality  
Maternal mortality is any death reported during pregnancy, childbirth or within 42 day after the 
birth or termination of a pregnancy (MOHSW, 2008d). Maternal health has improved over the 
years, although the rate is still unacceptably high. According to the Tanzania Demographic and 
Health Surveys (TDHS), 2004/2005 estimates show that the maternal mortality ratio (MMR) at 
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578 maternal deaths per 100 000 live births. The TDHS results of 2009/2010 show that the 
MMR has declined to 454 deaths per 100 000 live births (NBS and Macro-ICF, 2005, NBS and 
ICF-Marco, 2011). This is a notable improvement, but maternal morbidities are still relatively 
high, requiring more effort to attain the MDGs, which is 265 per 1 000 000 live births, similar to 
the goal used for the MKUKUTA target. 
 
3.4.2 Proportion of pregnant women starting ANC before 16 weeks’ gestation age 
Antenatal care can be most effective in avoiding adverse pregnancy outcomes when it is sought 
early in the pregnancy and continues through to delivery. Timely and consistent check-ups by 
trained providers are very important in assessing the physical status of women during pregnancy. 
In 2008 about a sixth (14%) of pregnant women started attending antenatal care (ANC) services 
before 16 weeks of gestation, whereas in 2009, slightly less than half (47%) attended ANC 
services before 16 weeks of gestation. The Reproductive Health Strategy 2005 to 2010 set a 
target of 60% of pregnant women starting to attend ANC services before 16 weeks of gestation 
by end of year (2010); the current performance is significantly behind the RCH target, which 
implies that more intervention is required.  
3.4.3 Proportion of births attended in health facility 
Proper medical attention and hygienic environment during delivery can decrease the risk of 
complications and infections that can cause the death or serious illness of the mother and/or the 
new-born baby. Hygiene is essential to reduce health risks to mothers and new born children. 
There is slow progress in the coverage of deliveries by skilled birth attendants, which increased 
from 43% to 51% from 2005 to 2010.Heath management information system (HMIS) 2012 data 
show that 62% of deliveries took place in health facilities (MoHSW, 2013b). Not all health 
facility deliveries are attended by skilled birth attendants, despite the increase in the number of 
nurse-midwives in the country. Still, 30% of health facilities do not have a proper delivery room 
and adequate facilities (SARA, 2012). In rural areas, 42% of women delivered in a health 
facility, compared to 83% in urban areas. There also is a wealth gap in skilled birth attendance, 
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as 93% of the women in the highest quintile had attended births, compared to only 33% in the 
lowest wealth quintile (NBS and ICF-Macro, 2011). 
 
3.4.5 Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel  
The type of support a woman receives during childbirth has significant health consequences for 
the mother as well as the child. The proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel is 
measured by the number of deliveries conducted by skilled health personnel as a proportion of 
the projected number of births. The 2004/2005 TSDHS findings show that less than half (46%) 
of births or deliveries were attended by skilled attendants, whereas the 2010 TDHS reports that 
51% of deliveries were attended by skilled attendants, indicating a slight increase. 
 
3.4.4Contraceptive prevalence rate 
The level of current contraceptive use methods is one of the indicators commonly used to assess 
the success of family planning programmes and the determinants of fertility. This indicator is 
measured as the number of contraceptive active users (including and excluding condoms) as a 
proportion of the total number of women of childbearing age. In 2010, data from facilities 
(HMIS) indicated that 46.7% of the women of reproductive age were using any modern family 
planning method. However, the 2004/2005 TDHS found that 20% of married women were using 
any modern contraceptive method, and this increased slightly to 27% according to the 2010 
TDHS. These results show that there still is a big gap that needs to be filled when this realisation 
is linked to the 60% contraceptive prevalence rate by 2015 specified in the Maternal Neonatal 
and Child Health (MNCH) Strategic Plan 2008 to 2015. 
 
3.4.5 Percentage of HIV-positive women receiving ARVs 
This is an indicator that measures the number of HIV-positive women receiving antiretroviral 
(ARV) drugs for the prevention of mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT) as a proportion of the 
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total number of HIV-positive pregnant women per year. National Guidelines on PMTCT were 
developed in 2007 and integrated into ANC services (MOHSW, 2012b). Testing and counselling 
for HIV is offered to all mothers at ANC. Access to and coverage of PMTCT and ART continue 
to increase. About 92.4% of HIV-positive women were receiving ARVs in 2010 an increase 
from 43% in 2009 (TACAIDS, 2013). 
 
3.4.7 Proportion of mothers who received two doses of intermittent treatment (IPT)  
This is an indicator measured at household level and based on pregnant women aged 15 to 49 
years who received at least two doses of intermittent preventive treatment (IPT) during their last 
pregnancy that led to a live birth within the last two years, out of a total number of surveyed 
women aged from 15 to 49 years who delivered a live baby within the same period outlined 
above. The malaria prevention has integrated into ANC and pregnant women receive two doses 
of Sulfadoxine/Pyrimethemane during the second and third trimesters to protect them from the 
adverse effects of malaria in pregnancy and low birth weight. Also, at ANC, pregnant women 
access subsidised insecticide-treated bed net (ITNs). Nationally, 80% of pregnant women slept 
under mosquito nets at night but not all pregnant women receive IPT 2 due to low follow-up 
attendance in ANC (TACAIDS, 2013). 
3.4.8 Fertility trend  
The World Fact Book data estimates for 2013 show that the annual population growth rate is 
2.82% in Tanzania. This placed the country 17th in the world. The total fertility rate (TFR) is 
still high (5.4), although the TFR trend shows there are positive gains. When compared to 
previous TDHS, the 2010 TDHS estimates show that TFR is lower (5.4) than the 2004/2005 
TDHS (5.7). Similar rates were identified in the 1996 TDHS (5.8) and in the 1999 Tanzania 
Reproductive and Child Health Survey (TRCHS) (5.6). When compared to some SSA countries 
like South Africa, with a TFR of 2.8, the Tanzanian TFR is very high, differs widely within the 
country and is associated with the background characteristics of women. Women with no 
education have high fertility rates (6.7) compared to women with secondary and/or other levels 
of education (3.1). This signifies an inadequate, low or unmet need for family planning. Review 
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studies have shown that fertility declines are associated with an increase in women‘s health, 
earnings and participation in paid employment (Canning & Schultz, 2012). 
 
3.5 Chapter discussion and conclusion 
The chapter looks at the contexts that led to health sector reforms in Tanzania. The poor 
performance of the economy and poor public administration led the government to solicit 
partnership with donors. The analysis reveals that in regard to the targets of health sector reforms 
to improve health system performance and local health service delivery, government had adopted 
deferent measures including centralising or decentralising depending on the time. For example 
during the socialist era government adopted deconcentration as form of decentralisation to 
consolidate development programs to grassroots like construction of dispensaries through both 
government and community efforts. 
 
With regard to health reform there have been numerous changes. The foremost is the change in 
the role of central government from service provider to policy maker. Currently local authorities 
are in full of charge of local service delivery and citizens have been transformed from service 
recipients to clients/customers. Service providers are allowed to charge fees up to a certain 
amount and prices may vary depending on the level of service delivery Therefore, the 
relationship between the provider and receiver has changed into buyer and seller.  
 
Since independence the government has pursued a distinct path of decentralisation with some 
approaches more meaningful than others. Government has concentrated on devolution to give 
meaningful authority to lower levels of government. However; their relative autonomy has not 
significantly changed despite a deliberate official policy of ‗decentralisation by devolution‘. The 
subsequent chapters which present field evidence, show that there are areas where the reforms 
have progressed and areas where they have had limited progress or even led to centralisation of 
the decentralised functions.  
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However, it is also widely recognised that the transitions of political and economic systems have 
been incomplete with lack of accountability and responsible governance. It is generally 
recognised that implementation of the decentralisation is influenced by values of the ruling party 
CCM with the patronage of the civil servants representing central government in local affairs. 
The opposition parties are becoming vibrant but CCM is still the majority party, with 98% and 
70% of national and local parliaments respectively. Although, decentralisation was included in 
the CCM election manifesto; yet some of the party leaders have been supporting legislations 
which are against decentralisation. In an interview with the Prime Minister (PM) during the 
evaluation of the LGRP in 2007, he PM argued that some CCM leaders did not share the same 
vision of decentralisation. They felt that it was unrealistic for LGAs to employ and control their 
own staff. The existence of central appointees at the LGAs explains the interests of the CCM in 
strengthening local capacities for their political gains. Thus, unless central government decides to 
implement full decentralisation to enable LGAs decide upon their own matters, there is no hope 
further devolution would resolve service-delivery issues. 
 
It has been obvious that health sector decentralisation is strongly influenced by the contextual 
factors surround general public reforms. In Tanzania, it is clear that decentralisation is strongly 
determined by historical, political, economic and international elements, as found in other studies 
elsewhere (Gilson and Mills, 1995, Mills et al., 1990, Collins et al., 2003, Collins et al., 2007). 
The chapter suggest decentralisation policy is to be understood within its historical, political 
context, the economic system of the country has an impact on the content and outcome of the 
policy.  
 
Since adoption of the reform, development partners are playing key role for the initial push for 
reforms in the health sector following underperforming economies that were followed by broader 
national reforms i.e. ERP, SAPs. With resources from World Bank and other donors countries 
started analysing their specific situations, identified problems, designed reforms, planned them 
and started implementation. However, the ownership and willingness of the government to take 
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reform in its full package is not resolved Thus, the concern of the current study is to understand 
how a decentralised health system functions, with regard to political, fiscal and administrative 
aspects which are featured in the current local government reform and how it has impacted on 
reproductive health service delivery in rural Tanzania. The next chapter 5 presents views of 
national and local actors on the decentralisation policy in Tanzania  
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Abbreviations for Chapter 4 
ALAT  Association of Local Government Authorities in Tanzania  
CHMT  Council health management team  
DC   District Commissioner  
DED  District Executive Director 
DMO   District Medical Officer  
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HSR  Health sector reform  
KI   Key informants  
LGAs  Local government authorities  
MoFEA  Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs  
MoHSW Ministry of Health and Social Welfare  
NIMR  National Institute for Medical Research 
PMO-RALG  Prime Minister‘s Office – Regional Administration and Local Government  
PO-PS  President‘s Office – Public Service Management  
PSI   Population Service International  
RCH   Reproductive and Child Health Section  
RCHCo Reproductive and Child Health Care Coordinator  
SOAS  School of Oriental and African Studies 
SRH  Sexual and reproductive health 
WHO  World Health Organization 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction 
There are three critical issues in the study of any social phenomenon: theoretical, conceptual and 
methodological (Classen, 1999). This chapter deals with methodological issues. This is an 
inductive explorative research which aimed at generating rather than testing hypotheses. The 
issues examined include, how the decentralisation processes were formulated and implemented, 
who are the key actors and sources of power to mention a few aspects. The study examines the 
impact of decentralisation on district health service delivery particularly reproductive health 
services. Being an inductive study the impact of decentralisation was critically examined in 
relation to the entire health system delivery system. The study further unveiled the interactions 
between actors and their working environment that produce health outcomes. The nature of the 
study is reflected in its methodological approach (Grodos and Mercenier, 2000). The current 
study embraces both analytical and health system research The analytical approach focuses on 
interactions of actors and their roles, while the health system research focuses on the whole 
system and interactions between actors and their working environment that produce health 
outcomes. 
 
4.2 The research paradigm underpinning the study 
A paradigm is ‗a set of assumptions about how a phenomenon should be studied‘ (Henn et al., 
2006:10). It is argued that every research paradigm has its epistemological foundations, which 
influence knowledge and methods that are appropriate for different settings (Patton, 1990, 
Patton, 2002). Thus, a research paradigm is important in the construction of theoretical concepts 
for revealing assumptions about social reality. Furthermore, it influences the research design at 
all stages, including the formulation of methods and analysis (Gray, 2004).  
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A number of research paradigms have been identified in the literature, the most common of 
which are the positivist, interpretive and critical paradigms (Cohen et al., 2000; Henn et al., 
2006). These paradigms have their foundation in epistemology, ontology and methodology. The 
positivism paradigm is located within normative studies, whereby social reality exists ‗out there‘ 
and is independent of the observer (Crotty, 1998, Guba and Lincoln, 2005).The Positivist studies 
aim at discovering a ―set of laws to be used in predicting human behaviour‖(Esterberg, 2002:10). 
In this line of argument the positivist paradigm is not appropriate for the achievement of the 
objectives of this study. On the other hand studies that are informed by the critical science 
paradigm aim at ―exposing inequalities, malpractices, injustices and exploitation; give voice to 
the excluded and marginalised group and help explain generalised oppression in order to 
participate in the social change‖(Henn et al., 2006:10). The critical paradigm central argument as 
explained before is not reflected in the main objective of this study which is to understand the 
impacts of decentralisation on health services delivery. Arguably due to the shortcomings of both 
positivism and critical paradigms this study adopts the interpretive paradigm whose foundation is 
laid in constructivist epistemology (Gray, 2004). The interpretive paradigm holds that social 
reality is created jointly over meaningful interaction between the researcher and participants in 
their social and cultural context (Yanow, 2000, Yanow et al., 2006). Social reality is experienced 
in different ways and interpreted  ―often in similar but not necessarily the same way‖(Bessey, 
1999:43). 
 
The choice of interpretive paradigm was based on three reasons; first, it allows the researcher to 
access the experience and views of the participants in knowledge construction. Secondly, it is 
useful to understand the complex phenomena in a particular sociocultural context (Creswell, 
1998:17).Lastly, the paradigm positions researchers as listeners to participants‘ experiences and 
practices in their working environment. Then the information collected is pieced together as 
narrative. It is in this way that knowledge is generated in the area of interest, and findings are 
translated into a narrative layout (Kouritzin et al., 2009). Labonte and Robertson (1996) used 
constructivism approach in analysing community-based health promotion programmes and came 
out with convincing results. Their findings show that constructivism has the potential for 
knowledge generation (Labonte and Robertson, 1996). 
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From interpretive perspectives, national policy agendas, issues, problems and solutions are 
socially constructed by policy makers, government officials and other policy actors, including 
the public at large (Gamson and Lasch, 1983, Becker and Bryman, 2004). Constructivism calls 
for the attention to the manner in which policy makers and members of institutions are affected 
by policy and the way  in which the general public makes sense of and constructs their own 
understandings (Yanow, 1996),decentralisation policy being the case. Actor‘s interpretation 
shapes the policy implementation, which at the end affect policy outcomes, in this case, 
reproductive health services. As argued before the paradigmatic position of the study is 
concerned with the two key aspects of policy process and outcomes. This involves how different 
categories of actors including but not limited to policy makers, health managers, providers and 
the service users construct realities from their own experiences with decentralisation policy and 
the outcome produced at the end.  
 
4.3 Research approach: Case study 
The research design depends on the central question and the theoretical background of the study. 
This study aimed at understanding and examining decentralisation and its impact on reproductive 
health services in rural Tanzania. Therefore, it is clear that the research question demanded a 
research design that could capture and explain a phenomenon that is rooted in its context.  Based 
on the foregoing argument, this study adopts a qualitative research approach. Qualitative 
research is concerned with offering specialised techniques for obtaining in-depth responses about 
what people think and their experience with the implementation of the decentralisation policy 
either as policy makers, service providers or service users. It enables researchers to gain insights 
into attitudes, beliefs, motives and behaviours of the target population, and gain an overall better 
understanding of the underlying processes. By its very nature, qualitative research is subjective 
and exploratory. The basic principles of qualitative research are openness, research as 
communication, reflexivity of objects as well as flexibility (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994, Bryman, 
2004). 
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The qualitative research design enabled the researcher to gain an in-depth understanding of the 
complex nature of the implementation of the decentralisation policy in the health sector and how 
it has impacted on reproductive health service delivery. Policy implementation issues are 
embedded in the complex socio-economic, political and cultural spheres of different layers of the 
governance. The study was not linear, neither did it aim at discovering or generalising the truth, 
nor did it look at causal-effects relationships, rather it describes, explains and evaluates 
decentralisation policy in relation to reproductive health delivery. It aimed at understanding the 
complexity of the implementation of decentralisation in the rural setting of Tanzania. To 
understand this complexity, the qualitative approach was applied to understand the realities of 
decentralisation. Qualitative studies aim at providing illumination and understanding of the 
complex issues and are most useful in answering ‗how‘ and ‗why‘ questions (King-Keohane and 
Verba, 1994). Thus, the improved understanding of a complex subject is more important than 
generalizability of the results as far as studying the outcomes of the decentralisation policy in 
reproductive health delivery system is concerned. 
 
The qualitative approach covers many research approaches, including historical research,  
phenomenological study, ethnographic study and case study. These approaches may have some 
related features, but different goal/s (Gall et al., 2007, King-Keohane and Verba, 1994). 
However, case study research is more holistic in conducting in-depth analysis of phenomena 
while accommodating both ‗understanding‘ and ‗analysing‘ dimensions(Yin, 2003b, Yin, 
2009).(Yin, 2009, Yin, 2003a) The case study has used Yin‘s ‗embedded design‘ to provide a 
deeper investigation of the actors which can be  individuals institutions, communities and their 
relationships(Baxter and Jack, 2008). Furthermore, it supports the deconstruction and 
reconstruction of a phenomenon, in this case decentralisation. In relation to selecting the case 
study, Denscombe (2003) pointed out four reasons to justify its selection. Firstly, the case can be 
selected if it is an extreme instance, contrary to the norm. Secondly, an area is selected because 
of its suitability for either ‗theory-building or testing‘. Thirdly, a case might be selected to test 
the validity of a theory, and fourthly, a case can be selected because it is a typical instance. He 
stressed that ―the logic being invoked is that, the particular case is similar in crucial respects with 
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others that might have been chosen and that the findings from the case-study are likely to apply 
elsewhere‖(Denscombe, 2003:33). 
 
The aim of this research was to understand decentralisation process and to examine its impact on 
reproductive health care delivery. In relation to the research questions, the focus has been on the 
‗process‘ and ‗impact of the process‘ through which health outcomes can be achieved. The 
research is on the decentralisation of the health system which ultimately had an impact on the 
provision of RHS. Thus; the study recognises that policy actors (bureaucrats, politicians, service 
providers and users) construct their own meanings and reality from their experiences of 
decentralisation. Actors who are involved directly with community service delivery (downwards) 
construct knowledge through their views over reform content, new roles, responsibility, which 
informs policy makers (upwards). The upward actors (policy elites including politicians and 
bureaucrats) have an administrative role which influences and shapes the relationship between 
implementers and users. Thus, their views, perceptions, actions and interests provide a useful 
link in understanding the process. The interrelationships of the individuals in the process can 
change the content of that knowledge. However, meaning construction is experienced differently 
in a given setting (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994). Thus, in establishing a consensus of 
understanding the realities among policy actors, the study borrows from Mitra the idea of 
―engaging the actors and observers through focusing on the discourses that connect them‖(Mitra, 
2006:6). Health gains of decentralisation were analysed through users‘ perceptions. To 
understand participants‘ own experiences of the process, fieldwork was conducted over the 
course of six months in an attempt to capture the complex and unpredictable nature of the 
decentralisation process. 
 
4.3.1 Study setting 
Decentralisation is happening at both national and local levels. Therefore the study was 
organised at four different levels, namely the national, district council, facility and community 
levels. Political, fiscal and administrative decentralisation was studied in relation to the structures 
105 
 
that support the process and how they affect reproductive health services. At the national level 
the study aimed at understanding the roles of central government in the formulation of 
decentralisation policy and its subsequent role in the implementation of the reproductive health 
services. An understanding of institutional changes that resulted from implementation of 
decentralisation is important in understanding its effects at the lower levels, which in the end 
affect reproductive health service provision to various degrees. This was done at council and 
lower levels; the analysis covered the entire decentralisation policy. A decision space mapping 
table was used to map the degree of decentralisation. This was done to understand the authority 
of local government over fiscal, administrative and political decentralisation. The analysis at 
facility and community levels was to understand the impact of fiscal, administrative and political 
decentralisation on health service provision (outcomes). 
 
Context of the council that formed the case study  
The district council is the unit in which decentralisation reforms are implemented in Tanzania. It 
represents the geographical area within which Local Government functions. Therefore, in 
selecting the case study the researcher used the district council as the unit for understanding how 
decentralisation has been implemented. One district council was purposely selected in analysing 
how decentralisation policy has influenced the delivery of reproductive health services. The 
council is located on the central plateau of the country. According to district profile data 2011, 
the case district has a population of approximately 238 951 people, with an annual average 
growth rate of 2.3%. The people of the district are relatively homogenous in that they are of 
Bantu origin, with a few exceptions with Gogo forming the largest tribe.  
 
Administratively, the council is made up of four divisions, 21 wards and 56 villages. It has a dry 
savannah climate and a very long dry season. Many parts of the council lack basic services such 
as electricity, safe water and transport systems. This provides a challenge in providing social 
services, in particular during the rainy season, when some areas are totally cut off from other 
areas, including council headquarters.  
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The main economic activities are animal husbandry and agriculture, which is mainly subsistence. 
The most important food crops are maize, beans, millet, sorghum, cassava and sweet potatoes. 
Sunflower seeds are the main cash crop but they are grown at subsistence levels. Seasonal 
unemployment is very prevalent in the council because of the short rainfall season, which is from 
December to March. 
 
The 2010 comprehensive council health plan shows that the council had a total of four health 
centres and 39 dispensaries, of which 38 are publicly owned and one dispensary is privately 
owned. The council did not have a hospital, and the regional hospital served as a referral from 
the health centres. The council had a total of 175 health personnel as against the required number 
of 347 personnel. Therefore there is a shortage of 167 staff. In addition some of the available 
staff had inadequate skills, which has resulted in poor quality of services provided. Most health 
centres are a bit far from surrounding villages which require people to walk from 2 to 10 
kilometres in seeking for health services including reproductive health services. The district‘s 
health system is linked with the council‘s administrative structure. At each division there is a 
health centre which serves up to fifty thousand people, while at lower levels there are 
dispensaries serving up to ten thousand people each. The council has four health centres and 39 
dispensaries. Council‘s health secretary coordinates all public health activities in the council, and 
health services were delivered by the public system.  
 
4.3.2 Ethical considerations 
Ethics is of paramount importance in any research that involves human subjects. Since the 
signing of the Declaration of Helsinki in 1965, the World Medical Association has established 
international guidelines for health research that combine clinical and non-therapeutic care. 
Article 13 of the Declaration of Helsinki requires research proposals to be scrutinised by an 
independent committee to ensure that they conform to the laws and regulations of the country in 
which the research experiment is conducted (WHO, 2001). Crombie and Davies (1996) argue 
that ethics in health research is important since it employs patients. Thus, ethics are essential 
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Although some research might not involve a hazardous investigation, time can cause distress and 
anxiety (Crombie and Davies, 1996). Research into reproductive health carries with it ethical 
issues since it involves human affairs in the real life of the participants, thus there is an 
obligation to address ethical issues.  
 
At first, research clearance was granted by the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) 
research committee to conduct this study and the reference is appended at the end. In Tanzania, 
local clearance procedures were followed whereby the research proposal was submitted to the 
National Ethical Committee at the National Institute for Medical Research (NIMRI)
2
 and ethical 
clearance was granted. A copy of the clearance letter was presented to the responsible heads of 
departments including the head of the reproductive and child health care,  the health sector 
reform secretariat at the Ministry of Health, the directorate of local government at the Prime 
minister‘s Office‘s and the civil service department. Also at the regional and district level the 
clearance letter was presented and permission was granted  Afterwards, a copy a research 
protocol was presented in advance to the relevant organisations and institutions that were 
involved in data collection (see Appendix ii). The organisations and institutions were contacted 
in advance of data collection, and the objective of the study was explained. The researcher also 
asked for permission from the Ministries of Health and Finance and the Prime Minister‘s Office, 
so that she is able to access, retrieve and read records on financial expenditure. Permission was 
also requested to access and retrieve records at the council and health facilities. The researcher 
was granted all the permissions she asked from the mentioned organisation and Ministries.  
 
Seeking for informed consent from participants is one of the ethical issues in any given research, 
health research in particular. To adhere to ethical considerations the following were addressed in 
this study: (i) obtaining written informed consent from the participants before the interview, (ii) 
not exploring sensitive issues before a good relationship had been established with the 
participants and (iii) ensuring the confidentiality of the data collected. The tape recordings and 
transcriptions were handled with care and, when the thesis is accepted, all tapes and transcripts 
                                                          
2
NIMRI is a regulatory authority for health studies in Tanzania. 
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will be destroyed. The participants were free to withdraw from the interview at any point. Also, 
to ensure confidentiality, the council studied is not named. Anonymity is ensured in the 
presentation of the research findings. On the other hand, at the national level, national key-
informant interviews (NKI) are represented as NKI-01 and so on. These include representatives 
from central ministries, donors and civil society organisations. In addition, regional key-
informant interviews (RKI) are represented as RKI-01 and so on while council key-informant 
interviews (CKI) are presented as CKI-01 and so on. For politicians, data were presented as 
politician key informant interview PKI-01 and so on. Facility key informant interviews were 
presented as FKI-01 and so on. For the focus group discussions (FGD), data were presented as 
FGD-01, FGD-02 and so on. In order to maintain anonymity personal names are not used in the 
thesis unless it was agreed by the respondents. In addition, photos used in the thesis were used 
after the given consent from the participants. And last but not least all sources are well 
acknowledged. 
 
4.3.3 Piloting the research tools 
It is argued that, when using interviews to collect data, bias can result from ‗misconceptions on 
the part of the interviewer of what the respondent is saying and misunderstandings on the part of 
the respondents of what is being asked‘ (Cohen and Minion, 1994:282). Piloting is commonly 
used in testing research instruments as has been done in this study (Opie, 2004).  Before piloting, 
questions were presented at a postgraduate seminar workshop at the SOAS whereby the 
workshop facilitator and research students gave their comments to modify some of the questions 
before they were used for field work in Tanzania. In Tanzania, the research interview and focus 
group guide were piloted in Rombo district to test their reliability. In consultation with the 
district medical officer, one village was selected for the exercise. This enabled the researcher to 
refine some of the research questions before the actual process. 
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4.3.4 Sampling procedures 
This study employed non-probability (purposive) sampling. The power of the purposeful 
sampling is embedded in the selection of respondents with rich information on the given issue of 
interest to the researcher (Creswell, 2003). These were reached following the attainment of a 
theoretical closure
3. Non-probability sampling usually involves the selection of participants due 
to their availability, convenience and those who have features that a researcher seeks for the 
study. 
 
The study aimed at collecting information on decentralisation has impacted on reproductive 
health service delivery. Dodoma region was chosen purposively since it was a pilot region for the 
implementation of health reforms in Tanzania. One of the rural councils from Dodoma region 
was purposively selected to follow-up the decentralisation process in relation to reproductive 
health services. The selected council was in the first phase of the implementation due to the local 
government reforms which started in 2001, which went hand in hand with the health sector 
reforms. The selection was also based on its geographical location with good and reliable 
transport which enabled the researcher to easily collect data for the study. Also, the Prime 
Minister‘s Office, which coordinates the decentralisation process, is located in the region, 
making it easier for documentary review while collecting data. Additionally, there was no 
evidence of a similar study conducted in relation to decentralisation and its impact on delivery of 
the reproductive health service.  
 
Although the study is not representative, the selected council involved in this study, its health 
facilities and district administrative structures are similar to those in other rural districts in the 
country in terms of the relevant characteristics, such as number of staff required per health 
facility, structure of health facilities and administrative division of wards and villages. The case 
study council has a total of four divisions, 21 wards and 156 villages, of which three wards and 
four villages were purposively selected for the study because of their accessibility during the actual 
                                                          
3
Theoretical closure is when the researcher no longer gets new information from the respondents (Glazer and Strauss 
1967) 
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process of data collection. Thus, statistical sampling procedures were not used in selecting study 
sites and participants.  
 
Instead, purposive sampling in consultation with the district medical officer was used in selecting 
six health facilities. All four health centres were visited, as well as two dispensaries within the 
radius of each of the health centres. Based on the location of the health facilities selected, four 
villages were purposefully selected. Two villages were close to a health facility, and the other 
two villages were located far from the health facilities. In all the selected villages, pastoralism 
was the main form of livelihood. Data collection began in December 2010 and ended in July 
2011. Data were collected from the following sites: 
(i) National/central level:  
 Representatives of the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MoHSW) 
 Representatives of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs (MoFEA) 
 Representatives of the Prime Minister‘s Office – Regional Administration and Local 
Government (PMO-RALG)  
 Representative of the President‘s Office, Civil Service Department  
 Representative of  the Association of Local Government Authorities 
 Representative of the civil society at national level  
 Representative of the Parliamentary Committee for social services 
 Representatives of the development partners 
 
(ii) Regional level: 
 Representatives of the Regional Secretariat, including regional medical officers, the 
regional coordinator for Reproductive and Child Health and the coordinator for local 
government services. 
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(iii) District Council level:  
 Representatives of the district council administration: participants included the district 
director, district commissioner, planning officer, and human resource officer. 
 Representatives of district health services: District Medical Officer (DMO), Council 
Health Management Team, council‘s health secretary, district nursing officer and the 
Reproductive and Child Health Care Coordinator (RCHCo). 
 Representatives of civil society: Population Service International (PSI) was selected to 
participate in this study based on its long experience in the provision of reproductive 
health services.  
 Representatives of the council health services board 
 Representatives of the politicians, including the Member of Parliament of the case study 
council, council chairperson and councillors. 
 
(iv) Facility level:  
 The person in charge of the health facilities  
 Reproductive health coordinators 
 Members of the health facility committees  
(v)  Community level:  
 Participants included representatives from various groups of different geographical 
locations (participants for the focus group discussions). 
4.4 Methods of data collection and analysis 
The study used a combination of methods including semi-structured interviews, focus group 
discussions, participant observation and documentary research as detailed below. Open-ended 
questions were used in both semi structured interviews and focus group discussions. The open-
ended questions allowed the researcher to explore various issues in detail. The interviews were 
guided by a set of similar and different questions that were asked to different people purposively 
sampled in this study. The use of numerous interconnected methods in this research had the 
benefits of creating a better understanding of the research questions and reduced a ‗tunnel vision‘ 
of truth by guaranteeing that each method contributes to reveal part of the truth (Verschuren 
112 
 
2003). The secondary data were collected from the selected literatures; institutions and health 
facilities to complement the primary data. The following are the methods used in this study. 
 
4.4.1 In-depth interviews 
This method is commonly used in qualitative policy studies as it allows the researcher to get rich 
and underlying reasons for many practical undertakings in relation to the policy under analysis. It 
also offers an opportunity for the  researcher to clarify or probe and expand on interviewees‘ 
responses to ascertain their feelings (Wragg, 2002, Opie, 2004). In-depth interviews use a 
flexible approach by asking questions of a target group (Patton, 1990). Therefore, the selection 
of the correct participants, who are informed about the study topic, is important to obtain quality 
data. For the purpose of the study, an in-depth open-ended interview questionnaire was used 
(Appendix ii) and the participants were selected on the ground of their relevance.  The final list is 
made up of 47 participants for the key informant interviewees (KIs), 12 at the national level, 20 
at council level, six at facility level and nine politicians. The interview checklists were 
developed, covering the process, structures and outcomes of the reforms. Flexibility was applied 
in the use of the research guideline questions which reflected the key themes of the study. Two 
different sets of guidelines were used one, for the policy makers and the other for the service 
providers. The interviews were mainly carried out by the researcher herself and were tape-
recorded after obtaining the consent of each participant, except for seven participants, who 
refused. The recorded information was verified with notes, corrected in the case of any missing 
points and validated through further clarification with the relevant participants. The aim of the 
key informant interviews was to collect first-hand information on the decentralisation policy, in 
particular on its formulation and implementation and its overall policy objectives, as well as its 
effect on health service organisation and management. Providers were encouraged to compare 
service provision and implementation status before and after decentralisation. The data obtained 
were used to complement information from policy documents. Figure 4.1 bellow summarises the 
distribution of the KIs at the various levels. 
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Figure 4-1: Distribution of the key informants by sex 
Source: Field survey, 2011 
 
4.4.2 Focus group discussions (FGDs) 
A focus group discussion is one of the common participatory methods for qualitative data 
collection involving a small number of participants. A group of six to eight participants usually 
take part in the discussion by talk freely about the particular matter, while the researcher 
facilitates the discussion. The FGDs collected information on participant‘s views and perceptions 
on the implementation of decentralisation and its effect on reproductive health service delivery. 
During the discussion, participants were encouraged to identify changes in relation to health 
services after decentralisation. While selecting the FGD participants at the community level; 
priority was given to the same surroundings of the facilities that were selected for the KIs. This 
aided in triangulating information provided by the KIs. Generally, the FGDs were made up of 
four different sets: 
 
The first set of FGDs was made up of the Regional Health Management Team (RHMT), and 
eight members participated. These came from different departments, including reproductive and 
child health. Of the eight participants, four were male and four were female, and they have been 
working in their current posts for more than two years. 
National Council Facility Community
Female 10 12 6 2
Male 4 6 5 4
N
o
 o
f 
K
Is
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The second set of FGDs was at the council level with the Council Health Management Team 
(CHMT) with a total of eight members, of whom five were males and three females. The group 
members shared their understanding, knowledge and experience with decentralisation processes. 
As discussed earlier, reality is socially constructed.  Individuals perceive and understand 
different social economic process based on the position they hold in a certain social context. 
Therefore there were differences in term of understanding of the health sector decentralisation 
process and its variations. The differences were noted depending on the level of the participant‘s 
education. Despite divergences in understanding decentralisation, the participants showed their 
commitment to fulfilling their new roles and responsibilities under decentralisation. 
 
The third set of FGDs was with the health committees which represent communities/service 
users. A total of four FGDs were conducted whereby each had an average of six to eight 
members. Of 26 participants, 15 were women and 11 were men. Of these, 9 women did not 
complete standard seven level of education which is the elementary level in Tanzania. FGD 
members were asked about their views on the way decentralisation has impacted reproductive 
health services delivery. They were also asked about community representation and service 
accountability. The collected data from the FGDs were used to complement information from the 
health facility KI interviews and the FGD with the regional and council health managers.  
 
The fourth set of FGDs was held with communities in each of the visited villages, where three 
FGDs were conducted. In order to get appropriate FGDs participants, village leaders and village 
health workers assisted the researcher in recruiting participants. A total of eight FGDs (four 
villages) were conducted. Members included community leaders, men and, women below 30 
years of age and those above 30 years. The decision to separate women into two groups with 30 
years as a cut-off point was based on local experience, which has shown that younger women are 
not comfortable being involved in discussions with older women. Thus, the groups were 
deliberately separated to allow younger women an opportunity to participate actively in the 
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discussions. There were a maximum of eight participants in each group discussion. The FGDs 
with the communities focused on decentralisation, how it reached the communities and changes 
experienced to reproductive health service delivery. 
 
FGD guidelines with key themes were used to collect the data (Appendix iii). The Swahili 
language, which is widely spoken and understood by the majority of Tanzanians, was used. 
Informed consent from participants was given verbally in advance of each session. The FGDs 
lasted between forty-five minutes and one hour. The discussions were tape-recorded after 
obtaining group consent and transcribed at the end of each day. The distribution of FGD 
participants is summarised in Figure 4-2 below. 
 
Figure 4-2: Distribution of the FGD participants at different levels 
Source: Field survey, 2011 
4.4.3 Observation 
In this study, observation was used at two levels: at council and health facilities. The observation 
method was used to validate the information given by the key informants. The researcher 
attended two council meetings, observing the dynamics of planning and budget meetings .In 
addition, the researcher observed the way providers and clients interact at six health facilities. 
This helped the researcher to have a deeper understanding of the dynamics of reproductive health 
service delivery. The experiences were noted in a field diary. Observation method was used in 
different settings and contexts as described elsewhere in order to validate the data obtained 
Communities FHC CHMT RHMT
Female 32 15 3 4
Male 32 11 5 4
N
o
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f 
F
G
D
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through other methods such as interviews and FGDs.  To put it differently observation method 
helped the researcher to note some of the embodied messages arising out of the interaction 
especially between service providers and clients in relation to the provision of reproductive 
health service delivery. 
 
4.4.4 Documentary review 
In addition, the study used documentary review to collect information on the extent to which 
RHS issues are prioritised in broad development strategies and health policies. As well, to 
analyse the extent to which RH components that are identified in national policies re reflected in 
council health plans. The document reviewed included: national development vision 2025, five 
years development plan 2011/12 - 2015/16, national health policy, health sector strategic plan III, 
national road map for accelerating the reduction of maternal deaths, national family planning 
costed implementation program and national package of the essential reproductive health 
interventions. The policy analysis tool was used to analyse number of issues including policy 
reaction to international commitments to universal access to RH, prioritisation of the RHS at 
different levels as well budget document at national and council level were reviewed and 
analysed to gather information data on funding distribution from central to Council level, as well 
as allocation to reproductive health services. Additionally, council information of RHS 
utilisation in relation to family planning, antenatal and postnatal care and facility utilisation, 
were collected. However, the records obtained were from 2007, hence it was not easy to compare 
service trends before and after decentralisation.  
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Table 4-1: Summary of  activities for the research project 
Phases of the 
research project 
Data and data 
collection 
methods 
Method of 
analysis 
Number of respondents  Reporting 
Stage 1: National level  
Decentralisation 
policy: 
formulation & 
implementation  
Review of 
relevant policy 
documents and 
KIs with  national 
actors 
Gilson framework 
for policy analysis 
and thematic 
analysis of diaries 
12 KIs at national level 
20 at council level, six at 
the facilities and nine 
politicians (FGD with the 
CHMT and RHMT)  
Chapters 1 & 5  
Stage 2: Council and community/village level 
Development 
implementation of 
reproductive 
health polices  
In-depth 
interviews with 
DMOs, DED, DC 
and villagers. 
FGDs with the 
CHMT and  field 
observations 
Gilson framework 
for policy analysis  
20 KI interviews at the 
council, six at the 
facilities and nine 
politicians (FGD with the 
CHMT and RHMT) 
Chapter 6  
Decentralisation & 
its impact  on 
health service 
KI with health 
managers and 
providers.  
FGDs with 
communities and  
health 
management 
committees  
Decision pace 
framework  & 
accountability 
framework  
20 at the council, six at 
the facilities and nine 
politicians (FGD with the 
CHMT and RHMT) 
Chapter 7 
Summary and 
conclusion of the 
thesis   
   Chapter 8 
Source: Author, 2010  
 
4.5 Data analysis and interpretation 
Data analysis is about organising and interpreting the enormous amount of collected data to 
examine results against the research questions. Data collection and interpretation influence each 
other to establish an inter-subjective consensus on the interpretation of the reality logically and 
empirically (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The main concern of the research question is the 
process; recognising the way in which actors, either from the supply or the demand side, 
construct their reality from their own perspectives and experiences of decentralisation in relation 
to reproductive health service delivery. The way actors translate reform objectives, the way they 
manage to undertake new responsibilities, and their relationship with service beneficiaries, form 
one part of knowledge production. However, elite groups, particularly policy makers and 
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politicians, shape the relationship between providers and beneficiaries. Furthermore, their 
perceptions, actions and interests provide links to the outcomes.  
 
This study deals with the bulk of qualitative data from the KIs, FGDs and observation. At the 
end of each day, data was supposed to be transcribed from the recorded interviews but this was 
not possible due to the large amount of information. Thus, some transcriptions were done in the 
two months after the fieldwork. Tapes were labelled to match the interviews. The organisation of 
the data was conducted through the following stages: (i) Preparatory stage, in which the 
responses to each interview were written on a separate sheet to make reading easier for 
conversion into a transcript, and then translated into English from Swahili. The interview data 
then were categorised into four types of responses – national, council, facility and community – 
for effective management. (ii) Intensive and repeated reading of data was carried out to 
determine analytical themes. The process was guided by the research questions. Themes were 
developed by both research objectives (deductive) and interpretation of the raw data (inductive). 
Codes containing short phrases expressed by the participants were developed (selective coding). 
To ensure that the quality of the information was not distorted, analysis was done in Swahili and 
then translated into English. The decision was used to analyse decentralised function against 
actual implementation. The findings on each question are presented in a separate chapter. In the 
discussions, references were made to detailed explanation and validation. 
 
4.6 Trustworthiness, credibility and transferability 
The criteria for examining rigour, both in qualitative and quantitative studies, have been internal 
and external validity and reliability (Punch, 2005). The origin of these concepts has been 
associated with positivist research, hence interpretive researchers have been unenthusiastic to 
consider them in their studies, as it would imply accepting positivism as the only absolute source 
of knowledge (Esterby-Smith et al., 1994). Brock-Utne (1996:612, cited in Bush, 2002:60) noted 
that the questions of validity and reliability within qualitative research are as important as within 
quantitative methods, although they may have to be treated somewhat differently. Gall et al. 
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(2007) noticed that validity and reliability in qualitative research are poorly applied when open-
ended instruments are used to collect data. Likewise, Merriam (2002:27) argues that reliability is 
problematic in the social sciences simply because ―human behaviour is never static, nor is what 
many experience necessarily more reliable than what one person experiences‖. 
 
Wolcott (1990) argues differently on the use of reliability and validity in social sciences. He 
stipulates that these criteria do not fulfil their research methodology because of differences 
existing between the axioms of interpretivism and positivism(Silverman, 2005). Guba (1992) 
suggests ‗trustworthiness criteria‘ in judging the quality of a study that is positioned within 
interpretive paradigm. These elements include credibility, transferability and dependability 
(Guba, 1992), and were used, together with other strategies, to ensure the quality of this study. 
 
The first strategy adopted to ensure the credibility of this study was triangulation (Gall et al., 
2007). It comprises ‗the use of two or more methods of data collection in a study of some aspect 
of human behaviour‘ (Cohen et al., 2000). Using this strategy helps researchers to balance the 
limitations connected with the use of one method to collect data (Creswell, 2003; Punch, 2005) 
and to determine the reliability of the information collected. The concept of triangulation is 
detailed elsewhere. 
Apart from triangulation, peer examination was also used to ensure credibility of this study (Gall 
et al., 2007; Merriam, 2002). Regarding this strategy, colleagues at my working university were 
given the tentative findings to review and comment on in relation to the raw data. The comments 
increased the assurance of the findings of this study. 
 
4.7 Triangulation 
Triangulation refers to the process of observing a phenomenon in different ways rather than in 
one way only. Triangulation helps to improve the accuracy of data and is considered to be a 
fundamental principle in collecting data in case studies (Yin, 2009. It is an important strategy for 
establishing the internal validity of data and its interpretation(Bush, 2002). The purpose of 
triangulation is to merge the data and use the results to best understand the research problem 
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(Creswell, 2003:564). Two types of triangulation were incorporated into this study: method and 
respondent triangulation.  
 
Method triangulation involves using multiple instruments to collect data for a study (Denscombe, 
2002, Yin, 2003). Also, method triangulation enables researchers to compare and validate the 
outcomes in terms of one another (McFee, 1992). The use of multiple methods to collect data is 
an ‗attempt to map out, or explain more fully, the richness and complexity of human behaviour 
by studying it from more than one standpoint‘ (Cohen &Manion, 1994:233). Method 
triangulation was obtained through the combination of semi-structured interviews, FGDs and 
observation for qualitative data collection. Documents were used to generate quantitative data, as 
already noted, but the data were analysed to add another perspective to the information collected.  
 
Respondent triangulation involves using the same instrument to collect data from different 
participants (Bush, 2002). It is consistent with McFee‘s (1992:216) claim that the ―reality of a 
situation is not to be captured from a single viewpoint. Thus it brings to bear two or more 
viewpoints on a particular occasion, with a view to characterising the occasion so as to 
accommodate, or account for, all these viewpoints‖. Respondent triangulation was achieved by 
using the same instruments to collect data with slight instrument changes to fit the purpose of the 
research at different levels. This strategy enabled similarities and differences in the views of the 
participants to be ascertained.  
 
Figure 4-3 represents triangulation of the data at each level of analysis. While analysing the 
policy formulation process, triangulation was done between what participants were saying about 
what was set as organisational process and structure and what was written in a relevant 
document. This enables one to filter out ‗noise‘ from the interview and construct a solid picture 
of the decentralisation policy process in Tanzania.  
 
At the implementation level, triangulation was done between organisational documents and 
interviews with health managers, health committee members, politicians and providers and what 
was observed. Likewise, in analysing the impact, triangulation was done between the observed 
data, focus group discussions and in-depth interviews. These triangulations were finally used to 
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construct an understanding of the entire decentralisation process and what kind of impact it has 
on reproductive health services in rural Tanzania.  
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4.8 Limitations and challenges of the study 
In the course of the fieldwork in Tanzania the researcher faced several difficulties and obstacles. 
The most serious one was power disruptions, followed by power rationing which sometimes 
lasted up to 48 hours. This affected the study in different ways. Lack of electricity was not the 
only problem (making it difficult to type and print the research clearance), but also some 
members of the research review committee at NIMRI were outside the country on other duties. 
This caused delays of up to three months before the actual process of data collection could 
commence. The researcher however made considerable effort to make sure that quality and 
reliable data were collected within the available time. In addition, some bureaucrats, particularly 
at national level, were not happy to be tape recorded. Their interviews took longer and, in some 
instances, interviews were stopped and continued on another day at their convenience  
 
Data on reform outcomes were limited with regard to availability and precision. Because of the 
frequent transfer of government officials who were involved at the initial stage of 
decentralisation, it took time to find former key participants at their new offices. This was 
possible because some of the executives were transferred within government institutions. At 
council level, follow-up was not possible because staff members were transferred to other parts 
of the country. Thus, local experiences were somehow restricted, as many of the officials were 
new to the office and did not take part in the initial process of decentralisation reform even if 
they were implementing the same objectives.  
 
Another important constraint experienced throughout the study was difficulties in separating 
reproductive health services from other services. Lack of specific data on the use of resources for 
reproductive health interventions was a problem at national, council and sub-council levels. 
Wherever possible, the researcher tried to gain specific data on reproductive health services as 
affected by decentralisation. Where this was not possible, the research used data on district 
health services in general, given that reproductive health services form the major part of primary 
health care services. Reproductive health services are funded via a comprehensive council health 
plan whereby a budget is allocated for integrated service provision along the cost centres.  
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Decentralisation is not the only reform policy in the health sector. There are a number of policy 
initiatives that are implemented within the health sector geared to improve health services. This 
causes difficulties in attribution the impact of decentralisation on reproductive health service 
delivery. 
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Abbreviations for Chapter 5 
BFC   Basket Funding Committee  
BNR   Big Result Now  
CA  Central authorities  
CCHP  Comprehensive council health planning  
CFGD  Community focus group discussion 
CHMT  Council health management teams  
CHSBs Council health services boards  
CIDA  Canadian International Development Agency  
CKI  Council key-informant interview  
DANIDA  Danish International Development Agency  
DFID  Department for International Development  
DHS  District health system  
DLG   Directorate for Local Government  
DPs  Development partners  
FHCs  Facility health committees  
FKI  Facility key-informant interview 
HSPS  Health Sector Programme Support  
HSRS   Health Sector Secretariat  
IMTC   Inter-Ministerial Technical Committee 
JICA   Japan International Cooperation Association 
LGAs  Local government authorities  
LGR  Local government reform 
LGRP   Local Government Reform Programme  
MDGs  Millennium Development Goals  
MoF  Ministry of Finance 
MoFEA Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs  
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MoH  Ministry of Health 
MoHSW Ministry of Health and Social Welfare  
NEHP  National Essential Health Package  
NKI  National key-informant interview 
NSGRP National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty  
PMO-RALG  Prime Minister‘s Office – Regional Administration and Local Government  
PO-RALG  President‘s Office – Regional Administration and Local Government  
POW  Program of work 
RCHS   Reproductive and Child Health Section  
RHMT  Regional health management teams  
RKI  Regional key-informant interview 
SWAP  Sector-wide approach 
TWG   Technical working group  
UNAIDS United Nations Agency for HIV/AIDS  
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund 
UNICEF  United Nations Children‘s Fund  
URT   United Republic of Tanzania  
USAID United States Agency for International Development  
WB  World Bank 
WHO  World Health Organization  
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CHAPTER 5 
HEALTH SECTOR DECENTRALISATION IN TANZANIA: POLICY PROCESS AND 
VIEWS OF NATIONAL AND LOCAL ACTORS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the policy process of decentralisation by looking at the policy actors, 
rationale and content. The chapter aims to first answer the research question, with regard to 
understanding policy processes involved in implementing health sector decentralisation. Thus, 
the chapter begins by reviewing policy documents to identify who are the key actors and the role 
they play in the decentralisation process. It was noted that the government policy formulation 
process is usually taken as a technical process, mainly with a high level of consultation with the 
key decision makers. Policy implementers and beneficiaries are rarely consulted at the 
formulation stage. They claim to be recipients of the central policies, rather than being part of the 
process.  
 
The chapter also looks at the second question of the study, which aims at understanding the 
meaning attached to decentralisation and how it affects its implementation. The government 
policy thrust in Tanzania is fiscal, administrative and political devolution of functions to 
councils. At the national level, participants were aware of the decentralisation policy objectives, 
although some failed to articulate the meaning of decentralisation. At council level, most of the 
participants were not aware of the decentralisation policy objective. The majority defined 
decentralisation process based on the way they perceive the practical reality of decentralisation. 
Service providers and users are of the view that decentralisation process is has not grant them 
power to make autonomous decisions. The decentralisation process in terms of decision making 
concentrates at council level and not at the community level where services are delivered. The 
health care providers were found to have limited power; despite having institutional and social 
power that affects decentralisation objectives and reproductive health service delivery. As per the 
Tanzanian context health care providers are the ones who interact directly with communities; 
hence they have the role of executing decentralisation goals, including the engagement of 
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communities in health care planning.  However, their roles are underestimated in the current 
policy reform process. 
 
This chapter is organised into four sections. The first section is the introduction; the second part 
presents a review of the public policy process in Tanzania, followed by the presentation of data 
from the field findings on the actors‘ knowledge about the objectives and process of 
decentralisation. The final section contains the discussion and conclusions. 
5.2 Policy-making processes in Tanzania4 
This section reviews the process of public policy making in Tanzania. This is to enable the 
readers to link the two processes: formulation and implementation. The government of Tanzania 
has been striving to provide quality social services to its people. The primary objective is to 
improve service delivery in public institutions. This led the government to develop policies and 
give directions towards the achievement of the intended outcomes. Theoretically, policies are 
proposed as a response to deal with a particular recognised problem(s). The purpose is to ensure 
that the root causes of the problem are addressed in the design of the policy. The idea usually 
originates from actors, such as communities, public or private institutions, professionals and 
trade unions among others. The proposed ideas are then put into action to become a policy.  
 
The suggested way of policy development in Tanzania is assumed to use a bottom-up approach 
and to be participatory, where consultations are undertaken with the interest groups to ensure 
their ideas are accommodated. The process is initiated after the recognition of a problem that 
needs to be tackled. Then actors likely to be affected are identified and their roles in the process 
are recognised. All key actors, including ministries and their agencies, regions, councils and 
communities are supposed to be involved. In the early stages, actors‘ participation is important to 
ensure that their ideas are taken on board. They can participate in different ways, such as 
workshops, round table meetings, interviews, policy dialogues with various people and interest 
                                                          
4
United Republic of Tanzania  (1997) Social Policy Formulation Process has been a source of the material presented 
in this section   
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groups. Also, the national media like radio and television can be involved for actors to engage 
themselves in discussions. This is to ensure that the policy papers are comprehensive and address 
the pressing needs.  
 
Theoretically, participation should include key actors at all levels, since not all stakeholders can 
be fully involved. Consultation with actors is assumed to be an opportunity for the interested 
groups to air their voices and give their inputs into the process. The reality is that it is the 
government that chooses which actors to consult. Besides, consultations are mainly done to 
respond to what has already been proposed by the government. A draft of the proposed policy 
document is presented to actors in a stakeholders‘ workshop so that they can respond. The 
limitation of this approach is that there is no means of ensuring that stakeholder contributions are 
incorporated into the final document. In Tanzania there are two levels of policy making - the 
national and the council level. 
 
5.2.1 National policy making 
The national level involves macro-policies, sector policies and sub-sector policies. The macro-
policies are those policies that are implemented by several ministries or cut across sectors.  These 
include: National Vision 2025, National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP) 
and Big Results Now (BNR). These policies provide the overall framework for the formulation, 
implementation and monitoring and evaluation of the sector policies. The key actors in 
formulating these policies are the President‘s Office, the Vice-President‘s Office, the Prime 
Minister‘s Office, and the Ministry of Finance and Economic Empowerment, in particular the 
Policy Planning Division. 
 
The design of the sector policies is the responsibility of the respective sector ministries and their 
agencies. They have the mandate to formulate, monitor and implement sector policies although 
they are supposed to formulate policies through a participatory approach. However, the 
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ministries can put together a task force, which is a technical team.  Members are usually made up 
of ministry and other staff who possibly come from different implementation levels, such as 
local authorities, research and training institutions, civil society, etc. Usually, the team works 
closely under the supervision of the policy planning division. Their role is to review the 
performance of their sector and prepare the framework and policy declarations as well as to 
bridge the gap between policy makers and implementers. The task force solicits views from key 
stakeholders like ministries, institutions and NGOs and organises workshops to confirm their 
stand on the issue raised.  
 
A series of workshops are organised for editing, finalising and preparation of the final policy 
document to be presented to the government for approval. This time there is a policy window 
that can be exploited by civil society organisations in presenting their inputs to the policy 
makers, either by being present in the workshops or by making formal submissions to the task 
force. A department within the sector can formulate sub-sector policy within the framework of 
the sector policy when the need arises.  
 
After the ministerial level, sector and sub-sector policies are sent to the higher policy-making 
level organs, called the Cabinet Secretariat, where discussions are carried out in depth before 
being forwarded to the Inter-Ministerial Technical Committee (IMTC), which is made up of all 
permanent secretaries of all sectors. Their role is to ensure that the proposed policy is 
synchronised with the existing policies in other sectors. After the IMTC recommendations, the 
policy paper is submitted to Cabinet for approval. 
 
Policy implementation follows the approval, referring to the transformation of policy choices 
into action. Often the delivering of the policy is the result of the interpretation of that policy and 
may lead to different outcomes than those originally planned. As a result, implementation is the 
critical part of the policy process. Engagement of the stakeholders is important for effective 
implementation. This is to establish ownership of the policy and to affect the outcomes. 
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Policy monitoring and evaluation follow in order to evaluate the policy outcomes to show the 
relationship between policy and outcomes. This is an intentional assessment of how policy has 
impacted the targeted population. This can be through policy dialogue via various research 
institutions and academia, some of which may have been involved during formulation of the 
policy (URT, 1997c). 
 
5.2.2 Local Government-level policy process 
Following decentralisation, local government authorities (LGAs) and village government are 
given legal mandates to formulate their own policies that may be passed into legally-binding by-
laws to address a particular problem or to facilitate and/or regulate certain activities.  For 
example, local authorities can make by-laws for facilitating the local collection of revenues from 
various sources in the form of levies and taxes. 
 
The initial idea of formulating by-laws is raised by a village or ward development officer who is 
a member of the village assembly. The idea is then presented to the village government 
committee for further discussion and endorsement, before being submitted to the village 
assembly. The local by-laws should be approved by the Village Assembly. A draft of the village 
or ward by-law is presented to the Ward Development Committee so that amendments can be 
made before submission to the Full Council Meeting for final approval. Thereafter it may be 
functional for the village or ward concerned (URT, 2001d). 
 
Similarly, at council or municipal levels, the proposed by-law may come from one of the 
technical departments of the council or from the communities through their councillors. The 
proposal has to be discussed by the relevant Council Committee before being presented to the 
full Council for approval. Minister responsible for Local Government has a legal mandate to pass 
the Council by-laws that may be applied to all or some of the LGAs.  
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Above all, government policies have to address a particular problem aimed at improving the 
welfare of Tanzanians. The changing of the environment and global process at large drive many 
countries to formulate different policies to address different socio-economic problems. Since 
1986, the Government has been implemented reforms including Structural Adjustment 
Programme and Economic Reform Programme aimed at solving the socio-economic crisis 
through restricting the role of the state in the economy while giving greater flexibility to the 
market and the private sector. In the course of executing these reforms, concerns about their 
impact on social service provision have come to light. Thus, the Government has been 
formulating a number of public policies addressing different those needs. Despite the process of 
policy formulation, implementation and evaluation being somewhat participatory, yet the desired 
impact is far from the reality. As will be detailed later, during the implementation stage national 
actors have remained distant from policy implementers and from beneficiaries.  
 
5.3 Health reform policy process 
Decentralisation was implemented in the health sector as part of the broader government 
reforms. The Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MoHSW) begun to reform the sector and 
later decentralisation was taken on board as a key component of the health sector reform (HSR). 
Following the announcement of HSR, a national joint workshop was chaired by the MoHSW, 
World Bank (WB) and development partners (DPs) for the approval of the formulation of the 
reform Technical Working Group (TWG). The TWG was composed of senior officials from the 
MOHSW and Planning Commission with the responsibility of coordinating the reform process 
and preparation of the HSR implementation plan. This provided an opportunity for the DPs to 
form a coalition of actors, working together to influence policy ideas. The WB provided 
technical support, such as acquainting policy makers with the TWG and cost-effectiveness as 
policy-making tools. The TWG came out with the health sector reform proposal. The proposal 
outlines several problems contributing to the poor performance of the health system (MoH, 
1994). The HSR proposal and strategic health plan were approved by the cabinet in 1995. The 
MoHSW and the WB jointly prepared grounds for the implementation of the reforms. The part of 
the strategy was to increase the number of other DPs, since up to 80% of health expenditure was 
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financed by DPs(MoH, 1995). The government could only support one third of the financial 
expenditure required. This gave DPs a lot of influence in the process due to their high financial 
support to the sector as donor dependency means the country is far from being autonomous in 
policy formulation. DPs influence the process, since they contribute more than 50% to the sector 
survival.  
 
However, government and the DPs did not keep their financial promises regarding funding for 
the HSR. The spending was less than what was pledged which therefore affected the execution of 
the reform. This was supported by the Public Expenditure Review of 1995, which showed that 
there was a variation between budgets and executions (MOH, 1997). The shortfalls were 
contributed by incomplete donor support, shortfalls from local counterparts and inaccurate 
projections. To get actors on board, the MoHSW created a supportive network of actors, which 
resulted in the formation of the Joint Ministry of Health and DPs Mission. The aim of the 
mission was to identify and prioritise key issues in preparation for the reform. In 1995 the first 
annual joint mission was held and its outcome was the commitment by both DPs and government 
to reform the health sector by providing financial and technical input.  
 
The MoHSW conducted a number of pilot projects to learn from the experience. This included 
district capacity for planning and management, through which health boards receive training. 
The results showed that there was a need for close collaboration between health sector reform 
and local government reform (MOH, 1998b). Other pilot studies were undertaken in four other 
districts aiming at raising the quality, coverage and effectiveness of basic health services, which 
came with the recommendation for strengthening collaboration between the HSR and LGR. The 
other project was carried out in five districts, aimed at strengthening health management systems 
to improve accessibility to highly integrated reproductive health services at the district level. The 
lessons showed that this could be achieved through the enhancement of community participation, 
staff sensitisation, skills development and improving physical structure (MoH, 1998a).  
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Action plan 1996 to 1999 
The DPs commissioned a consultant to prepare the Action Plan for implementing HSR 1996 to 
1999.  In April, both the MoHSW and a donor mission met to appraise the Action Plan. The aim 
was to identify areas than needed further refinement. These included strategies for involving 
communities, ensuring government commitment of resources to implement the reforms, donor 
coordination mechanisms and clarification of financing modalities. The appraisal defined the 
roles of various actors in the implementation. The emphasis was on community involvement as 
an important idea, since they were primary beneficiaries of the reforms. This was to ensure that 
the communities took an active role in the policy process. Yet their engagement depends on local 
institutional arrangements made available to them in the process. 
During the process, government fund disbursement was poor, which discouraged the DPs from 
disbursing funds. The sector suffered from low financial support, which led to poor quality of 
services. The government requested financial assistance from DANIDA. In 1996 the government 
made an agreement with DANIDA for three years‘ funding. The support was known as Health 
Sector Programme Support (HSPS-I), and was extended from 1999 to 2003 as HSPS-II  
(DANIDA and MoFA, 1999). This support covered health system activities and part of health 
reform activities. 
 
Reform actors 
The actors in the reform process were the Ministry of Health (MoH), the Ministry of Finance 
(MoF), the President‘s Office – Regional Administration and Local Government (PO-RALG) 
and donor partners, including the International Development Agency (CIDA), the Department 
for International Development (DFID), the Danish International Development Agency 
(DANIDA), the Japan International Cooperation Association (JICA), German Technical 
Cooperation (GTZ), the United Nations Children‘s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Agency 
for HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 
the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the World Bank (WB), the World Health 
Organization (WHO), the Embassy of the Kingdom of Netherlands, and the Royal Norwegian 
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Embassy. The Program of Work (POW) 1998/2001 was revised and appraisal was carried out in 
1998. A sector-wide approach (Swap) was also approved (MoH, 1998a). 
 
Having Swap on board, the MoH had to re-orient its organisation, planning and resource 
allocation. This was implemented through a Programme of Work 1999/2001/2002, which was to 
begin from 1998/1999. However, the DPs requested further revisions and refinement of the HSR 
plans, and the POW was finalised and ready for implementation by 1999 (MoH, 1998a). The 
POW 1999 to 2001 carried eight interlinked strategies intended to achieve the following reform 
objectives: (i) district health services, (ii) secondary and tertiary hospital services, (iii) the role of 
the central ministry (MoH), (iv) human resource development (HRD), (v) central support system, 
(vi) healthcare financing, (vii) public–private partnerships and (viii) the MoH–donor relationship 
(MoH, 2003). It should be noted that district health services were the first priority that aligned 
with decentralisation reform aimed at transforming district health systems. 
 
The development partners showed strong commitment in support of the process. However, at this 
stage there was little participation by other actors, viz. communities, academics, civil society, 
etc. Later, the Health Sector Strategic Plan (HSSP II) 2003 -2008 carried forward the eight 
strategies. The HSSP II was extended to June 2009 to incorporate the findings and 
recommendations of the Joint External Evaluation of the Health Sector, which was conducted in 
2007. From July 2009 to June 2015, the MoHSW was guided by HSSP III. The HSSP III serves 
as the guiding document for the development of council and hospital strategic plans and for 
annual work plans. 
 
5.3.1 Policy process of health sector decentralisation: Context and content 
This section is concerned with the ways in which health sector decentralisation is being 
formulated and implemented. The discussions around the policy process cover an analysis of the 
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context of as well as the objectives of health sector decentralisation. The discussion then moves 
to analysing the way in which consultations with the key actors are being managed.  
 
The current reform started to be implemented in the 1990s being driven by political and 
economic contexts.  The political contexts included universal provision of health services as a 
right to all, and the government had the obligation to provide health services free of charge 
(Semali, 2003). The need for a decentralised sector is well rooted in the national legal 
framework, and the Local Government Act of 1982. The health sector decentralisation 
programme was reinforced by the adoption of the Local Government Reform Programme in 
2000. However, by 1993, the MoHSW had started to devolve non-core health services to the 
local authorities, even before the launching of the LGRP in 2000. The early adoption of 
decentralisation was because the sector experienced management problems relating to planning 
that proved unresponsive to the health needs of Tanzania (MoHSW and PMO-RALG, 2007). 
 
The reasons for the MoHSW to adopt decentralisation were to facilitate bottom-up planning and 
financing, the management of council health resources, procurement and purchasing of supplies 
and equipment, and addressing issues of access to services. Under health sector reforms, district 
health services were the first target to ensure that local service provision was accessible and of 
good quality (MoH, 2003). Government, jointly with the DPs, agreed that decentralisation should 
be devolution (MoH, 1995). This was launched officially in the health sector in 1999. The 
implementation initiative arose after the government announcement of the LGRP following 
approval of the decentralisation policy by parliament. 
 
Progress towards the implementation of health sector decentralisation was disrupted by the local 
government reform programme in 1996. LGAs had to wait for local government reform to take 
place first. By 2001 there was meaningful decentralisation within the health sector, as explained 
by one of the participants: 
It was after the revisions of the local government policy of 1982 in 2000 when the LGRP was formally put 
into practice (NKI-02). 
136 
 
It was agreed that decentralisation should be implemented in a three phase approach. The first 
phase began in 2000, with 38 councils on board.  The second phase took place in 2001 involving 
45 councils and the last phase started in 2002, involving 31 councils. By 2003, all councils were 
ready to put the decentralisation policy into practice.  
 
National participants had a different view on what and how much should be decentralised. 
Generally, senior officials at the national level did not support decentralisation, as they feared 
losing power. This was revealed during the interviews, when one of the participants insisted:  
.....if you decentralise you engage other government departments. There has always been disagreement on 
what should we devolved, especially from the central officials. The power struggle for control has always 
been the barrier to real decentralisation. For example, if I am with the Department of Finance and I agree 
that 70% of the functions should be devolved to councils, it means I will have only 30%.  This implies that 
a larger portion of what has been coming to me from the national treasury as allocation will go directly to 
the local authorities. Thus decentralisation changes the roles and allocation from national to local … some 
of the officials are not ready to lose control over the councils, therefore for decentralisation to happen there 
is a long way to go (NKI-02). 
 
He further insisted on the importance of a regional coordination plan for decentralisation to avoid 
sectors from either dumping functions on councils without resources or withholding other 
functions. The decentralisation task team at national, regional and council levels are no longer 
functioning. These teams were responsible for the coordination of the decentralisation of reforms 
and to ensure that local governments were well empowered to accept decentralisation. However, 
decentralisation teams were no longer in place due to budget deficits:  
… Government was not well prepared to roll out the devolution. Most of the funds were coming from 
donors. This led to implementation difficulties when donors delayed the disbursement of funds. For 
example, at present the established task team is no longer functioning due to lack of funds to pay for their 
activities. Also, the LGRP II has been delayed while waiting for donor funds. None of the planned 
activities has been implemented … we are still waiting. If donors decide not to release funds for the LGRP 
II, that will be the end of decentralisation (NKI-02). 
 
At the MoHSW there was no proper division to coordinate decentralisation. The health sector 
reform secretariat works independently, mainly focusing on sector reforms.  However, some 
consultations were done between the PMO-RALG and MoHSW with regard to council health 
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services. It was noted that MoHSW staff lack adequate experience of decentralisation. This is 
because decentralisation was not driven from within the MoHSW, but driven from outside the 
heath sector. The national and local roles of the decentralised sector also were not defined. The 
LGR just mentions that the role of the local authorities is to provide public services within their 
jurisdiction. The MoHSW was performing both planning and implementation roles. One of the 
participants claimed: 
… .We realised that MOHSW should not control both central level policy functions and the local authority 
implementation process; we have not been able to get out of this trap. May be we need to completely 
overhaul of the sector. It is confusing with both PMO-RALG and MoHSW working with councils at the 
same time (NKI- 02, -05, -06).  
 
Decentralisation was stressed in strong inter-sectorial coordination between ministries, 
departments and agencies and the decentralised sector. At the national level, fairly good 
coordination between government and donors was in place during the joint annual review and 
planning. At council level, no functional sectorial coordination was set up to steer the 
decentralisation process. The necessary reform measures per policy requirement were not made 
available in the council structure. Doubts were raised about the capacity of the LGA to 
coordinate all functions related to decentralisation. LGA lacked technical and management 
specialists in the planning section to lead a decentralised planning process. However, some 
participants commented that: 
Council lacks planning officers to take down decentralisation objectives. For example, participatory 
planning needs knowledgeable planning officers to use those tools to engage communities in identifying 
their needs. But we did not perform bottom-up planning because we lack experts (CKI-02, -03, -06). 
 
Similarly, participants pointed out the weakness of the national level for not taking an active role 
in the timely restructuring of the organisations that are involved. Failure to restructure the central 
authorities means that limited ranges of functions are transferred to the LGAs. They share the 
need for a proper restructuring of the PO-PSM office. The roles of the office were not 
restructured in line with decentralisation reform, and the roles of central managers were not re-
defined. There was no systematic consultation with national programmes. International 
experience suggests that it is very important for consultation and discussion to be on the policy 
agenda (Collins et al., 2003, Dhakal and Singh, 2006). 
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In the council, no functional sectoral coordination was put in place to steer the process. The 
necessary reform measures as per policy requirements were not made according to council 
structure. This led to some confusion about the roles and some actors were not in agreement on 
some issues linked to decentralisation. This was expressed by one of the participants:  
We are not all going in the same direction of decentralisation within government itself. While other 
councils are concerned more with decentralisation, central authorities are concentrated on centralisation. 
Decentralisation should be a package that includes all responsible departments to think the same about 
change … for example civil servants are now concentrating on centralisation of civil service functions; it 
no longer seems to be the intention to carry out human resource decentralisation. Before 2004, council used 
to recruit their personnel, but the civil service department has reversed the process without our consultation 
(CKI-04). 
 
The implementation of the LGRP ended in June 2008 with the limited achievement of the stated 
goals. Joint Government-Donor Reviews have consistently revealed that significant progress has 
been made at the local level. Little has been achieved in terms of fiscal and administrative 
decentralisation (MOHSW, 2008c, MOH, 2004, MOH, 2002). Building on the previous LGRP, 
government launched LGRP-II from July 2008 to July 2014, aimed at strengthening local 
government and mainstreaming the decentralisation policy to the central authorities and all sector 
ministries. The broader goal for LGRP II resembles the LGRP: to ‗ensure effective and 
empowered LGAs to serve as principal and accountable actors for local socio-economic 
development, public service delivery and poverty reduction in their areas of jurisdiction‘(URT, 
2008a). 
 
5.4 Objectives of health sector decentralisation 
Defining a set of objectives for decentralisation policy is important, as it gives direction to the 
process, and facilitates the monitoring and evaluation of the changes. Participants were asked to 
express their views on how they perceived decentralisation and why government had been so 
interested in decentralisation. It is conceivable that a common understanding of decentralisation 
among policy makers, implementers and beneficiaries would have great significance in 
influencing its implementation and final policy outcomes. The responses are grouped according 
to different levels of governance, namely national, council, service providers and users. 
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Participants at the national level were somehow acquainted with the objectives and goals of the 
decentralisation policy. At the council level, decentralisation objectives were not known. Some 
of the key participants were not knowledgeable about the intentions of decentralisation policy. At 
the community level, discussion about health decentralisation concerned community 
participation in service delivery through enrolment in the community health insurance scheme. 
This looks more market driven decentralisation with privatisation. Generally, decentralisation 
was given its own meanings at different levels, which were not in line with the decentralisation 
policy goals. The finding supports the argument that states that ‗decentralisation‘ means 
‗different things to different people‘. 
5.4.1 Objectives of health sector decentralisation: Views of national actors 
At the national level, most of the participants, in particular those who were involved in policy 
formulation were familiar with the objective of health sector decentralisation. To them, 
decentralisation was very straightforward and they related decentralisation to changes in the 
organisation and management of delivering local services. This includes a number of processes 
geared to stimulating local development, and steering social, economic and political changes. 
Decentralisation was defined as a transfer of power and resources from the central ministries, 
departments and agencies to local governments to give them more autonomy for local service 
delivery. Local communities should be engaged in managing local services delivery within their 
localities with the oversight of their elected councillors. The following are the responses from 
national participants about the intentions of health sector decentralisation policy:  
… Give away power and resources to local government authorities to take full responsibility for local 
health service delivery (NKI-01). 
A number of views were put forward by participants emphasising the importance of the 
community‘s involvement through decentralisation. It was felt by some participants that 
representatives of the local communities were more acquainted with local health problems than 
those who are at the centre. When communities are involved in identifying their needs, they can 
make priorities that reflect their local needs and make plans that are feasible. As one participant 
said:  
I am here at metropolitan city as a health manager … I cannot run health services in Dodoma from Dar es 
Salaam, it has to be done from the regions and local authorities (NKI-02).  
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Some participants saw decentralisation as a means for improving efficiency and effectiveness in 
the delivery of public goods such as health delivery: 
…objective of decentralisation is to build capacity at all levels of service delivery so as to increase 
efficiency through the devolution of authority. This is to enable communities to participate in defining the 
type of health services they need (NKI-03, NKI-04; NKI-05; NKI-09, NKI-12). 
 
Some participants see decentralisation as an important way of strengthening district health 
services. For others, decentralisation was all about giving local authorities autonomy for 
planning and budgeting local service delivery to communities, as well as the execution of plans:   
......decentralisation is the opposite of centralisation. It was adapted to facilitate bottom-up planning and 
financing, management of human resources, service delivery to communities (NKI-07; NKI- 10).  
However, knowledge and experience of decentralisation differ among the national actors. 
Participants that were outside the DLG department were not very knowledgeable about the 
policy objectives, although they were responsible for monitoring the councils, such as council 
personnel management, finance and service delivery. The researcher was frequently referred to 
the DLG department when decentralisation questions were asked. One of the participants insisted 
that: 
… all the issues regarding decentralisation have been the role of the DLG department. The policy has not 
yet mainstreamed into other departments; maybe in the coming phase two of the LGRP. We are not aware 
of what is happening. Probably in the second phase of the reform all the departments will be taken on board 
(NKI-08).  
 
Participants outside the DLG had a concern about government ministries, departments and 
agencies to mainstream decentralisation. There were notable delays in the implementation of 
decentralisation because of central authorities retains significant fiscal and human resource 
power. Decentralisation enhances implementation of programmes in more meaningful ways 
when local people are part of the process. With decentralisation, resources can be used more 
efficiently to benefit communities. Similarly, local participation is important for local resource 
mobilisation. 
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Another participant insisted that decentralisation was implemented without training and on the 
assumption that changes will happen automatically. Sharing his experience of coordinating 
council finances, he said:  
… working with councils as a finance coordinator for the district health basket fund, more than fifteen 
years, I never received any training in decentralisation, only a one-week refresher course on fiscal 
decentralisation in America. Unfortunately, their system was different from ours; hence the course was not 
useful. I am working through my experience. I am not sure if things are in line with fiscal decentralisation 
goals. The DLG department focused more on councils and forgot some of the important managers who are 
working directly with councils (NKI-02).  
 
At the MoHSW a similar situation was observed to that at the PMO-RALG office regarding the 
reform structure. A Health Sector Reform Secretariat (HSRS) was established to manage health 
reforms. The majority of the participants were acquainted with the intentions of the 
decentralisation policy. The following are some of the responses from the participants: 
Decentralisation means giving powers away from the ministry of health to the local authority to enable 
them to take responsibilities for local health care delivery (NKI-03). 
Decentralisation means yielding power to the community through health governing boards and committees 
to take responsibilities for planning and managing local health services (NKI-04).  
It was further asserted that the goal of health boards and committees is to manage community 
health funds (CHF). The health boards and facility committees were established along with the 
introduction of the community health fund. One of the participant insisted: 
… the main reason for having governing boards and committees was to facilitate the establishment of the 
CHF. The aim of the CHF is to make communities more responsible, as well as to own their facilities. 
Otherwise they will keep the mentality that health service delivery is the responsibility of the government, 
although they have a role to play (NKI-04).  
It was observed that there were different views among the participants within the central 
authorities. Participant from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs (MoFEA) and the 
President‘s Office-Public Service Management (PO-PSM) are not supporting decentralisation 
process whereas the PMO-RALG was in favour of decentralisation. The planning team from the 
MoFEA, who provide budget ceilings for the health sector budget, were in favour of 
centralisation. This affects policy coherence during implementation. One of the participants 
argued that: 
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… under the current arrangement we lack harmonisation of public policies. Everyone is busy within 
her/his departments executing their programmes without consultation. For example, in our department our 
reform concern is with integration of the previous vertical RH services into primary healthcare services to 
enable women to access all their health needs under one unit. While we are dealing with integration, other 
departments, like HIV/AIDS, are still implementing their programmes under the vertical arrangement (K1-
03). 
 
The above messages from the PMO-RALG and MoHSW show that participants had some 
common understanding of the overall purpose of decentralisation, namely that it was to improve 
service delivery. The official objective of health sector decentralisation is expressed in the 
National Health Policy, which states that: management and administration of health services has 
been devolved to district councils through their respective council authorities, council health 
service boards (CHSBs), facility committees and council health management teams 
(CHMTs)(MoHSW, 2003). It can be seen that some participants expressed views that matched 
more with this official view.  
 
5.4.2 Objectives of health sector decentralisation: Views of council managers 
At the council level, responses were not impressive, although this is the level where the policy 
goals are put into action. The knowledge of the actors at this level is important for the effective 
execution of policy at the grassroots level. There is a lack of common interpretation among the 
council actors about decentralisation. Participants, in particular councillors and administrative 
staff and health managers, had mixed views and experience with the decentralisation process. 
Some were aware of the decentralisation policy goals, while some were not. Some of the health 
managers were positive towards decentralisation, although the administrative staff, especially 
from human resources and finances department, felt that there still was a long way to go for real 
decentralisation to happen. 
 
The locally elected leaders (councillors) were observed to lack a clear understanding of the 
decentralisation process. Six out of seven of the interviewees admitted that they did not have 
good knowledge of the policy itself, laws and/or regulations regarding decentralisation. They 
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were dissatisfied with the overall policy process, as they had not been consulted. When asked 
about their roles in decentralised governance their responses were not impressive. Some said 
they participated in council planning. This low level of understanding is not shocking because 
they did not receive any training. The majority acknowledged that they were given general 
training on how to participate and the procedures for council deliberations. When asked about 
their views and experience of the decentralisation process, the following were their responses:  
… definitely, I am aware of decentralisation. I understand the council has power over local affairs for 
planning for local service delivery (PKI-06, PKI-02).  
… I am familiar with decentralisation … it means that councils are granted powers, at least in theory, to 
manage their own matters without the interference of the central government with the oversight of the 
elected council (PKI-03).  
Decentralisation means power to the councillors to manage the council‘s staff to bring local development. 
This is through monitoring their actions and to sanction council staff members in the case of any abuse of 
council resources (PKI-01). 
Some of the participants were not sure about decentralisation policy objectives. 
Although we know that government has shifted to a decentralised system, we have not officially been 
informed. We were just elected last November; we were never given any written document and/or training 
about decentralisation, we are not aware of its content. We only learn government by-laws and procedures 
for participating in council meetings (PKI-07). 
Another participant also answered by assenting: 
… Yes … I heard about the decentralisation policy … I know that central government has decentralised 
some functions to allow the councils to take control of service delivery. But I cannot tell you exactly what 
it means (PKI-05). 
One of the participants answered positively: 
… granting local authorities powers to plan and budget their plans with minimum control of the central 
government. The local governments are now free to plan by engaging local communities to prioritise their 
needs (PKI-01).   
 
Under decentralisation, councillors are key actors in allocating council resources for the different 
functions. All five interviewed councillors admitted that they had access to council data. 
However, planning was not their role; the technical departments were responsible for planning. 
Thus, councillors were not able to identify the amount of money received by the council from the 
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central level. They admitted they had never participated in developing the comprehensive 
council health plan.  
Low awareness of decentralisation among some of the participants was due to inadequate 
training. Some complained that they had never received any training since they had been elected, 
apart from training on local government meeting procedure and local by-laws. This was 
confirmed by one of the national participants, who argued that they did not have funds to 
conduct training:  
… government decided to cut off training due to lack of funds, as it is claimed, surprisingly, executives 
(council directors and commissioners) are provided with training on government policies soon after their 
appointments. However, even for them, official training covers national policy goals such as MKUKUTA 
and not decentralisation per se (NKI-03). 
 
Health managers and elected leaders agreed that a significant element of the role of the 
councillors should be to set up health priorities of their communities; however, they were not yet 
performing this function. This was partly because they were not aware of their roles or because 
they did not know the planning process. The councillor‘s role is complex and difficult to grasp 
with their limited education and experience. In many instances, differences in educational level 
between councillors and council staff seemed to marginalise their roles. It sometimes also 
created tension with the council staff with their technical expertise. This poses a challenge for 
making decisions on health-planning priorities. Likewise, it affects decentralisation goals, since 
council deliberations are supposed to include community needs presented by councillors. 
 
The council director was not familiar with the decentralisation policy, claiming that he was 
acting director since the director was on holiday. This is not an excuse, since he was heading a 
department in which decentralisation reform was being implemented. Unlike the acting council 
director, the District Commissioner was well informed about decentralisation:  
… decentralisation means having local authorities with autonomous powers and resources to deliver public 
goods and services through involving communities to have access to their basic social services including 
health, education, and water (PKI-02).  
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Some heads of departments said decentralisation was good, but they complained about the 
behaviour of central authorities to hold power for the council personnel and finances. Some 
asserted that ‗decentralisation is just on paper‘ no real power has been given to us. The following 
were responses from some of them: 
Decentralisation means giving power to the local authority to recruit our own staff locally. In the past we 
had all this power, but the government decided to centralise the process. No more decentralisation, most of 
the key council personnel are posted to the councils from the central authorities (CKI-04).  
… having power to levy taxes and raise our own revenues locally. However, we never experience this since 
the central authority decided to stop some of our revenue. We totally depend on central transfers to fund 
council plans (CKI-07). 
We have never been involved in government policy formulation, not even consulted or even shared in the 
policy document; we are recipients of central policies. The decentralisation policy document is not 
available at the council. And we need policy documents to be printed in Swahili which we can all 
understand. If any policy has been written in English, it should be translated (FKI-02, FKI-04, FKI-06, 
FKI-08, FKI-09). 
It was noted that council health managers were familiar with decentralisation to some extent. For 
them, decentralisation implies a change in roles at different levels of health service delivery. 
Some of the participants acknowledged that decentralisation had reduced central bureaucracy, 
since they can implement some of their plans more easily by consulting council health managers. 
This has been noted as an opportunity to improve local health service delivery, including that of 
reproductive health. With the DMO being accounting officer, with full authority to control 
council health resources, things are made easier than in the past, when there was little 
involvement of the council health managers.  It was noted that the CHMTs were happy with the 
improvement in donor relationships. With their council health plans they can access donor 
resources directly and work together to ensure council health plans are executed:  
With decentralisation we have power to plan, budget, manage and implement council health services with 
no central interference. This enables me to achieve what I have planned since we planned according to the 
available resources. In the past we used to plan but we were not guaranteed an allocation, since funds were 
diverted to other activities for which they were not intended (CKI-01).  
To others, decentralisation means additional managerial roles:  
More meetings and administrative roles compared to professional responsibilities. We are not sure what 
decentralisation means. But we produced a comprehensive council health plan which is a guide for health 
resource allocation at our council. Prior to the 1990s we did not plan, now we have an opportunity and 
communities are represented through health committees. Both private and NGO providers are now our 
partners in healthcare planning and healthcare delivery (FGD-01).  
To others, decentralisation means more negotiations between politicians and bureaucrats: 
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… now we are working with councillors who demand a number of meetings and negotiations. This takes 
much of our time to convince them of our plans. More of our time is spent on meetings than service 
delivery. Every councillor wants better services for their catchment, which means it sometimes takes time 
to compromise over health priorities (FGD-01).  
There also were others who said that decentralisation meant: 
Running local health services by letting communities manage their facilities through health boards and 
committees (CKI-02).   
Another participant asserted that: 
Yes, I know that central government has decentralised service delivery to allow CHMTs to plan and access 
health resources through comprehensive council health plans. Yet the MoHSW still control councils, 
through directives. We need a complete overhaul of the system (CKI-04). 
 
The responses showed that council heath managers had at least heard about decentralisation. But 
relatively surprisingly, not all health managers were aware of the objectives of decentralisation 
policy. This perspective was clearly described by one participant, who said: 
I was not alerted about the decentralisation programme probably because I am not a member of the 
CHMTs, I also don‘t know the intentions of decentralisation; however, I know health resources and  
management of the council health service delivery are now the role of the CHMTs (CKI-05). 
Despite the positive view of the health managers have of health sector decentralisation, the major 
challenge to the effectiveness of decentralisation to improve health outcomes was the inadequate 
and unqualified staff at the health facilities. Healthcare personnel are controlled by the central 
authorities, making it difficult to allocate health personnel according to needs. It was observed 
that most of the facilities were managed by unqualified personnel. Also, it was noted that 
medical attendants and nurse assistants, who are less trained, were the ones who were available 
in most of the facilities for delivering health services. 
 
Councillors and council health managers lacked common understanding and interpretation of the 
decentralisation policy objectives. In particular, some council health managers said that the 
councillors did not give them the needed support for example with regard to allocation of council 
funds for health. They allocated these funds instead to other priorities such as roads. It was 
observed that councillors who are supposed to work with CHMTs in planning for the local health 
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service delivery were not actively involved in the planning, but only in the approval of the 
council health plan. 
 
A key informant considered the problem of the conflict of interest between politicians and 
technical staff. The biggest challenge to health decentralisation was the tension created between 
the councillors and the technical people. The councillors thought they were in charge and that no 
decisions could be made without their consent, even if it was fine for the council: 
… they thought they should be involved in all decisions even on technical issues … I see this as the biggest 
challenge.  Decentralisation is a good thing; the biggest challenge is that some people are using it wrongly 
to cause hassles in health service delivery. For example, councillors are more interested in physical 
infrastructure to please their voters, since it‘s a tangible outcome. If we don‘t budget for the construction or 
rehabilitation of the facilities it takes time to convince them and sometimes we change the plan to please 
them (CKI-04, CKI-05, CKI-06).  
The CHMTs are not fully informed on health policies, programmes, or specific activities, let 
alone decentralisation policy. Their importance is not well appreciated at the current reform 
initiatives. The CHMT are important actors that translate policy goals into practice as health 
managers. 
 
5.4.3 Objectives of health sector decentralisation: Views of services providers 
Interviews with health providers in six selected health facilities indicated that there was a lack of 
clear understanding of decentralisation. They were not aware of what roles to play in the reform 
process; whether it involved resource allocation or priority setting. The majority of the health 
providers complained that they had never received any training on decentralisation. As a result, 
there were no significant changes in the re-organisation of services to reflect local health needs 
and priorities. Decentralisation was explained by emphasising on its characteristics, such as (i) 
community involvement in health planning and (ii) management of local health by the 
communities. The responses presented below are the interpretations of decentralisation by the 
service providers based on their experience of implementation of decentralisation reforms.  
I would also say that decentralisation has given powers and responsibilities to some people, in particular to 
the CHMTs and DMOs, regarding health matters. We cannot do something at the facility until we consult 
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the management team (CHMT). We write to inform them about what we want to do for them to give 
directions and sometimes they might refuse (FKI-04, FKI-06).  
Another participant observed that: 
There is a great change since the inception of the health reforms. Communities now play a key role in 
participating and contributing to the council health delivery. Through their health committees they are 
presented to the health facility meetings during planning. Also, communities are now paying for their 
services either through community insurance or through user fees. However, there are services that are 
provided for free when contraceptives are available (FKI-01, FKI-02). 
I have seen that decentralisation has helped the communities to initiate their own projects like health 
infrastructure, which has enhanced health delivery. For instance, through councillors we mobilise the 
communities to provide their labour to build a dispensary (FKI-05). 
The shared view about health reform among the health care providers was that: 
Charging for the health services that we used to provide for free … the era of free service has passed. What 
we can see as a change is the pre-payment for healthcare service through community health insurance or 
user charges at the point of service delivery (FKI-01; FKI-02; FKI-03; FKI-04; FKI-05 & FKI-06).  
Apart from the changes mentioned above, some of the participants claimed that there had not 
been substantial changes in the district health system since decentralisation implementation: 
I don‘t think there is any change so far, council health funds are from the central authorities. In planning 
and decision-making, there is no substantial change because the central authorities give us a budget ceiling 
for what they can fund and they approve our health plans before they release funds. This is to ensure the 
CHMT follows their instructions and sometimes they call to give directives. In some instances they hold 
the fund until the budget meets the stated criteria.  Sometimes they command us to include interventions 
that are not our priority (FK1-01). 
I have not seen any changes since I have been working with this facility for the past ten years. There has 
been little improvement in facility planning and decision making, since CHMTs are now responsible for 
everything (FK1-03). 
 
Theoretically, decentralisation reforms are aimed at empowering health providers; in practice the 
field findings do not portray a very positive picture. Health providers, both at the health centre 
and dispensary levels, felt that much power has been concentrated in the CHMT that operates at 
council level. Little power is given to the service providers, apart from planning and supervision 
of community health services.  Service providers expressed dissatisfaction with the slow pace of 
decentralisation to the lower levels. Also, they complained about a lack of responsiveness and 
feedback from the CHMT. Inability to use funds collected through user fees and CHF was cited 
the most by health providers as an example of the limited power they hold.  
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Generally, the decentralisation by devolution has not reached health facility level, leaving health 
workers disempowered. Decision making is, to a large extent, concentrated in the district centres. 
This affects policy implementation, as it was found that in some facilities clients were being 
charged for reproductive health services, which were supposed to be provided for free A lack of 
common understanding and clear policy goals of decentralisation at different levels was due to a 
lack of dissemination of strategies from the responsible ministry to the lower levels. This was 
mentioned by the national and council participants as one of the obstacles to the decentralisation 
process. Policies were reported to be unfriendly, resulting in different interpretations by the key 
actors.  
 
5.4.4 Objectives of health sector decentralisation: Views of the service users 
Generally, the findings show that service users/communities, have limited knowledge and 
information about decentralisation. Majority of the community participants, decentralisation was 
a new concept. Furthermore, very few community leaders were able to identify the 
decentralisation policy goals and process. It was explained during the interview with the 
community leaders that, before the reforms, villages had health committees and ward 
development committees that operated from within their office with very little concern for the 
communities. They said little had changed because they never received any formal guidelines on 
what roles they should play. A lack of information regarding the reform process was the major 
complaint by the village leaders. Overall, local leaders lacked a clear understanding of 
decentralisation and its processes. Only one out of four village leaders interviewed were able to 
identify the process.  
 
At the community level, all eight community FGDs revealed that the term decentralisation was 
not known. The question was altered by replacing it with other terms, such as health reforms, 
and/or other characteristics of decentralisation, like direct community involvement and/or user 
representation through facility health committees. There were mixed results concerning the 
meaning of the term decentralisation. Most of the participants linked decentralisation to finance 
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reforms. For them, health reform means community involvement in the payment of the CHF 
membership fee and user charges at the point of service delivery when they access public health 
facilities. Some participants identified the presence of facility health committees as the change 
brought by health sector decentralisation. The following quotations show the communities‘ 
views about health sector decentralisation: 
Decentralisation came with changes in which health service user‘s pay when they seek health care at public 
health facilities. In the past we used to receive free medication, but now things have changed, you either 
have to pay for the fees at the point of service delivery or enrol with community health insurance funds to 
access public health services (C-FGD-01-08). 
 
The extent to which communities understood decentralisation varied slight from one village to 
another. Some participants identified reform in relation to the availability of supplies and 
equipment for health service delivery. For some, health reforms meant having enough health 
personnel, drugs, running water and electricity in their health facility. The following quotations 
give community opinions: 
Ten years ago there was no facility nearby. Health services, particularly maternal services, at least have 
been brought closer to the user. In this community, women used to be delivered by traditional birth 
attendants, now they access the service at the health facility. However, some still trust the traditional birth 
attendants (C-FGD–03).  
I really wonder why we pay insurance and user fees while we face the same problems as in the past. My 
experience in the colonial period was we paid for the service although it was not expensive, but we got 
better services than now. I am wondering what type of reform are these in the public sector (C-FGD-06).  
 
A follow-up mechanism that is currently used at community level to ensure direct community 
participation in the identification of health priorities was found to be limited. The village health 
workers (member of village health committees) are supposed to work closely with communities. 
They form the first link between the communities and the facilities. They are nominated by their 
respective villages and receive some basic training in health services delivery from the nearby 
facilities. They are not paid, and usually work on a voluntary basis. Their responsibilities include 
setting health priorities based on their experience of working with the communities. 
Communities are informed when decisions are already made. In many instances, village 
151 
 
governments held a village meeting where people were given information on the deliberations of 
the village government.  
 
Among the goals of health sector decentralisation in Tanzania is having the communities running 
their own health facilities. At present, there is no mechanism in place that ensures communities 
are taking charge in the management of health facilities in their vicinities. Health workers were 
sometimes invited to village meetings when health matters were reported on. However, due to 
insufficient time and huge workloads, they rarely get the chance to attend. In other cases, health 
care providers said they were not invited because village government failed to pay their 
allowance. One of the participants argued that: 
… the village government hesitated to invite us because they are supposed to pay for living expenses as we 
need to travel from our working stations. They are nevertheless reluctant to pay us even the sitting 
allowances while they pay themselves the same. So I never attend their meetings, if we are all civil servants 
we both deserve to be paid the stipulated allowances (FKI-04). 
Some participants expressed concerns that some actors were opposed to decentralisation or were 
not enthusiastic about it: 
… central government officials do not want to delegate authority and responsibility to local governments. 
In reality these people do not have a desire for decentralisation. At most they may delegate some authority 
with the intention to snatch or take it away whenever they want (CKI–01, CKI-03, CKI-05). 
The interviews exposed an ambiguity about whether participants opposed decentralisation or 
whether the process was more complex than simply identifying who is for or against it. This was 
stated by one of the participants, who did not see resistance but rather confusion and a lack of 
enthusiasm to implement decentralisation in its totality.  
Central authorities are in a state of confusion regarding decentralisation … it cannot openly deny 
decentralisation, neither does it show willingness to devolve authority and resources to LGAs.  
The same participant criticised the lack of authority given to LGAs in managing their own staff: 
… no one opposes decentralisation, but some of the central authorities usually create an unfavourable 
environment for the implementation of decentralisation. Members of parliament and ministers usually make 
policies that are contrary to decentralisation … maybe it is not the right time to implement. It can be said 
there are people who are against decentralisation (CKI-03).  
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The complexity of the resistance to decentralisation is characterised by the opinion raised by one 
of the participants mentioning a lack of deliberation: 
… the theoretical part of decentralisation is well articulated in policy documents and has not been opposed 
by anyone. But there are those who oppose the practice. For instance there are those who do not explicitly 
oppose decentralisation but tend to dilute the definition to suit their own perspectives. In particular, central 
bureaucrats who are the ones who produce policy that favours decentralisation at the same time produce 
policy that contradicts it (NKI-06).  
 
Communities felt disempowered with the current practice of decentralisation. This marginalises 
their responsibilities and obligation to participate in the decentralisation process. The data 
presented in Table 5-1 summarises the views on health sector decentralisation. Participants were 
asked to rate decentralisation policy. In replying to this question, some participants saw it as an 
opportunity to express their feelings. The responses are grouped under two headings, namely 
good and bad policy. About 64% of the participants viewed decentralisation as a good policy, 
while 34% of the participants viewed it as bad policy. Those who said it was good were the ones 
to whom decentralisation gave more power, while those whose power was taken from them feel 
that decentralisation is not good. Positive comments towards decentralisation emphasised the 
increase in the number of facilities, hence bringing the services closer to the users; improved 
availability of funds for local service delivery, i.e. each council can access health resources 
through their comprehensive council health plan, hence easier problem solving and improved 
service delivery. Those who said decentralisation was not good associated it with tension and 
confusion over the new roles and responsibilities. The participants commented on the poor 
dissemination of national policies and the lack of consultation during the formulation process. 
This was mentioned as a source of misunderstanding and delay in implementation. 
 
According to the findings, the characteristic of decentralisation that was seen at national, council 
and community level was the establishment of governance structures to manage health facilities.  
However, the CHSB and FHCs were put in place to facilitate the financing of reforms and not to 
re-organise local health service delivery. Communities repeatedly mentioned that the key role of 
health boards and committees was to mobilise communities to join the community health 
insurance. This is contrary to the goals of decentralisation that aim to empower communities to 
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define and prioritise their health needs. The next section presents the discussion based on the 
research findings and other literature.  
Table 5-1: Summary of the actors’ opinions on health decentralisation 
Opinion on decentralisation Good Not good 
National  n = 15 5 (11%) 9 (19%) 
Regional n = 3 - 3 (6%) 
Council n = 13 9 (19%) 4 (9%) 
Providers  n = 11 11 (23%) - 
Politicians n = 5 5 (11%) - 
Total = 47 30 (64%) 16 (34%) 
Source: Field visits, 2010. 
5.5 Chapter discussion and conclusion 
The findings presented in this chapter confirm there is no universal form of decentralisation that 
applies to health systems. The decentralisation of the Tanzanian health sector is based on public 
administrative typology that defines decentralisation in terms of its components: 
deconcentration, delegation, devolution and privatisation. In each form of decentralisation, 
significant power and authority has remained with the central authorities despite government 
advocates for devolution. Similarly, the international experience shows that country health 
systems tend to approximate systems of deconcentration, devolution and delegation and 
sometimes combine all these forms (Mills et al., 19990). 
 
The empirical evidence showed that the participants defined decentralisation differently, 
although there were common aspects shared among the participants. To some extent the evidence 
matches with what Rondinelli (1981) defines as decentralisation, as the transfer of planning and 
decision making to the sub-national level. Despite the fact that some of the participants, 
especially at the lower level, were not knowledgeable about the policy goals of decentralisation, 
they were observed to perform some activities that were identified in the decentralisation policy. 
These activities include decision making over local resources, organisation of service delivery, 
and internal transfer of health personnel within the council, which indicates that decentralisation, 
has taken place at the council level.  
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McLaughlin (1987) asserts that individual interpretation of policy meaning has a significant 
influence on how policy is implemented. Thus, meanings attached to policies affect policy 
implementation. Makinde (2005) contends that if policy is seen to favour the implementers, their 
attitudes towards implementation are very positive. But, when policies are likely to affect 
implementers negatively, their attitude towards implementation is poor. Similarly, Smithson et 
al. (1997), Mills et al. (2001) and Batley and Larbi (2004) studies show that the attitude of staff 
can be an obstacle to implementation. 
 
This study argues that prior knowledge of policy objectives is the basic prerequisite for effective 
implementation. One participant insisted: 
…..LGAs leaders do not really understand what decentralisation means. It is then the role of government to 
train such people and other actors to play their part (NKI-07). 
Thus, those who are responsible to execute policy decisions should have knowledge in order to 
communicate the policy goals effectively during implementation. The case of Tanzania has 
shown that central authorities usually produce policies but fail to communicate not only with the 
lower-level authorities, but even the higher authorities.  This leads to difficulties in translating 
the decentralisation policy into practical outputs. The gap between policy formulation and 
implementation existed at all levels, and a policy can only get support if there is a clear 
understanding of its content. Likewise, the probability of getting support for implementation can 
be high if policies are decided upon among central government and local authorities (Ramji, 
2009). 
 
According to Sabatier (1991), the status of policy implementation is measured by the extent to 
which policy objectives are achieved. Thus, the process of implementation determines the 
success of a policy. Grindle and Thomas (1991) put forward evidence that policy outcomes are 
different from policy intention. Studies by Sakyi (2008) and Dhakal and Singh (2006) have 
shown that policy implementation is likely to suffer whenever there is misunderstanding and 
uncertainty over the policy objectives. This is because of the communication gap and the failure 
of central officials to share information because of the power struggle between them and local 
bureaucracies (Sakyi, 2008). This led to the discrepancies between the policy intentions and 
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implementation. Lower-level managers were not comfortable with the pace of decentralisation. 
Roles and responsibilities of the lower levels were not well articulated hence it is difficult for the 
facility managers to demand accountability of the council managers. It is alleged that the status 
of policy implementation is largely defined and shaped by the given conditions, objectives and 
characteristics (Grindle & Thomas, 1991). In the case of Tanzania, the policy characterised 
perception gaps between policy makers, implementers and users about the objective of the 
decentralisation policy. This has been one of the challenges for effective implementation. For 
example, providers perceive that decentralisation improves the mobilisation of resources, while 
service users perceive that services have not improved. 
 
Decentralisation was reported to be complex and unclear, resulting in different interpretations 
among different parties involved in implementation. An example was the user fees policy which 
was interpreted differently by different actors. Despite the fact that a key component of the RHS 
direct health services is that they are provided free of charge, healthcare providers were charging 
the users. In addition, lack of a clear implementation strategy that specified the resources needed 
has also affected decentralisation as far as health delivery is concerned Likewise, the policy did 
not define the roles and functions of the decentralised sectors at the national level. This has led to 
the duplication of activities in the PMO-RALG and MoHSW.  
 
Central structures are inadequate and inefficient to address decentralisation policy needs. The 
health sector decentralisation is not guided by sufficient communication from the MOHSW or 
the PMO-RALG, which is responsible for the administration of primary health facilities (MoH, 
2002). This could be due to a lack of a clear decentralisation policy for the health sector. 
Decentralisation efforts are more politically motivated than technical efforts geared to address 
inefficiencies of the health care system (Watt et al., 2005, Jeppsson et al., 2003, Hanson et al., 
2003). 
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Another challenge that was raised by the participants was lack of capacity at all levels. These 
included both financial and human resources. Mills et al. (2001) and Larbi (1998) questioned the 
capacity resources available in the health sector to implement decentralisation. They found that 
most of the district health management teams lack the technical knowledge to implement health 
reforms (Larbi, 1998). Additionally, a perception of losing power by central officials, along with 
the unclear roles of the actors and institutions involved in the implementation process, can lead 
to institutional divergences, which cause implementation gaps (Collins and Barker, 2001, Batley 
and Larbi, 2004). Successful implementation of decentralisation demands strong central-local 
relationships and inter-sectoral coordination (Collins et al., 2003, Green and Collins, 1994, 
Collins et al., 2007, Mills et al., 1990). This has been a challenge in Tanzania. 
 
Capacity development should be a constant process before and after decentralisation, as demands 
for new skills emerge in the course of implementation (Gottret and Schieber, 2006). Health 
managers are basically clinicians who lack training in health related managerial structures. The 
significance of balancing capacity-building measures in management with technical skills was 
realised at all levels. Inability to balance these two skills prerequisites could lead to serious 
shortfalls in service delivery. In Namibia it was noted that health management teams were not 
trained in complementary public health skills and therefore focused more on management than 
on clinical skills, hence the public health programme became the victim (Bell et al., 2002, 
McPake et al., 1991). 
 
Conclusion  
Limited understanding of the decentralisation objective has emerged as one impediment to its 
effective implementation. The findings presented in this chapter acknowledge that effective 
policy communication among the actors and agencies involved is one of the important factors for 
effective implementation. The conclusion supports Jeppsson et al. (2005) on the importance of 
proper dissemination strategies to make policy available to the ultimate actors. It has been noted 
that policies that are not properly communicated to implementers, in particular the workforce, 
are usually left undone (Makinde, 2005). The case of Tanzania shows that local actors lag behind 
157 
 
in the decentralisation process (Jeppsson et al., 2003) . One of the reasons is lack of consultation 
during policy formulation and implementation stages. And after implementation, monitoring of 
the progress of sector decentralisation is rarely carried out by the Ministry of Health; whenever 
health sector evaluation is carried out decentralisation components are hardly included 
  
158 
 
Abbreviations for chapter 6 
FKI  Facility key-informant interview 
FY  Financial year 
GPG   General-purpose grants  
HFCs   Health facility committees  
HIV/AIDS Human immunodeficiency virus/Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome 
HRH   Human resources for health 
HSBF  Health Sector Basket Fund 
HSR   Health sector reforms  
HSSP   Health Sector Strategic Plan  
ICPD   International Conference for Population and Development  
LGA  Local government authority  
LGCDG Local Government Capital Development Grant  
LGRP  Local Government Reform Programme  
MDAs  Ministries, departments and agencies  
MDGs  Millennium Development Goals  
MoFEA Ministry of Economic Affairs  
MoHSW Ministry of Health and Social Welfare  
MPs   Members of Parliament  
MSD   Medical Stores Department  
MTEF  Medium-term expenditure framework  
NGOs  Non-governmental organisation 
NHIF   National Health Insurance  
NKI  National key-informant interview 
NPERCHI  National Package of Essential Reproductive and Child Health 
NSGPR National Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction  
O&ODs  Opportunities and obstacles to development  
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OC  Other charges  
OPRAS  Open performance review and appraisal system  
PE   Personal emoluments  
PER   Public expenditure review  
PF   Policy Forum 
PHSDP Primary Health Sector Development Programme  
PMO-RALG  Prime Minister‘s Office - Regional Administration and Local Government  
PO-PSM  President‘s Office - Public Services Management  
RCHCo Reproductive and Child Health Coordinator  
RH  Reproductive health  
RHMT  Regional Health Management Team   
RKI  Regional key-informant interview 
RMO   Regional medical officer 
Tsh  Tanzanian Shillings 
US$   United States Dollar 
WHO  World Health Organisation 
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CHAPTER 6 
DECENTRALISATION AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH SERVICE DELVIERY IN 
RURAL TANZANIA 
6.0 Introduction  
This chapter analyses the three dimensions of decentralisation that is fiscal, administrative and 
political decentralisation and how they have impacted on reproductive health delivery. The 
findings presented indicate that fiscal, political and administrative decentralisation has taken 
place in the health sector. The most important effect of the fiscal decentralisation is that there is a 
notable increase in local health spending transferred from the central government (CG) to the 
local government authorities (LGAs). However, intergovernmental transfer has made the LGAs 
depend heavily on CG for local spending which is contrary to fiscal decentralisation goals which 
aim at strengthening LGAs to generate their own revenues to support their budget. Thus, the 
discretion of the LGAs to set local expenditure priorities continued to decline as has been 
reflected in field findings. 
 
Administrative decentralisation has not been very successful much succeeded as the key 
authority and autonomy for the civil service regulations has been re-centralised since 2006. 
LGAs were found to have very limited power for their personnel. This made it difficult for LGAs 
to hold them to account in case of abuse. Therefore, LGAs should be granted more autonomy in 
order to hold their personnel accountable. In addition, LGA staff lack skills and qualifications 
and, currently, there is no system in place for in-service training let alone a strategy for local 
human resource development. It is difficult to attract skilled staff to LGAs.  This compromise the 
quality of health services provided to the citizens. 
 
Political decentralisation has led to the introduction of bottom-up planning, service user 
representation though council health services boards (CHB) and heath facility committees 
(HFCs) as a means for the community are heard. The findings challenge the assumption that 
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service user representation in such structures enables users to voice their needs. Since selection 
of the members is not democratic, representatives feel themselves as principally accountable to 
government and not to their communities.  
 
At this point it is worth outlining the different definitions of decentralisation. There are three 
distinct elements of decentralisation that are applicable to this study: 
 Fiscal decentralisation refers to the transfer of financial resources and granting the LGAs 
more financial discretionary powers to raise local revenue, to make and approve their 
own budgets according to their own priorities reflecting the local health needs. Three 
issues will be analysed: funding, budgeting and expenditure. 
 Administrative decentralisation refers to the transfer of powers for human resource 
management to the LGAs in order to improve local service delivery and enhance 
accountability to the citizens. The study will therefore look at the relation between 
decentralisation, human resources and reproductive health service (RHS). It covers the 
following issues: public service arrangements and conditions of service, hiring and firing, 
supervision, and training and performance management. 
 Political decentralisation refers to the transfer of power for decision-making regarding 
local health care planning and management to the citizens either directly on indirect 
through user representation. Political decentralisation is expected to provide a means to 
reflect local health needs and priorities. The section therefore, analyses the practices of 
community engagement and analyses how it has improved accountability for the 
provision of reproductive health services. 
 
Basically, political, fiscal, and administrative decentralisation can be applied to any number of 
different functions in the health service delivery. For-instance, the ministry of health may control 
many of the health functions, including those relate to financing (such as expenditures 
allocation); service organisation (such as insurance payment mechanisms); governance (such as 
facility oversight committees); and human resources (Bossert, 1998). Yet, decentralisation of one 
function, such as financing for services through intergovernmental transfer grants, does not 
necessarily imply decentralisation within other functions, like autonomy to adjust centrally 
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defined program priorities. In Tanzania, for example, despite devolution of primary health care 
services delivery and delinking of health personnel from the Ministry of Health and Social 
welfare, human resource functions remain highly centralised (Munga et al., 2009).The next 
section analyses fiscal decentralisation in relation to council power to set local revenues and 
local autonomy over health care expenditures. Local own source revenues are very important to 
enhance local accountability between the council and local citizens. 
 
6.1 Fiscal decentralisation 
Fiscal decentralisation defines how and in what way expenditures and revenues are organised 
among different layers of government (UNDP, 2005).Section 10 of the Local Government 
Finance Act, No. 9 of 1982 spells out how central government should make fiscal transfers to 
LGAs. The overall intention of fiscal reforms is to give ―local government wide discretionary 
powers and a strong financial base‖ and capacity to raise their own revenues (PMO-RALG, 
2008:9).The highest degree of fiscal autonomy is determined by the ability of the LGAs to raise 
their own funds to support public services delivery(Boex and Martinez-Vazquez, 2003). 
Accordingly, fiscal decentralisation has expanded the amount of central grants allocated to the 
LGAs.  Since the endorsement of the decentralisation policy in 1998, it was in 2004 when central 
transfers to LGAs were introduced. The Financial Act No. 6 of 1999 was amended to improve 
inter-governmental fiscal relations through fiscal devolution to ensure that LGAs‘ 
responsibilities are performed in the spirit of cooperation, equity and efficiency(URT, 2007b). 
Generally, intergovernmental transfers has been increased from 79% of total LGA revenues in 
2001/02 to 93% in 2006/07 while own-source revenue decreased from 21% of total LGA 
revenues in 2001/02 to 7% in 2006/07 (URT, 2007b).Approximately 25% of the national budget 
is earmarked for intergovernmental transfers(MoFEA, 2013b). Table 6-1 shows local 
government budgets for the FY2010/11, FY 2011/12 and FY2012/13 in Tanzania. The transfers 
are allocated based on a formula-based mechanism, which takes into account socio-economic 
factors such as size of population, area, poverty, as well as access to health facilities (Boex and 
Martinez-Vazquez 2006). 
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Table 6-1: Overview of local government finances, (Tshs. billions) 
Fiscal Year * FY 2010/11 FY2011/12 FY2012/13 
Total Revenues 2,251 2,439 2,988 
Intergovernmental Transfers 2,084 2,243 2,733 
Own Revenues 158 195 240 
Total Expenditures 1,987 2,708 2,619 
Intergovernmental Transfers as % of Total Revenues 92.59% 91.97% 91.47% 
Own Revenues as % of Total Revenues 7.03% 8.02% 8.06% 
* Fiscal year starts on 1
st
 July and ends on 30th June 30. 
Source PMO, RALG, 2013. 
 
6.1.1 Council health budget management and expenditure 
Until 2003, LGAs in Tanzania had power over local revenue sources such as development levy 
and business fees. However, in 2004, Government came with a locked list of LGAs revenue 
sources and some other sources were abolished. The locked list includeproperty and land rent 
tax, sales taxes on crops, forest products and services, guest-house tax and various fees, fines and 
penalties. LGAs are not allowed to levy any tax outside of the locked list (PMO-RALG, 2007). 
This idea was imposed by central authorities without any inputs from parliament as ―the ruling 
party CCM politicians fearing that the opposition would make use of unpopularity of local 
nuisance taxes‖ (Therkildsen and Mette, 2010). 
 
At current, LGAs do not have full autonomy over locally generated revenues as the National 
Treasury Office imposes some restrictions. A proportion of locally generated revenues are 
remitted to the central government. For example, 80% of land taxes are remitted to central and 
the LGAs retain only 20%. Value added tax is centrally managed. LGAs‘ power to impose their 
own taxes was taken away, as explained by one of the participants: 
… since 2003, the local government has to get permission from the Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Affairs (MoFEA) when we want to increase local taxes and levies. The MoFEA has approved very limited 
increases in councils … it is a local tax but it is not really local tax because you have the MoFEA that has 
to approve it … that flies in the face of decentralisation because when you decentralise … you are giving 
the councils ability to raise revenues for them to deal with their new roles. … Generally, national treasury 
controls local levies (RKI-03). 
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The effect of removing local tax reforms made the LGAs lose substantial revenues which 
weakened their autonomy.This made LGAs to have limited control over local revenue sources 
(Cochran et al., 2009, URT, 2007a). LGA revenues from own sources comprised only 6.6% and 
8% (table 6-1) of the total revenues for FY 2010/11 and FY 2011/12, respectively. This implies 
that LGAs depend on CG transfers for local spending. For example in financial year (FY) 
2002/2003, CG was 81.0% but in FY 2011/12 the level has increased to 91%. This has a 
detrimental impact on local financial discretion and ultimately service delivery as it came with 
directives (URT, 2007b). 
 
As an alternative to LGAs own revenues, CG established a system of the intergovernmental 
transfers to provide LGAs with financial resources to provide services. There are three main 
types of intergovernmental transfers that are found at the LGA level: (i) Formula-based recurrent 
block grants: cover block grants for the decentralised sectors (education, health, roads, 
agriculture, and water) and (ii) General Purpose Grant (GPG). The recurrent block grants 
contributed 68% of the total LGA funding for the FY 2011/12, (ii) other transfers (subventions): 
these are from Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) for recurrent purposes. For the FY 
2010/11 and FY 2011/12 the subventions and funds accounted for 6.6% and 6.8% respectively of 
the total LGA funding and (iii) Local Government Capital Development Grant (LGCDG) serving 
as discretionary development grant transferred to the LGAs for capital investments such as new 
infrastructure construction and rehabilitation of health facilities. 
 
The LGCDG is allocated according to a formula and annual assessment performance. LGAs that 
don‘t qualify are given a Capacity Building Grant (CBG) to enable them to qualify for LGCDG. 
DPs support LGCDG by combining project support, earmarked sector budget to fund the 
LGCDG activities, and the associated CBG (Mzumbe-Univeristy, 2010). Since its 
implementation in 2009/2010, at least 50% of the LGAs has claimed the grant (Tidemand and 
Sola, 2010a). The LGCDG funds are highly politicised, and grants are made available (more than 
50%) in councils led by CCM. Basically revenue disbursements are used ‗to protect party 
strongholds from decreasing vote shares‘ (Weinstein, 2010:53). Councils where opposition won 
are receiving 50% lower grants than average For FY 2010/11 and FY 2011/12 the development 
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grants (including funds under LGDG) constituted 17.2% and 17.4% respectively of the total 
LGA funding (Weinstein, 2010). 
 
External sources of funds to LGAs comprise borrowing from financial institutions and other 
development partners that are not directly channelled through either Recurrent Block Grant or 
LGDG funding system. However, LGA borrowing has not been a preferred source of funding for 
LGAs. In the FY 2010/11, borrowing accounted for only 4.6% of LGA financing. In the 
FY2011/12, LGA borrowing has decreased to nearly zero (MoFEA, 2013b). 
 
6.1.2 Source of council health funding 
There are types of intergovernmental transfers from the CG to LGAs for the recurrent and 
development expenditures: The recurrent expenditure is referred to as the health block grant 
covering personnel emoluments which are mainly covered by government while development 
expenditure is known as Health Basket Funds (HBF) supported by donors which is mainly 
allocated for service delivery (Masau et al., 2011) Both health block grant and basket funds are 
allocated to councils through a needs-based formula which reflects four main factors: population 
(70%); poverty rate (10%); district vehicle route (distance), which is a proxy for the size of the 
area covered (10%); and mortality rate, for which under-five mortality is used as a proxy 
indicator (10%) (MoHSW, 2010). 
 
At council level, funding of health services is fragmented and uncoordinated. There are at least 
13 sources for LGAs health funding (table 6-2). Funds for drugs are from central government 
and donors in the form of Block Grants (BG) or Health Basket Funds (HBF). The allocation is 
made straight from the MoHSW to the Medical Store Department (MSD). Facilities request their 
supplies directly from the MSD on a quarterly basis as per their budget ceiling. There is little 
information on how cost sharing money is eventually distributed and used. Better coordination of 
the financial resources at the council level, and reporting systems that allow an overview across 
the country would help decision makers at all levels. Table 6-2 provides an overview of budgeted 
and actual expenditure for FY 2010/2011. Block grants from government constituted the largest 
share (57.4%), followed by donor basket funds (18%). The share of block grants increased from 
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52.2% in 2009/2010 to 57.4% in 2010/2011 due to the deployment of new health staff. The share 
of basket funds has declined from 21.3% in 2009/2010 to 18% in 2010/2011.  
 
Table 6-2: Sources of health funds for 125 LGAs 
 2010/2011 2011/2012 
Sources  
 
Approved budget Actual expenditure Actual expenditure 
(% of total) 
Estimate 
Block grants 216 454 617 771  170 980 370 156  57.4%  275 144 699 103  
Basket Fund 57 378 810 288  53 762 902 631  18.0%  65 992 031 177  
Global Fund 4 788 370 409  844 741 984  0.3%  4 792 297 004  
UNICEF  1 951 577 906  910 947 561  0.3%  10 721 692  
CHF  3 519 419 856  2 627 257 173  0.9%  4 411 925 252  
NHIF  1 657 255 399  1 036 486 116  0.3%  2 453 000 212  
Cost sharing  9 497 199 609  7 156 968 446  2.4%  12 465 167 399  
Own sources  6 439 655 159  2 703 534 631  0.9%  9 202 929 745  
DRF  346 419 322  439 892 812  0.1%  459 369 100  
In kind  19 884 711 219  24 020 575 605  8.1%  40 310 387 269  
JRF  495 966 083  428 269 210  0.1%  388 804 735  
LGCDG  2 297 364 394  1 128 398 612  0.4%  5 913 877 254  
PHSDP 32 898 294 754  14 397 617 202  4.8%  37 039 790 240  
Others  43 494 961 697  17 692 256 874  5.9%  44 571 021 795  
TOTAL  401,104,623,095 298 122,219, 013 100.0%  503, 156, 021, 977  
Source: URT, 2011. Note: DRF = Drug Revolving Fund; JRF = Joint Rehabilitation Fund; LGCDG = Local 
Government Development Grant; PHSDF = Primary Health Sector Development Programme 
 
Generally, for the LGAs to provide health services, a combination of central-local transfers and 
local own source revenues are important. The average expenditure from councils‘ own resources 
for health spending accounted for only 1% in 2010/2011, which shows a declining trend, from 
2% in 2009/2010. The low capacity of LGAs to sponsor their health budget threatens 
sustainability of council health service delivery if donors decided to withdraw funding. As well, 
it threatens local accountability between the LGA officials and the citizens.  
 
(ii) Budget between layers of government 
An analysis of the budget share between layers of government is presented in Figure 6-1. The 
data shows there is a significant variation in budget share over the three years. Central 
government has remained in possession of the largest share, followed by councils, with regions 
last. It was expected that councils would receive higher allocations under devolution. However, 
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the LGAs‘ shares are smaller than those of CG, despite a significant increase in their proportions. 
The percentage of public sector health resources allocated to councils‘ health services has 
slightly increased from 24% in 2005/06 to 34% in 2010/11. The allocation for the regional level 
increased from 4% to 6% in the same period. The increase in local spending was achieved 
through decreases in central allocation for tertiary services, from 72% to 60%, for the same 
period. It is argued that limited budgetary allocation from national level to LGAs has hampered 
the decentralisation process (MoHSW, 2013). Considering that the vast majority of the health 
care services are delivered by the LGAs; the proportional of LGAs spending suggests 
considerable underfunding of council health services. Despite government efforts towards fiscal 
transfers LGAs have limited fiscal discretion (URT, 2007b, Tidemand and Sola, 2010a, Kessy 
and McCourt, 2010, Braathen and Mwambe, 2007). This suggests central resistance to fiscal 
devolution. 
 
 
Figure 6-1: Proportion of central and LGAs health budgets 
Source: MoHSW, 2011 
 
Council health funds are disbursed directly to council according to the council comprehensive 
plan. Usually, Government issues guidelines for production of the Comprehensive Council 
Health Plan (CCHP) before receiving central funds. The guideline directs the CCHP activities to 
be included in the CCHP. The plan should reflect the priority areas of the Tanzania Essential 
Health Package (TEHP) identified by the MOSHW. Under the TEHP, there are six priority areas 
Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Actual
FY 2007/08 FY 2008/ 09 FY 10 FY 11
Central 57% 51% 49% 52% 51% 46% 43% 41%
Regional 7% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 9% 10%
Council 36% 39% 41% 38% 39% 44% 48% 48%
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to be covered in the CCHP for central allocations. The TEHP aimed to ensure that health 
interventions address the high disease burden in Tanzania. The six priority areas, include 
reproductive and child health, communicable disease control, non-communicable disease control, 
treatment and care of other common diseases of local priority and community health 
promotion/disease prevention, and the establishment/strengthening of organisational structures 
and institutional capacities to improve health service management at all levels (MoHSW, 2010). 
 
Funds are transferred directly from the MoFEA to council health account no 6 for the 
development expenditure after the approval of the CHHP. Implementation is monitored on a 
quarterly basis using the quarterly progress implementation and technical reports. The CHHP 
Planning Guidelines (2010) provide guidance on the distribution of the HBG among the council 
health cost centres as table 6-3 presents. 
 
Table 6-3: Guidance on the use of Council health Resources 
Cost centre Ceiling range for allocation by Council 
Office of DMO 15%–20% 
Council Hospital 25%–30% 
Voluntary agency hospitals (Health basket funds only) 10%–15% 
Health Centre 15%–20% 
Dispensary 20%–25% 
Community Initiatives  2%–5% 
Source: MOHSW CCHP Planning Guidelines (2011). 
 
Although the guideline health centres and dispensaries are separate cost centres in the council 
budget, individual primary health facilities do not have their own sub-accounts (MoHSW, 2010). 
This implies that although council‘s health accounts can be used to identify how much funding 
goes to dispensaries and health centres overall, it is not possible to identity the resources that 
flow from the council to individual health facilities in the budget. The common practice that has 
been found in this study is that council officials manage all the health funds including user fee 
collections and community health insurance (CHF). This can be viewed as a limitation to fiscal 
decentralisation to the level below the council. 
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(iii) Council fiscal discretionary 
The Public Financial Management Act has decentralised responsibility and accountability for 
expenditure to the council health managers. Funding for council health services are mainly 
transferred from central for the specific priorities, which make it difficult for the LGAs to 
respond to local health priorities. It is obvious that local expenditure is driven primarily by the 
nature of the intergovernmental fiscal transfer system, which limits local pinning and spending 
discretion for certain activities, such as PE, OC or capital development. In terms of discretionary 
funding as per (table 6-4) about 86% was utilised for personnel emoluments while OC is 14% 
which is used to cover administrative costs and the recurrent spending service delivery was 57%. 
 
Table 6-4: Local government health spending 
 2010/2011 2011/2012 
Sources  
 
Approved 
budget 
Actual expenditure Estimate 
Government Fund (PE)  178 143 254 266  146 401 509 485  242 360 873 095  
Government Fund (OC)  38 311 363 505  24 578 860 672  32 783 826 008  
Recurrent  216 454 617 771  170 980 370 156  275 144 699 103  
Development total  364 650 006 098  127 149 848 860  228 011 322 874  
Grand total  797,559,241,640  469,110,589,173,469 778,300,721,080 
Source: PER, 2013 
Estimates of the Council budget for the year FY 2011/2012 were 9 984 180 554.Council‘s own 
source of revenue is very limited; hence council health services were financed through inter-
governmental transfer. While locally generated revenues are an important source of funding at 
council level, of the total budget of Tsh 9.9 billion, the Council is planning to contribute Tsh 1 
844 000 million only 0.02% of the total budget. Thus, the amount collected is insignificant to 
support local service delivery. 
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Table 6-5: Council allocation source for the FY2011/2012 
Source Approved budget % 
Government block grants 1 320 453 510 13.22% 
Basket fund 470 298 300 4.71% 
Council own sources  1 848 000 0.02% 
Cost sharing  and CHF 492 192 700 4.93% 
Receipt in kind  7 228 325 670 72.40% 
PHSDP 59 094 000 0.59% 
Other funding  411 968 374 4.13% 
Total  9 984 180 554 100% 
Source: DMO‘s Office, 2011 
Fiscal decentralisation grants councils power to set a fee for insurance and user charges 
depending on the local economic context. An enrolment fee for the CHF was Tsh 5 000 and user 
fee minimum was Tsh 2 0000 charged for consultations and for basic treatment. Data presented 
in Table 6-6 shows that collection from the CHF was Tsh 44 399 500 million. Out of that only 
3% was allocated for purchasing drugs, while 25% was allocated for community sensitisation 
and the remaining 72% was allocated for administrative costs. 
Council health funds are usually transferred and controlled by the central government through 
budget ceilings, guidelines and approvals. This is to impose national priorities on local spending, 
which restricts local choices. The preparation of the CCHP should be done in accordance with 
the budget ceiling from the MoFEA, PMO-RALG and MOHSW. The Council cost centres were 
allocated the recommended proportional according to the budget ceiling (see table 6-6).  
Table 6-6: Council budget allocation among the cost centres FY 2011 
Cost centres Amount allocated  
DMO‘s Office (20%) 94 263 136 
Council (regional hospital) (25%) 116 047 700 
Unallocated for VA (10%) 49 290 034 
Health centres (20%) 96 184 636 
Dispensaries (20%) 93 285 260 
Communities (5%) 21 277 534 
Total 470 348 300 
Source: DMO‘s Office, 2011. 
There were mixed opinions among health providers and council health mangers about fiscal 
decentralisation. One of the main financial benefits of the implementation of health service 
decentralisation within LGAs as reported by one of the participants is that decentralisation has 
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increased autonomy in the mobilisation of financial resources from local sources and the 
possibility of deciding on how to use them for the implementation of health services in the 
district. One participant insisted: 
Councils are now given power to mobilise local resources from different resources like own sources, 
including fundraising, community health fund and cost sharing (CKI, 4) 
Other participants felt that decentralisation has enabled council to access the central funds 
directly with the CCHP. One of the participants insisted: 
….in the past planning was theoretical as funding was not guaranteed during the execution; funds would 
somehow be diverted to other activities like roads. And no one questions, there was very little you could do 
about it…at least now there is some assurance that plans receive allocation (CK, 01). 
 
While, theoretically, fiscal decentralisation is geared to empower health providers, in reality the 
field does not portray a very positive picture. Facility providers felt that much of the fiscal power 
was concentrated at the council level, with very little trickle down. They expressed 
dissatisfaction with the slow pace of fiscal autonomy as well as lack of responsiveness from 
health managers at the district level. Failure to use money collected at the facility level through 
CHF and cost sharing was cited as an example of the limited powers health facilities have been 
granted. These funds were managed at council level while providers cannot speak about their 
own budgets and they were not aware how much Council allocates for their budget. Participants 
claimed that: 
We never get feedback from councils on the approval of our budgets, thus we don‘t know how 
much we received (FKI-01, FKI-06). 
 
With decentralisation it was expected that facilities would have power over utilisation of funds 
collected at their facilities. Staff in all the facilities visited complained that they did not have the 
power to utilise funds they collected. After the collection of the CHF contributions, providers 
deposited them at the district and later they were re-allocated upon request or as determined by 
the council. The allocation mechanism of the money does not follow a standard formula, but is 
instead based on observed need. Sometimes CHF is used as a pool fund at the council level and 
allocated to all health facilities. User fees are also allocated to the health facility which collected. 
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Providers felt discouraged by the fact that they are failing to meet the health needs of the 
communities. 
 
Providers complained about difficulties in retrieving funds after they were deposited in the 
council account. This is contrary to CHF policy, which states that it is the facility and CHSB that 
have the mandate over the fund. Providers interviewed in this study were of the view that they 
would be more empowered if funds were reserved at the facility level. Lack of autonomy to use 
CHF creates a disincentive to mobilise more funds, since facility priority needs are not 
addressed.  
 
Funding for reproductive health services 
Budget for RHS was limited due to other competing demands of health priorities. National health 
resources are allocated based on health sector strategic plan (HSSP) III and broader national 
policies. At the council level, health resource allocation begins with the prioritisation process to 
identify which health interventions should receive funding. Most of the budgetary 
responsibilities for the RHS are centralised although councils are allowed to establish budgets for 
procurement of some items like contraceptives. Funding for RHS was channelled through budget 
or project support directly to councils. The experience with earmarking funds within the health 
sector is diverse. First, there is a sense among national programme managers that RHS is losing 
out under current implementation of SWAps, where development partners are pooling funds to 
support general budget rather than programs. For this reason earmarked funding for RHS should 
continue due to the delay in government disbursement and complicated procurement procedures. 
Secondly, national programme managers felt that earmarked funding for RHS did not influence 
priority setting; instead, it tends to alter funding arrangements and resource flows to LGAs. The 
feeling from the council managers was that RHS is benefiting from both earmarked and pooled 
funds. 
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The study struggled to find precise figures for RHS expenditures. The council allocates funds 
through primary healthcare services but there was no specified separate funding for RHS. 
However, HIV/AIDS does receive separate funding. Funds for RHS are allocated under the 
Maternal and Child Health (MNCH) interventions but the MNCH was allocated only 5% of the 
total health spending, (See table 6- 7). The largest proportion of the budget was spent on salaries 
(44%). 
Table 6-7: Council  allocation to health interventions 
Priority Interventions  Amount allocated (Tsh) % 
 Maternal, new-born and child health            150 004 100  5% 
 Communicable disease control              78 147 841  3% 
 Non-communicable diseases              15 194 359  1% 
 Treatment and care of local disease priority             22 455 450  1% 
 Environmental health and sanitation              44 785 624  2% 
Strengthening  social welfare and  social protection services              17 054 650  1% 
 Strengthening human resources for health         1 246 766 040  44% 
Strengthening organisation structure and institutional management            977 850 320  35% 
 Emergency preparedness and response              56 479 000  2% 
 Health promotion            199 897 500  7% 
 Traditional medicine and alternative healing               2 463 000  0.1% 
TOTAL        2 811 097 884  100 % 
Source: DMO‘s Office, 2011 
 
Further analysis was carried out on MNCH allocations to identify the proportion allocated to 
different RHS components as table 6-8 presents. Only two components of RHS received funding. 
The CHMTs thought that RHS are funded by donors thus the council should concentrate on other 
pressing health needs. The Council allocated Tsh. 66 million to procure theatre equipment while 
family planning was allocated Tsh. 1 million from the basket fund, not council sources. The 
CHMTs were aware of other RH problems, like teen pregnancies, infertility and reproductive 
system cancers but because of inadequate funds they failed to make allocation to those 
interventions. Inadequate funding was contributed to by lack of reliable sources from local 
revenues. Almost 100% of the council health expenditure was from the intergovernmental 
transfer. This was not adequate to meet council health needs. The government usually provides a 
ceiling as a reference for the production of the CCHP and councils have to budget according to 
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that ceiling. This implies that council plans are aligned with was made available from the central 
authorities and they must adhere to the provided ceiling. The stated goal of decentralisation to 
enable the council to plan according to their local health needs is still a nightmare. A participant 
at the national level commented: 
….council resources from own sources are extremely limited….they cannot plan according to their wishes, 
hence, they must obey the given budget ceiling….we understand health needs are many…but we cannot 
afford them all….the central resources are limited, hence, council plans should have  a limit on what we 
can afford to fund. It cannot be for each council to plan and budget without ceilings. (NKI, 05) 
The delays in disbursement of funds interrupt the implementation of health activities and some of 
the activities were not implemented at all. This was where participants highlighted the 
importance of local resources, although they were difficult to raised  
… When central government delays fund, council revenues can be used to fill in the gap. However, the 
total revenue allocated is very little and the amount received is not what we budgeted for. If you look at the 
performance of the budget for the health sector of this financial year, the Council did not release the 
amount requested (CKI-02, CKI-04) 
 
Table 6-8 : Council Budget allocation for MNCH FY 2011/2012 
Components Allocations (Tsh) 
Antenatal care  
Obstetric care, including emergency care 66 057 500 
Post-natal care  
Sexually transmitted infections  
HIV, early infant diagnosis and PMTCT  
Post-abortion care  
Family planning  1 250 000 
Peri-natal care  
Care of new-borns 2 520 000 
Immunisation 34 305 000 
Adolescent sexual reproductive health  
Other maternal conditions  
Reproductive system cancers  
Community-based healthcare services for MNCH  
Total  104 132 500 
Source: PMO-RALG, 2011 
Earmarked donor funds to support RHS were available through vertical programme as table 6-9 
shows. These include support from Engender Health and Marie Stopes. Engender Health has 
been advocating for long-term family planning methods. Marie Stopes provides outreach 
services on long-term and permanent methods for FP, as well as community sensitisation of FP 
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methods. The UN-Joint Program (UNJP2) support since 2008 aimed to increase equitable access 
to comprehensive reproductive and child health interventions. UNJP2 funds were allocated for 
training and awareness campaigns on FP for community leaders. Global funds are targeted for 
HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis. Although these programmes have made significant 
contributions to improvements in RHS, they usually operate parallel to other programmes with 
technical supervisory staff to ensure that treatment guidelines and procedures are followed. The 
challenge to vertical programmes has been the competition for qualified health staff at Council 
level which is already in crisis. 
Table 6-9: Council donor funding for MNCH FY 2011/2012 
Sources Amount (Tsh) 
UN JP 2 11 989 000 
Global Fund 12 020 000 
Engender Health  13 452 100 
Marie Stopes Tanzania  16 187 199 
Total  53 648 299 
Source: DMO‘s office, 2011. 
It was also noted that vertical programmes take managers away from other priorities. As claimed 
by one district manager: 
…….. Vertical programmes influence priority setting; they come and marginalise other priorities as we 
want to catch donor funds (CKI-03). 
It is important to note that vertical programmes have preferential support, which contributes to 
inequities within the health system. Usually these programmes are not distributed across the 
Council; hence some places are not served. Additionally, Council personnel that are working 
with vertical programmes, in particular HIV/AIDS are more motivated than other staff because 
of the incentives such as extra duty allowances, bonus and training. The output-oriented, results-
based financing is realistic in vertical programmes, but does not occur within general health 
services programmes. Furthermore, despite integration of services at facility levels, there is very 
little coordination at the central level due to inadequate staff. 
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6.2 Administrative decentralisation 
The aim of this section is to present research findings in relation to human resources. It will 
therefore look at the relation between decentralisation, human resources and RHS. Basically four 
issues will be analysed: public service arrangements on hiring and firing, supervision, training 
and performance management.  In Tanzania administrative decentralisation aimed to enable the 
LGAs recruit and administer their human resources, but Public Service Act 2002 and subsequent 
regulations (2004) centralised management of all civil servants. Thus, LGAs must for example, 
obtain permission from the central government to recruit new staff. Besides, the Prime Minister‘s 
Office-Regional Administration and Local Government (PMO-RALG), exercises unilateral 
control over the appointment, posting and transfer of council directors, Heads of Departments 
and other key LGA personnel. Although the Act allows for mobility of employees among 
employers; due to conditions of service are much better in the central government and other 
sectors, LGAs lose the staff they recruit and train at great cost to the central government, private 
sector.  
 
The PO-PSM regulates the key conditions of civil service from national, regional and council 
levels. Although health workers have their specialised unions, like the Medical Association of 
Tanganyika, the Association of Nurses in Tanzania and the Pharmacy Council of Tanzania, but 
they are not represented in the civil service. Salaries and benefits, once set by the PO-PSM, are 
applied equally to civil servants. Councils have no authority to change conditions of service, but 
they can offer additional incentives such as housing to attract professional staff(Manzi et al., 
2012). 
 
LGA lodged requests to the PO-PSM office to fill health personnel demands. The MOHSW has 
been given the role of posting staff in accordance with PO-PSM-approved posts. The PMO-
LARG approves health personnel transfers from one council to another. MoHSW or PMO-
LARG can appoint DMOs, while approval of skilled health personnel is done by the MoHSW. 
LGAs can recruit lower skilled health personnel after securing recruitment permits from the PO-
PSM. The MoFEA allocates funds for salaries as per the approved post by activating salaries that 
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are computerised. The reform process is poorly coordinated among the central agencies. The PO-
PSM pursues its reforms without discussion with PMO-RALG. Likewise, the PMO-RALG 
implements LGRP without consulting PO-PSM.  
6.2.1 Hiring and firing of council health personnel 
LGAs remain in charge of hiring and firing health personnel whose salary scales are below 
Tanzania Government Salary scale number 2 (TGS-2). For personnel who are entitled to be 
above the TGS (2), special permission has to be sought from the PO-PSM. The council managers 
identify their need for staff and can proceed to fill the vacancy. The local level is involved in the 
whole procedure of appointing health personnel such as medical attendants. This includes setting 
selection criteria, skills required, advertising, short-listing, interviewing and final recruitment. 
 
The LGAs recruitment goes together with budgeting processes. Regions and councils are 
mandated to identify and fill in the existing staff vacancies. The DMOs‘ offices assess the 
personnel needs, indicating the number of staff and skills required and the associated costs under 
local government recruitment committees then approve at the full council meeting. After 
agreement on the number of staff and type of skills required, councils forward their HRH plan to 
the PO-PSM for securing the recruitment permits. Thereafter, estimates and adjustments can be 
made, depending on the budget approved by the MoFEA for the MoHSW. At this stage, the 
recruitment permit is issued and the council is informed. DED informs the council employment 
board
5
 of the existence of funded vacancies. After that, advertisements are placed locally and 
interviews are conducted to fill the vacancies.  
 
It was noted that procedures for recruitment under the employment board are complicated. 
Securing permits from the PO-PSM is seen as an obstacle due to bureaucratic procedures, which 
means that such a process takes time, and the permits expire after three months. This makes it 
                                                          
5
Members of the board include the chairperson (respected person from the council), one council member, the 
council administrative secretary, and a representative from the civil service department   
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difficult for remote councils to get enough time to recruit qualified staff within this short period. 
One participant noted: 
You can get those with required skills while short listing, they might show up for the interview but when 
we offer the posts most of the time they don‘t show up. Hence, you need to re-start the recruitment process 
again from the advertisement, invitations and interviewing, which doubles the cost. By the time you invite 
them for the interview, the permit has already expired (CKI-05). 
 
To address the local hiring problems, the Government decided to centralise the process. Re-
centralisation was seen as an effective means of equalising HRH in remote councils. It was seen 
that the MoHSW can easily access information from its own training institutions and 
universities; hence this would facilitate the placement of HRH to LGAs. However, this has never 
been the reality in Tanzania, and disparities across regions and councils are enormous. Lack of 
feedback from the LGAs hinders the MoHSW‘s efforts to fill vacancies in remote councils, since 
the majority of personnel do not report. 
 
As other councils, the case council had a shortage of health personnel. The total number of posts 
that are not filled is 175, which is 51%, with only 176 (49%) of the required personnel in posts. 
The deficit was higher for nursing officers (21%) and clinical officers (13%). There remains, 
however, a shortage of professional staff such as doctors, pharmacists, midwives and 
obstetricians. As with many other managers, the DMO believes one of the main problems in the 
health sector is the lack of qualified staff: 
… I do think we are making progress at the moment, especially on professional skills like obstetricians …  
I think the biggest problem is staff scarcity and having the available professional midwives. I have clinics 
where I only have medical attendants who do everything (CKI-03). 
 
Retention of well-trained medical doctors was observed to be a problem in rural settings. When 
trained at the degree level, health personnel move to urban centres for better career opportunities. 
Once appointed to work at the rural facilities, doctors then went for further university training 
but staying on the council payroll. When they returned they were saw themselves as too highly 
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qualified to work at the facilities and often go to work as hospital experts. One of the health 
managers had the following view: 
Once personnel have been recruited into the district health service, mostly they go for further training, 
without a replacement. But the problem is, when these doctors go for training, they still remain on our 
payroll and therefore we cannot recruit because they are still on the payroll. So that is a problem that we 
have experienced (CKI-03).  
According to another participant at facility level claimed that: 
The main problem with the well trained health personnel especially doctors has been the high attrition rate. 
Mostly doctors don‘t stay in their working stations for long; may be 2 years, and then they leave. …… the 
reasons are varied, some go for further training. Some get better jobs in NGOs . So the rate has been high 
especially for the doctors (FKI, 02). 
To improve retention of health personnel, council have decided to assist newly employed staff 
with resettling allowances. However, any such scheme has to be approved by the central 
authorities. This would appear to lead to a certain amount of tension between the centre and the 
LGAs given the shortage of staff and the difficulty in introducing policies of staff retention. One 
of the council participants noted: 
…the country in general has a severe human resources problem. …… we just don‘t have that enough 
clinicians and if we are not going to correct it we are going to run into severe problems. There are all these 
nice national strategies; you know recruitment and retention strategies of scarce resources, hardship 
allowances for those who are working in rural health facilities; but it doesn‘t get implemented (CKI, 02). 
 
Disciplinary procedures are in place and CHMT are responsible for the providers. However, if 
the case is serious the HR office is involved.  However, because of the shortage of personnel, 
procedures are not always followed. This means appeals take a long time, often up to three 
months. Labour union activities are not active at LGAs level. The health managers expressed 
their frustration in delays or completion of the process: 
.....sometimes it is difficult to fire personnel who are misbehaving due to procedures required to be 
followed even if s/he committed a serious offence which calls for dismissal. The person usually appeals and 
they know the loop holes of time which means the process goes beyond the three months. For the highly 
skilled personnel, the situation is worse. The process involves setting up a team from the central authorities 
which can take time, up to six months (CKI, 04).  
Labour relations functions at the council level are not well established. The code of conduct is 
set by the central ministry of health and is expected to be applied across all councils: 
..............MoHSW provides us a code of conduct and sometimes professional organisations. If someone 
doesn‘t abide by the code of conduct a disciplinary action can be taken (CKI, 04). 
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6.2.2 Supervision 
A system of dual supervision operates which combines the role of the clinic supervisors and visit 
the clinics on a regular basis and conduct the performance assessment of the facility and the 
programme managers who conduct visits to deal their own programme activities. The RHMTs 
are supposed to offer quarterly supportive supervision to CHMTs. In turn, CHMTs could provide 
clinical supervision to health facilities. Management style encourages sharing of knowledge and 
experience at each level. The national and regional level is responsible for ensuring that capacity 
is built at the lower levels. The councils are closer to the providers and, if they are not able to 
perform, the regional and higher managers are equally responsible. However, the process faces a 
number of challenges, mostly funding for fuel. Supervision is therefore, more administrative than 
technical. A lack of funds and transport were the most cited reasons for failure by CHMTs to 
conduct supervision as per the guidelines:  
Funds allocated by the central government are not enough to carry out supportive supervision. We are 
given responsibilities without resources; we need a budget for supervision. Decentralisation is bypassing 
the regional level; we are struggling with the little resources (6%) allocated to the total annual health 
budget, which is not enough for service delivery and other roles like council supervision (RKI-01).  
Similar concerns were found at the council level:  
We rarely conduct supportive supervision, which is supposed to on a monthly basis. We are working under 
a constrained budget (FGD-01). 
 
Lack of capacity hinders the RHMTs to execute their supervisory roles. In some instances, new 
guidelines were provided by the MoHSW without adequate capacity building for RHMTs before 
supervising the CHMTs. For example, new planning and reporting (PlanRep)
6
 guidelines for the 
CCHPs were produced by PMO-RALG in 2010, with the view that RHMTs would use similar 
guidelines to support councils to develop CCHPs in the same year. This was not feasible, as one 
of the participants argued: 
… training is important particularly when new things are introduced to the sector. Our experience is only 
in medicine, now we are managers using different tools in planning and accounting systems. We cannot 
impart the skills to the CHMTs unless we are well trained (FGD-01). 
                                                          
6
 PlanRep is software used by CHMT while developing CCHP that enables them to compare expenditures with the 
actual disease burden. 
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CHMTs are supposed to provide technical and administrative as well as clinical supervision, to 
council hospitals, health centres and dispensaries. Supervision provides an opportunity for 
follow-up, improved performance and solving systemic problems that contribute to the poor 
service delivery. National guidelines recommend at least four supervisions are recommended per 
year; during planning and preparation, conducting actual supervision to access performance, 
immediate oral feedback to health staff, and final written feedback and follow-up actions. 
Although these guidelines are in place, it was found that supervision visits are not prioritised or 
planned accordingly. When supervision was conducted, facilities were visited once instead of 
four times per year as per the guidelines. Out of six facilities, two had not been visited at all. Of 
the few supervisions conducted, facilities were not provided with written feedback, only oral 
feedback while the CHMTs were at the facilities. This was described by the participants: 
Facilities are not receiving written feedback from supervisors. And now we are supposed to supervise the 
dispensaries. CHMTs are not carrying out their supervision role. They delegate it to us (FKI-01, FKI-02, 
FKI-03, FKI-04). 
It was also commented by the national coordinators: 
providers are not monitored as frequently and as comprehensively as needed, which may lead to reduced 
motivation to improve the quality of care. Health facilities do not receive enough feedback and 
encouragement from supervisors. Individual performance appraisals are not established and are not 
connected to promotions or demotions (NKI-01, NKI-04, RKI-02, and RKI-03). 
 
Reproductive health services supervision 
Supervision is usually carried out by the CHMT. According to the CCHP guidelines, the council 
reproductive health coordinator is not a member of the CHMT. Although the CHMT in the case 
study council was flexible in involving the RH coordinator, supervision is not conducted as 
scheduled, which affects her participation. Usually, RH follow-up is carried out when there is an 
extreme case in the facilities. This limits supervision for RH activities, which has a negative 
impact on the quality of service provided. It was found that, in some facilities, women were 
charged Tsh 500 for antenatal clinic cards and for family planning pills, both of which services 
are supposed to be provided for free.  
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Likewise, at the council level, CHMTs lacks guidelines for the supervision of reproductive 
health and safe motherhood activities. Regarding their own supervision, only four out of ten 
CHMTs reported having been supervised by their respective facilities within the previous two 
months, and the rest less frequently. However, most of the visited facilities were those with 
serious problems, such as conflicts among the staff. Supervisory visit rosters were in place but 
not adhered to because funds were not available for supervision, as mentioned. 
 
In the current situation, it is not possible to establish a linkage between facility performance and 
supervision conducted. There is a transition arrangement to use cascade supervision, whereby 
health centre staff supervise dispensary staff, while dispensary staff supervise village health 
workers. Cascading was opted for as a cost-effective method of supervision. It was mentioned by 
health managers that cascading has saved 25% of the total cost that would have been spent on 
ordinary supervision. However, cascading adds more responsibilities to providers who were 
already constrained. This has an impact on the quality of service delivery and clients queue up to 
four hours. 
6.2.3 Training 
Prior to decentralisation, the MoHSW was responsible for both pre and in-service training. With 
decentralisation; the councils have taken on in-service training although these roles are also 
carried out by central government and NGOs. The actual in-service training is usually done in 
association with the centre and particular programmes due to the lack of funds in the council for 
training. Training is a joint responsibility of the ministries and human resource division. The 
ministries focus on technical issues, while the latter focus on more general issues. In this study 
reference is made to in-service training. However, training can be organised outside the council 
and it is the responsibility of the district to select staff and make some contribution in terms of 
allowances. The LGAs can allocate specific funds for staff development. Otherwise it is 
organised in the central government through short courses. 
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There was a general view that there is more training conducted following decentralisation. For 
instance, LGAs can arrange in-service training according to locally available resources allocated 
under other charges (OC) subvention. Its proportion decreases from time and since 2010, the 
government banned allocations for local training. However, low skilled personnel do not benefit 
from these funds. Managers are the main beneficiaries of the fund, which pays for their 
participation in short training. Some of the health providers complained that they had never 
received any training since their appointment: 
I hear see a lot of training in HIV/AIDS, a lot of training in malaria, immunisation. But training is not 
meant for us with lower qualifications (medical attendants). I usually work alone. As you can see, today the 
nurse went for training, which she does frequently, but I have never been called for training in the five 
years since I have been working with this council (FKI-02).  
 
The country faces a major challenge of having a large number of staff with low qualifications 
managing the health facilities, especially in rural areas. The government has introduced a policy 
to encourage existing staff to upgrade their skills and knowledge to improve their performance. 
The upgrade includes changing from one level to another, like from MCH aide to public health 
nurse, assistant clinical officer to clinical officer, and clinical officer to assistant medical officer. 
In-service training is usually undertaken as individual-level initiatives with support from the 
DMO; however, study leave has to be approved by the MoHSW. Costs for the courses are 
sometimes paid by the MoHSW and the staff members. Personnel retain their posts and salary 
during the training period. The negative effects of in-service training, as observed in this study, 
include the absenteeism of health care personnel, which increases the workload of the remaining 
staff hence compromising the quality of health services provided. This sometimes causing long 
delays and queues for the patients. And the mechanisms for replacement of staff that attended 
training were not in place. 
 
During the facility visit, at least one of the personnel was away attending training at the regional 
level. This hinders access to the services as some of the facilities were closed. Two of the target 
facilities were closed during the visit and the two providers were absent. In interviews with 
Village Executive Officers they explained that the facility has only two providers; one was 
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supposed to submit a monthly report to the council while the other was on holiday. One of the 
participants asserted that: 
The situation happens as some of the facilities have two staff only. Facilities with one staff sometimes are 
closed for the staff to attend training. Another CHMT contended that: Some of the health staff has never 
attended any kind of training since their appointments. Imagine some have been working for more than 10 
years without any training, and medical technology is changing fast (CKI-04). 
 
Training programmes for the RHS have recently suffered as decentralisation and other health 
service reforms are not well synchronised. The council training guidelines do not support 
training of more than one week. Meanwhile, short training for FP is conducted for two weeks or 
more. There have been no funds from government to support in-training services for 
reproductive health, apart from donors under the ‗off budget‘ expenditure.  
 
It was observed that some of the reproductive health providers have never attended any SRH 
training, which is important for quality improvement. The lack of training was mentioned as a 
problem for them to provide quality services, especially when clients need more information. 
One of the providers articulated this clearly: 
I was employed 15 years ago and I have never attended any training on FP, this has made me feel 
incompetent especially when women in the FP programme come for more information regarding side 
effects. I don‘t know what to tell them other than introduce them to other methods. Even MCHAs who 
were trained to provide MCH services were complaining about training … 
We have never been called even for refresher courses for the past five years; we don‘t know what is 
happening now, as in the past we used to attend like four times per year. But our fellows in HIV/AIDS had 
the bulk of training (FKI-02).  
The low-skilled personnel expressed unhappiness with the present selection process. Other 
complaints concerned short notice for training opportunities, with the information arriving too 
late for the providers to apply. This has become more of a problem due to the poor transport 
system in remote councils, where people rely on a single bus service on specific days. Providers 
were not happy about distribution of government funding for the advanced training and those 
who were given the opportunity never shared information to strengthen capacity of those who 
did not get the opportunity: 
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… Some of us when we asked for government funding we never get the proper information. You have to 
pay for yourself, whereas the same people from the same council you hear have government funding. This 
is not fair at all (FKI-07). 
 
Person in charge of the facilities feel that they are not adequately trained to manage a health 
facility. They are trained as clinicians rather than managers. The role of clinicians is now 
widened so that they are not only responsible for the medical services, but also act as facility 
managers. Their role extends to budgeting, control of stock such as drugs, supplies, etc. 
However, most of the managers complained about having to take new responsibilities without 
proper preparation. One of the participants claimed that: 
… In medical school we were trained as clinicians, either as nurses, clinical officers, etc. …. we never had 
any curriculum on management and our employer is not giving us an opportunity for management training 
(CKI-02).  
 
Also, some of the CHMT members were not qualified to head the programmes. The majority of 
the posts were filled on an acting basis due to the lack of qualified professionals with the 
required skills. The CHMT believed that training improves motivation for the staff in their daily 
duties. Providers had a positive experience with training and it was seen as a path to increase 
personal knowledge and assist capacity building to others:  
 
On other hand, in-service training was seen as a tool which enables council staff to acquire 
knowledge for the higher paying jobs with better working packages outside the civil services. 
This adds to staff turnover, especially in rural councils where retention is a challenge. Some of 
the participants thought that before allowing staff to go for higher training they should sign a 
bond to work with the council for a specified number of years.  
 
Reproductive health training 
Training in reproductive health services that was provided by the NGO was disrupted by the 
donor shift to basket funding. Until 2002, UMATI coordinated the provision of long-term family 
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planning services on behalf of the ministry of health and supervised and provided programme 
support for capacity building, quality of care training and expendable supplies for 98 public and 
private sector locations. The USAID funds ended in 2003, which led to the reduction in the 
number of partners to support the national programme, including training. The transition while 
shifting oversight and training roles led to a disruption of services. UMATI has currently shifted 
to a broader reproductive agenda focusing on the youth.  
 
There are no separate funds for training in RHS at all levels. Training is included in general 
council training programmes. However, funds for short training can be made available through 
DPs, if there is a new programme to be implemented. Regional office had a limited funding for 
RH training. But they were undertaking extensive training for specific purposes, like cervical 
cancer screening. The active involvement of regional programme managers was confirmed: 
… training for reproductive health is organised by the regional coordinator for reproductive health. But 
this is arranged when the coordinator has a donor project. Otherwise there are no funds allocated by the 
government for RH training. When there is national support for a certain service, government funds can be 
made available (CKI-05). 
 
After training, participants are expected to share the new skills and knowledge with other 
Maternity and Child Health Aides (MCHA) and nurses in their facility. This was not always 
successful, since not everyone shares what they have learnt. Some put messages on the wall as a 
means of sharing the knowledge. The extract on (Photo 6-1) talks about things to consider while 
providing FP to mothers who are on antiretroviral therapy. The key message is to remember 
some of the FP methods interfere with ARV efficiency. 
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Source: Field survey, 2011 
 
There were training gaps for reproductive health providers at the council level. For example, 
long-term family planning, such as the insertion of intrauterine devices was performed though 
the NGOs via outreach services. Training has a constructive effect on the level of skills, as 
expressed by some of the providers. 
Reproductive health technologies are changing so fast. There are new supplies like female condoms. 
Training is important … RH providers believe that such training would have helped them to improve 
service delivery … Training should be extended further (FKI-07, FKI-09). 
 
Health managers had negative views on the training curriculum provided in medical schools in 
Tanzania. They complained that human resource management skills were not provided while 
they were studying at medical schools. Council health secretaries are the only ones trained in 
human resource management. CHMTs obtained support from the Council Human Resources 
Officer, who is responsible for the entire council staff. Even the DMOs are not trained in human 
resource management, while they control all the HRH at the council. Human resource 
management practices at council level are limited and practised poorly. As a result there are 
delays in staff promotions. 
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6.2.4 Human resource performance management 
An open performance review and appraisal system (OPRAS) has been introduced as a means to 
motivate staff and improve health service delivery since 2008. OPRAS originated from the PO-
PSM and is being implemented gradually in all government sectors, including among health 
personnel. In health sector the government has embarked on a reward system through payment 
for performance (P4P). This is a strategy focusing on performance management for health 
workers to improve maternal, new-born and child health. P4P is used as a motivational tool to 
health workers. Within the MoHSW there is broad commitment towards P4P as a means to 
motivate staff and improve service. At the Council, P4P had not yet been rolled out, although 
council had set aside a budget for it. 
 
The possibility of improving performance through OPRAS system has not yet been realised as 
most of the government departments have not rolled out the system. Limited use of the OPRAS 
is contrary to the intention of the Public Service Pay and Incentive Policy (PO-PSM, 2010). In 
2011 the MOHSW initiated a pilot project in the Coastal region. The results from this pilot study 
show that staff were inspired and proactive in solving health system problems through the 
OPRAS system (Mamdani et al., 2013, MoHSW, 2013c). 
 
6.3 Political decentralisation 
In this study the findings has found that government has taken bold initiatives to establish the 
mechanisms for community participation through management structures. However, the study 
challenges the assumption that user representation through HFCs enables users to voice their 
interests and makes services to respond to their health needs. It has been noted that because 
selection of the committee members is not democratic, representatives perceive themselves as 
primarily accountable to government and not to their communities. Lack of genuine political 
decentralisation as well as inadequate resources have compromised their roles. Health boards and 
facility health committees have an important role in monitoring the use of health resources and 
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the overall performance of the facilities, yet the majority of the members were not well aware of 
their roles.  
 
In service delivery there was significant community involvement in support of prevention 
activities and community mobilisation for tasks such as building new facilities and other small 
work. Initially, the contact with the communities is through the village health worker, who plays 
a significant role in promoting local participation and the provision of information to 
communities. The effectiveness of community mobilisation for collective action depends also on 
the abilities of the councillor who is locally elected and holds the office for a period of four 
years. Their motivation and effectiveness vary greatly. 
 
In relation to service accountability; the study challenges the assumption that political 
decentralisation enhance service user to hold providers to account and makes services more 
responsive to the local interests. It was found that HFCs members do not access information 
about the performance of the district health system, resources that government allocates and how 
those resources are used at their health facilities. Thus, community participation under political 
decentralisation has not strengthened accountability with respect to the delivery of local health 
services including those of reproductive health. The next section analyses the structure of the 
community participation. 
6.3.1 Community participation 
The formal process and structure for community participation in the council health system was 
through local village assembly and local management structures named council health service 
board (CHSB) and facility health committees (FHCs). Findings presented showed divergent 
views were presented by participants as to the effectiveness of these boards and committees. On 
the positive side they were seen as informing communities. In the three villages, the participants 
were not seen as a level for community involvement. Interpretations concerning the extent of 
community involvement varied according to the participants. Politicians tended to be more 
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positive about decentralisation. Health care providers tended to be more negative about the 
appropriateness of political decentralisation, viewing it as a form of control over technical 
people. 
 
(i) Community participation through village assembly 
Bottom-up planning is perceived as a means by which communities participate in decision 
making in their villages through ‗Opportunity and Obstacles to Development‘ (O&OD) approach 
(PO-RALG, 2005). It aims to enhance local participation in making plans and priorities that 
communities perceive to be necessary to address their specific local needs and demands. 
Government policy documents stipulate clearly that: 
―O&OD is designed to promote community initiatives so as to accelerate achievement of 
national goals in the Tanzanian Development Vision 2025. In the O&OD planning 
process, the sub-goals in the Vision 2025 become direct basis of setting specific 
objectives, under which planning items are identified such as opportunities, obstacles, 
interventions, costs and so on. Besides, the O&OD is intended to promote effective and 
efficient allocation of Local Government Capital Development Grants (LGCDG) as 
clearly elaborated in the Planning Guidelines for villages, the O&OD is an essential 
methodology to identify community preferences for which the LGCDG is disbursed‖ 
(PO-RALG, 2004, PO-RALG, 2002). 
 
Theoretically, bottom-up planning procedures start at the grassroots level. The O&OD planning 
concept is centred on the understanding that communities have different needs and resources. 
During the planning process, a facilitator who usually comes from the council is involved in 
initiating the planning process whereby all village members are invited. After the discussion with 
the villagers, they make suggestions of what they think to be their health priorities. The ideas are 
passed to the Village Development Committee, but if a higher decision is needed, the idea passes 
through the Ward Development Committee, and then to the Village Assembly for final adoption. 
The Village Assembly is open for ordinary citizens from 18 years to influence decisions and 
raise any question to the leaders. Being a legal meeting, the minutes are sent to the council 
office; for the council officials to understand what happening at the lower levels. In the case of 
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council, village assembly meetings were rarely conducted which is contrary to the practice of 
O&OD.  
 
It was observed that communities were only involved after the decisions have been made by 
higher authorities. This was insisted on by some of the participants: 
Usually communities are given directives after the decision has been made. For example each village is 
supposed to build a dispensary with joint government and community efforts. The decision was made by 
central authorities without involving the communities during the initial stages of developing the idea. 
Hence communities are just recipients of the centrally decided programmes (WKI-01, WKI-02).  
In many instances when communities were called, they did not show up because their experience 
of such meetings is negative. Their involvement was meaningless since local preferences were 
not taken into account. Therefore, attending community meetings was not a priority to the 
majority of the citizens. One of the village officers insisted: 
 … in the past we used to mobilise the communities and the village assembly was powerful. But in many 
instances communities did not see the results of their contribution. They never get feedback, hence it is now 
very hard to call for a meeting and people show up (VKI-02).  
Communities can be involved in planning specific projects, but they are not involved in 
identifying health priorities. They have been mobilised in providing in-kind support like labour, 
which does not require technical skills. Others activities included fetching water, and collecting 
stones and sand for the construction of dispensaries. Photos 6-1 and 6-2 below show a dispensary 
close to final construction and a maternity ward building to which communities contributed their 
labour. This indicates that when communities are well mobilised they participate effectively and 
can make a difference.  
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Photo 6-1 (l) and 7-2 (r): Constructed facilities through collaboration between local government and 
communities 
Source: Field visit, 2010 
Another challenge to roll out bottom up planning was the issue of resources needed from the 
LGAs. Under decentralisation, LGAs are supposed to transfer 20% of the own source revenues 
for each FY to lower level governments that is village level to be spent on priority needs of their 
own choice. However, this obligation has faced challenges as pointed out in the Annual 
Assessment Synthesis Report for FY 2011-12 which stated. 
“Sharing of own revenue still remains a challenge across a number of LGAs. A total of 53 LGAs (40%) 
shared less than 15% of collected revenue while 27% shared between 15-19% and 43(33%) met the 
minimum requirement of 20%. Non-remittance of local revenue to lower levels erodes the principles of 
devolution of power and finally thwarts the benefits of decentralization. Eventually, the communities 
become disinterested in participating in planning and budgeting for their localities”. 
 
One of the key challenges facing LGAs is the inadequate revenues to fund the planning process. 
The transfer of funds to lower levels has remained limited as own sources are constrained and 
government‘s inconsistency in releasing general purpose grant (GPG) which was introduced  to 
compensate for local revenue sources that were abolished in 2003. Unless the government 
ensures that the GPG funds are made available to councils and LGAs improve their own sources, 
lower level planning will remain problematic.  
 
The structure for bottom up participatory planning does not provide space for communities to 
raise concerns regarding their local health needs and priorities. In this study it was found that 
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direct community participation was not executed for several reasons. The Council planning 
office complained over financial and capacity (skills for carrying out O &OD) to roll out the 
process. The village levels had very little direct responsibility in health service delivery and 
planning. Therefore, the CCHP is driven by CHMTs, with little or no inputs from wards or 
villages. When comparing the facility health plans with that of CCHP, few activities matched, in 
particular construction or rehabilitation of facilities. User representation through health boards 
and committees is a common practice in the health sector. The section below shows how people 
see the practice of user representation. 
 
(ii) Community participation through user representation 
Decentralisation reforms provide an institutional framework within which communities/ service 
users can participate. In the 1980s, Primary Health Care Committees were established throughout 
the country. This initiative did not achieve the expected results; therefore the health sector 
review of 1993 suggested that health committees be re-established at the village level to give 
communities more power and voice in the ownership of health facilities. Before introducing 
facility health committees; service users were represented through elected representatives. 
Because of their political influence; MoHSW found elected representation was not effective and 
proposed that a management structure namely council health service boards (CHSBs) and health 
facility committees (HFCs). They were established as democratic organs with legal status to 
oversee the provision of local health services (URT, 2000). It was thought that committees and 
boards would lead to an increase in service user representation and accountability (URT, 2003, 
URT, 2000). The guidelines for the establishment of the CHSBs and HFCs explicitly place them 
‗within the context of the local government reform which aims to improve service delivery 
through empowering councils, genuine community involvement, sensitising communities to take 
the initiative and advocates for alternative financing options like CHF and user fees‘ (URT, 
2000:1). 
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Formal responsibilities of the health committees 
The central authorities introduced health governance structures to align with the institutional 
framework of the overall decentralisation policy, supporting government commitment to the 
devolution of powers to LGAs and communities (URT, 2000:1). The CHSB is endowed with 
legal discretionary powers and council health managers are supposed to be accountable to the 
CHSB without ‗jeopardising the board‘s autonomy (URT, 2000:5). In the case study council, it 
was found that CHMTs have more autonomy over the CHSB in discussing local health plans and 
expenditures. This is contrary to what the policy entails, where CHMTs are supposed to work 
under the CHBS. 
 
Generally, the goal of the establishment of the HFCs is to act as an arm of central government at 
the local level. The HFCs are assumed to sensitise communities on government policies. In 
conjunction with the CHSB and HFCs guidelines, the government introduced the Community 
Health Fund Act in 2001. The objective of the fund is ‗to mobilise financial resources from the 
communities for provision of health services to its members‘ (URT, 2000:1). Thus, the HFC 
structures were given four specified legal mandates: (i) approving facility plans and budgets, as 
well as a report prepared by the facility staff (health centres and dispensaries); (ii) submitting 
reports to the CHSB; (iii) liaising with other health providers and potential donors; and (iv) 
assisting facility staff in executing ‗community based health initiatives‘ and ensuring ‗affordable 
health care services‘ are provided to the communities (URT, 2000:1334). Thus, the main linkage 
between the communities and primary health facilities is through the HFCs. 
 
Roles and functioning of the health committees in the case study council 
The analysis of the structures between council and the lower level, that is. Health management 
committees took into consideration their division of functions and decision-making powers. This 
section gives that perspective by summarising the formal responsibilities of the four management 
committees. Out of six facilities visited, only four had established health committees. The section 
analyses the data from the group interviews and anecdotal evidence about the actual roles of the 
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committees by looking their meeting frequency and agendas. Then the reflections and feeling of 
the HFCs members on their success and challenges are presented. 
 
Meeting frequency  
At the council level, one of the participants insisted that all the facilities had HFCs and that they 
meet regularly. However, in practice, the person in charge of the facility reported that some of 
the HFCs had been inactive for a long time. During the visits it was found that no committees 
were established at two out of the six facilities visited. Only one HFC held a meeting with the 
community to discuss the construction of the village dispensaries. Another HFC conducted their 
meetings with the providers, but rarely held meetings in accordance with the guidelines. 
According to the guidelines, meetings are supposed to take place four times per year. The facility 
manager is the secretary of the meetings whiles the chairperson is a community representatives 
meetings. The meeting minutes are kept by the committee secretary. Sometimes secretaries are 
not consistent in fulfilling their role which means that meetings are conducted less frequently.  
 
Meetings usually take place at the facility offices and there were delays and interruptions in 
meetings. It was observed in one of the visited facilities that the meeting was supposed to start at 
9.00 am but it started at 11.50. The reason for the delay was that the secretary for the meeting 
(provider) was continuing with health service delivery. There was also a delay in the arrival of 
some HFC members who were coming from far away. All members were encouraged to 
participate in meetings. Individual contributions were treated equally and with respect. The 
meeting agenda was set by the secretary, who introduced the meeting, and then the members 
contributed ideas one after another. 
 
There were inconsistencies in the HFC members attending meetings. In many instance fewer 
than 50% of the members attended the meetings. The person in charge of the facility of one of 
the facilities visited frequently cited lack of allowances as one of the key challenges for HFC 
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members to attend the meetings. Other reasons mentioned included limited awareness among the 
HFCs on their roles and distance from the facilities. By contrast, HFC members complained that 
some providers were hesitant to hold meetings because of CHF abuses: 
….Providers misuse the CHF; instead of putting the funds in the facility account they use them … hence 
they won‘t hold the FHC meetings fearing that the committee will ask questions about the funds, which is 
true (CKI-06). 
On the other hand, providers complained: 
… when we call the committee for the meeting the first question they asked is how much is the per diem? 
Unfortunately, we never had that budget; hence we did not manage to hold a committee meeting for quite 
some time (CKI-03). 
The HFC members had the view that providers are abusing the CHF and user fees collected, 
hence they feared to be questioned during the HFCs meetings: 
When asked about the collected amount from CHF and user charges … providers are so furious and harsh. 
We just leave them to do what they want, because if they decide to leave, who will come to work in this 
remote village? (C-FGD-03). 
An interview with council managers revealed that providers were resistant to collaborate with 
HFCs. One of the reasons mentioned was that providers want to have full control over the CHF 
and user charges, without interference from the HFCs:  
… some of the providers resisted giving away power to the HFCs, which might reveal their abuses. When 
the government introduced the user fees, providers were happy and supported the implementation 
…probably because they can access funds from the patients directly (CKI-03). 
The formal responsibilities of the HFCs include planning and monitoring of health services 
delivery, financial planning, and accounting as well as reporting to the higher level. However, 
their roles vary depending on the members‘ understanding of their roles. 
 
(i) Views about functioning of community participation structures (HFCs) 
Different actors, including healthcare providers and communities, were able to identify some of 
the roles of the HFCs. Health managers, health providers and community members recognised 
the potential of the HFCs. The functionality and experience of the HFCs varies between councils 
and at different levels of the system. The categories of roles mentioned by the HFC committee 
members were related to health service delivery and resource mobilisation. Despite the official 
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role of the HFCs to mobilise community members to enrol in the CHF, evidence is lacking. It 
was noted that most of the sensitisation and mobilisation programmes were carried out by the 
providers, either at the facilities when patients seek care or through outreach services. The HFCs 
said they just discussed the CHF with communities when they had time, but there were no 
meetings reported to be held as part of their mobilisation. This was reflected during the 
community group discussion, when a significant number of the participants (35) said they did not 
know the roles of the HFCs. The remaining (17) commented that their roles were to mobilise the 
community to join the CHF and to control its expenditure. The responses in the case study 
council are discussed below. 
 
Community knowledge about the roles of the HFCs was limited. However, in two out of eight 
villages visited, the community members were able to mention the function of the HFCs. This 
was an indication of their visibility and functioning. The mentioned activities were related to 
service delivery and control of CHF expenditure. What was frequently mentioned by both 
community members and village officers on the function of the HFCs was that it mobilised CHF 
contributions. However, in practice the facility providers were more in charge of mobilising 
communities to join the CHF: 
… the HFCs are supposed to mobilise the communities and to educate them about the CHF scheme. But 
usually providers do this role since the HFCs are not active … we must implement government policy 
directives given by the council office … we should abide by this (CKI-06).  
 
Village officials thought that the only function of the HFCs was to mobilise contributions for the 
CHF. In some villages the HFC were referred to as the ‗community health fund committee‘. 
Generally, community awareness of the functionality of the HFCs was limited. The 
communities‘ FGDs (four) showed that participants that stayed near to the facilities were at least 
aware of the HFCs, compared to those who were far from the facilities (three) who had not heard 
about them. Only one group mentioned representation of the communities in various decision-
making organs: 
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… HFC members act as a link between the health providers and community members. We took information 
from the providers to the communities like on pandemics of diseases. And sometimes we took community 
claims to the facilities (CKI-03).  
 
As has been explained elsewhere in this thesis, the HFCs were formulated along with the 
introduction of user fees and the CHF. They were expected to play a major role in community 
mobilisation to join the CHF, planning on how to use the user fees and CHF collections and 
giving feedback to the communities regarding the finances (URT, 2001:1). The contributions are 
collected from facilities and managed by HFCs. Councils decide on the disbursement of the 
funds based on the plans prepared in advance by the HFCs. The incentives packages –‗top-ups‘ – 
are set by central government as financial support. HFCs were seen by health managers as a 
means of communication between the community and the facilities: 
Council health boards and facility committees are important structures that link communities with the 
facilities. However, members are not really elected by the communities (CKI-06). 
Decentralisation brought user representation through the boards and committees. They have power to take 
decisions; they also have the power to give a decree directly to the CHMTs (CKI-02). 
However, communities did not view HFCs as a means by which they can air their complaints 
related to health services delivery. As one of the participants claimed: 
HFCs are supposed to mobilise the communities, to give them the knowledge about the potential of the 
CHF scheme and how they can benefit … they have to educate people, which is their role (RKI-01). 
 
Arguably, community involvement is somehow outside what devolution policy entails. From the 
previous discussion, their engagement is linked to health finance reforms. The idea of devolution 
to empower local communities to respond to their own health preferences and needs is 
marginalised by financial reforms. This has been the result of decentralisation being part of the 
neoliberal economic reforms, where the role of provision by governments has been transferred to 
the citizens through user contributions. Some of the national participants contended that: 
… Introduction of the community health insurance increases the awareness of the users to feel more 
responsible and have ownership of their facilities. Otherwise they will keep on thinking the provision of 
health services is the responsibility of the government alone, while they have a role to play (NKI-01, NKI-
02, NKI-04).  
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The council health management team was positive about the participation of the community 
through the HFCs: 
The role of the HFCs cannot be underestimated; they are the ones who stay closer to the communities. In 
case of any outbreak they bring the information to the facilities. They are our eye reporting on anything. It 
is a good service (FGD-02). 
Some of the healthcare providers had a positive attitude towards HFCs, although some were 
ambivalent about the role of the committees. Some see them as overseers to which community 
members complain about services.  
… HFCs are good because they link the facilities with communities. Communities raise their complaints 
through the HFCs. But the challenge is that HFC is not motivated to perform their duties. They always 
complain about allowances which we don‘t have a budget for. Sometimes we call them for a meeting and 
they don‘t show up … we rarely get feedback from the communities via the HFC (FKI-05).  
At one of the visited facilities, the health providers had managed to forge a close relationship 
with the community through the HFCs. In this facility the HFCs understood their roles and the 
health issues of their communities and were actively involved in meetings. There were positive 
suggestions for the improvement of the health services and they felt free to complain directly to 
the providers whenever the clinic was not functioning well. One of the participants explained 
that: 
HFC is there to monitor whether things have been done well, especially with the CHF fund. They were 
helpful to mobilise the communities. This year we managed to collect a substantial amount, 13 Tsh million, 
and with the top-up fund from the government we have 26 million. We are planning to renovate some of 
the health workers‘ houses and harvest rainwater and buy a solar panel. This will improve our working 
environment (FKK-04).  
Only the people in charge of two out of six facilities appreciated the work of the HFCs, who 
were actively involved with the facilities and also with the communities. They said:  
… for each project and every activity for which we need the community‘s involvement we sit with HFCs in 
our meetings. We don‘t just impose on them and say what we want to do. We get them in and share what 
we need to do, and we plan how we can do it together (FKI-04, FKI-06).  
 
There were some challenges regarding the HFC guidelines. The Community Health Fund Act 
(2001) stipulates that the roles of boards and committees are to monitor, mobilise and administer 
funds, but the roles of health facility committees are not mentioned in the Act (URT, 2001:8). 
Instead, both guidelines for the establishment of the governance structures and the CHF Act 
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mention that Ward Development Committees are responsible for the mobilisation of 
communities, supervising contributions, initiating and coordinating local health plans and 
organising meetings of CHF members. Thus, the comprehensive link between the community 
voice, payment for services and facility ownership is not well expressed. This is partly because 
of unclear power relations and concerns of common interest not being solved together. There is 
limited legitimacy over the selection of the community representatives and a lack of clear 
communication between the political structures, village and ward committees and health 
governance, which adds to the difficulties for HFCs to function properly. 
 
6.3.2 Accountability in local health service delivery 
Government reforms have put in place mechanisms for regulation of the health sector, with the 
scope for service users and other community members to complain about any misconduct or poor 
quality services. Both providers and service users have their complaints. Providers usually 
complain about low salaries, low motivation, poor working conditions, shortage of equipment 
and supplies. Service users largely complain about misconduct of the providers, which is 
manifested in corrupt practices, favouritism, substandard service and a shortage of medical 
supplies (Sikika, 2010). 
 
At policy level the MoHSW has developed a Client Service Charter to be used with both 
healthcare providers and services users. The charter outlines the rights of citizens, providers and 
service users as well as, guiding principles and the complaint mechanism (URT, 2002). 
However, misconduct of healthcare providers is increasing. Corruption, abusive language, 
absenteeism, favouritism and drunkenness have been reported to be problems among healthcare 
providers  (IHI, 2011). This is contributed to by ineffectiveness of the complaints system among 
health service users.  
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The study acknowledges that the existence and functioning of an accountability mechanism at 
any health service delivery point is one of the key fundamentals for the improvement of the 
quality of health services, including reproductive health. The non-existence of accountability 
mechanisms has a negative impact, not only on the service user, but also on the provider-user 
relationship. The improved quality of health service delivery reduces the chance of service users 
raising concerns about the betterment of health services. The study concentrates more on 
mechanisms for the service user‘s accountability. 
 
(i) Types of accountability in the local health care system 
There are two types of formal local accountability structures in local health service delivery. The 
first one is expected to receive complaints about health services provision, and the second 
concerns the roles communities can play in monitoring the flow of drugs and other resources 
through their representatives. The facility health committees are failing to hold providers to 
account. They are unable to withstand interference by the councillors which has negatively 
affected community accountability to be vague. 
 
Services users‘ complaints can be made through the village health committees and facility health 
boards. The communities monitor the flow and use of drugs through the HFC members and 
village executive officers. When the drugs are delivered at the facilities, the providers are not 
supposed to open the consignment until some members of the HFCs are around. Their role is to 
countercheck and sign the ‗kit box‘ delivered. This study did not obtain sufficient evidence to 
make an assessment of the effectiveness of this type of local monitoring. 
 
(a)Accountability through elected representatives 
At council level, councillors, who are the representatives of the communities, make decisions 
through full council (FC) meetings. This is the highest legal organ for local decision making that 
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is implemented by the council staff. The FC meets in each quarter of the financial year. The FC 
is supported by a number of committees: Finance and Planning Committee, Economic, Works 
and Environment Committee, and Social Services Committee. The membership of these 
committees is taken from the councillors and council technical staff. The function of the 
committee is to pass draft proposals, plans and budget from council departments before final 
presentation to the FC for their approval. The roles of the council standing committees under 
decentralisation have not been well established. Some of council personnel are the members of 
the standing committees while the same committees have the oversight roles over council staff. 
This endangers local accountability in the case of the misuse and abuse of a staff member who is 
a member of the committees. 
 
Health services fall under the Social Services Committee. Among the CHSB members is a 
councillor who chairs the council‘s Social Services Committee. Clashes between committee 
meetings occur regularly, making impossible for some key members of the CHSB, including the 
representatives from the Social Services Committee and the RHMT, to participate effectively. 
For instance, during the production of the CCHP, the council planning officer and the council 
chairperson for the Social Services Committee were missing, as both were attending another 
important council meeting. Thus, oversight role during planning sessions is not satisfactory. The 
CHMT decided on behalf of the board members. Time therefore was a serious challenge for the 
committees to function properly. 
 
On other hand, the council planning document is cumbersome, with up to 200 pages that are 
distributed to the members during the meeting or a day before the meeting. This makes it 
difficult for the councillors to work through it so that they can make a meaningful contribution. 
A lack of funds for transport makes it difficult to distribute the document in advance. The 
council is not able to provide a transport allowance for the councillors for them to attend the 
meeting. Likewise, the planning document is a technical document that some representatives 
cannot understand especially financial reports. This hinders their efficiency, as they cannot 
interpret the reports correctly and make use of the information to influence decisions:  
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The role of councillors at current is not really practical; the majority have standard seven education and 
others never attended elementary education. These people are supposed to hold the bureaucrats accountable 
who are very knowledgeable within their expertise … this is not feasible at all (RKI-03).  
 
Usually, council works through three standing committees, namely: (i) Finance, Planning and 
Administration; (ii) Heath, Water and Education; and (iii) Works, Economy and the 
Environment. The finance, administration and planning committee has the greatest authority to 
oversee council resources and the chair of this committee serves as Council Chairperson. The 
functions of these standing committees are to pass proposals, plans and budgets from council 
departments before a final presentation to council meetings for their approval. The roles of the 
council standing committees under decentralisation have not been well established. Some council 
workers are members of the standing committees, while the same committees had a role of 
oversight council staff. This threatens the local accountability of the council staff in the case of 
misconduct.  
(b) Accountability through health committees 
The HFCs were established as a mechanism for improving accountability between providers and 
service users. Guidelines for their establishment indicate that HFCs ―shall be accountable to the 
council‖ (URT, 2001:33). The HFC regulations detail that the HFCs are expected to submit 
‗quarterly, biannual and annual reports to the CHSBs‘ which are ultimately accountable to the 
Council. The committee can be directed to perform any other relevant activity by the Ward 
Development Committees (WDC). But the regulation stipulates that a HFC ―shall liaise with the 
community .to ensure that community health needs are adequately addressed and facilitate the 
two way flow of information‖ (URT, 2002:1334). 
 
Every facility should have a HFC to manage the delivery of services and to hold providers 
accountable. Thus, services users can channel their complaints about any acts of the providers 
either through village health committees or HFCs. The assumption is that HFCs direct their acts 
of accountability towards the community which are represented. However the finding in this 
study indicates that the current structures promote the acts of accountability more upward than 
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downward. The next section presents analysis from the HFCs including appointment process, 
members and their potential for control within a management committee, role of the ex officio 
members such as the facility in-charge. The acts of accountability of the HFCs are analysed to 
understand the locus of HFC accountability (upward vs. downward). The findings were based on 
the group interviews (four) with the committee members and the community group discussions 
(eight). 
 
Selection and election process 
The HFCs guidelines (2001) specified clearly membership composition in two categories: five 
voting members and three ex officio members. The five voting members comprise three 
members from community service users, who apply individually after the WDC has advertised 
the post for user representation. The WDC makes a selection from the applicants and proposes 
the list of candidates to the Council for approval. The other two voting members should be 
representatives from the private health facilities in the area; one from a not-for-profit and one 
from a private clinic. However, there were no private for-profit clinics in this study (URT, 
2001a). Thus, HFC members are from the communities. The three non-voting members of the 
HFC by virtue of their office are: a member from the WDC, a member from village council and 
the facility in-charge as the secretary (URT, 2001:1332). 
 
In the facilities that were visited, the facility in-charge distributed the application forms for the 
HFC members. There was no information about the responsibilities, but the requirement that was 
presented was that ‗an applicant should know how to write and read‘. The applications were to 
be channelled to the village government. It was observed that, forms were distributed just to give 
the impression that the procedure was followed. The HFC members were nominated either by 
the WDC or by the person in-charge. The HFC members participating in discussion all more or 
less went through this process. The following was the response from some of the participants: 
… ward development officer received a letter from the district medical officer for the formulation of the 
HFCs. Then, the WDC directed the village government to select three people and proposed us to the ward 
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development officer, who selected us. We never applied to be HFC members but feel privileged to be 
selected (FHC-03, FHC-04).  
…a letter from the district medical officer comes to the facilities to set up the HFC. Then I looked to see 
who from the community could can members, their names were sent to the council authorities for their 
approval. There has been a tendency to choose HFC members who live near to the health facilities (FKI-03, 
FKI-05).  
 
Generally, it was found that FHCs were not selected according to government regulations. None 
of the HFCs members were elected through public meetings. Some of the HFC members (11) 
were selected without application letter. Another remark is that committees lack representatives 
from private organisations. This is due to the absence of private providers‘ representation in the 
case of rural councils. The HFCs members belong more to the local authority than to the 
communities. None of the members mentioned the role of representing their locality, as they saw 
themselves as a channel of information from the facilities to the communities. They feel that they 
serve the government and they had expected allowances for performing their duties. This 
confusion is caused by the selection process, where the local authority identified out some of the 
members. This makes HFC members to be accountable to the person in-charge rather than the 
community they represent. 
 
The findings show that a key constraint on the activeness and effectiveness of the HFC members 
is the process of member selection. Communities were not involved in the selection of the HFC 
members. Thus, the HFCs are more answerable to the local authority than to the communities. 
The current working environment is failing to have an impact on holding government institutions 
accountable. The selection process results in individuals being selected with little interest in 
serving the community. It is because this would be considered an insult to those who nominated 
them: 
In some places, community members are active but in other places communities do not bother to have the 
committee. Providers usually pick those whom they think they can work with … but this endangers their 
working relationships. It is not easy for them to criticise providers in the case of misconduct (CKI-02). 
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In this study it was found that HFCs were unable to resist from the councillors and have failed to 
call them to account in the case of misuse. For example, on a field visit one of the councillors 
abused the construction funds for the dispensary, but no disciplinary action was taken by the 
committee members:  
… this councillor is very popular in the village … No one can touch him, even the council authorities. We 
report his abuses to the council but nothing is done (FKI-05). 
By virtue of their positions, the chairperson and treasurer would have more direct control over 
resources within HFCs. More importantly, the person in charge of the facility, being an ex officio 
member, has more delegated power to control the facility resources. In fact, the HFCs have no 
direct control over the finances. The potential power for the HFCs is through the treasurer, who 
is the signatory when the facility wants to retrieved the CHF funds from their account. The 
person in charge can exert informal power over the HFCs in terms of status and knowledge. 
Also, the central sector ministries exert control over the HFCs and the flow of resources through 
the person in charge, which have a primary commitment to the government as their employer.  
 
Arguably, if the providers as ex officio members had significant informal power, they would 
have been tempted to include friends among the HFC members. However, this study could not 
provide evidence for an informal local power dynamic. This offers an opportunity for further 
research on how informal power dynamics within health management committees affect health 
service delivery. The findings show clearly that the HFC members belong to the government that 
appointed/selected them. They served the government and expected allowances when performing 
their duties.  
(ii) Acts of downward and upward accountability 
An understanding of who controls local HFCs and the flow of resources can be one of the ways 
of understanding acts of accountability of the HFCs. The assumption made in this thesis is that 
HFCs will direct acts of accountability to those whom they believe are in control, despite the 
regulations which indicate that HFCs are supposed to be answerable to the communities. The 
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analysis of acts of accountability looks at the structure and its role in the accountability 
relationships for local health service delivery. 
 
Figure 6-2 illustrates governance structures, with the lines of accountability relationship among 
the key actors. The line management arrangement for the service providers provides the most 
direct form of accountability. The main element of the hierarchy from the MoHSW are regional 
officials, district officials (DMO, CHMTs, CHSB) and the person in charge of the facility, either 
at the health centre or dispensary levels. Below the council there are a number of institutions that 
are responsible for planning and budgeting for health services. These institutions manage local 
resources and ensure the availability of health services. 
 
The effectiveness of line management depends largely on the ability of the CHSB to oversee the 
activities of the CMHTs, and the HFCs to oversee the activities of the lower managers at the 
facility level, as well as the ability to apply sanctions and to provide incentives. With the current 
decentralisation arrangements, the CHMTs have dual reporting channels to the MoHSW and 
PMO-RALG. At the council level, the DMO reports to the District Director (DED) and District 
Commissioner (DC)-the extension branch of the ruling political party. The DED, in turn, is 
accountable to the elected Council Assembly. 
 
HFCs theoretically act as a link between the communities and the facilities. There also are other 
structures, like WDC and Ward Health Committees, which are able to call meetings, but the 
legislation grants the WDC greater power than the WHC in the execution of health plans. 
Apparently there is a duplication of structures between those that are established under local 
government administration and those under the health sector. This makes the relationship to be 
complex and complicated and its impact remains uncertain. There also is a duplication of 
functions between the local governance structure, such as ward committees, and health 
governance structures. The WDC and WHC have some objective in common, and this leads to 
confusion and probably delays in implementation or bringing health problems to the higher level. 
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This was resolved by following the two lines of reporting directly to the district council office 
and to DMO‘s offices. This was noted by one of the participants: 
… we usually report to the council director and to the district medical officer … the director authorises the 
health budget and the DMO is in charge of the health-related activities. Both demand feedback on the 
executed activities (FKI- 01, FKI-03, and FKI-06). 
 
At the council, CHMTs are supposed to be answerable to the CHSB. However, the lines of 
authority between the management teams and council health service boards are lacking. At all 
levels, there are medical personnel as heads: in the case of the health centre it is the person in 
charge of the health centre and the person in charge of the dispensary in the case of the 
dispensary. These officials were the overseers of the functioning of their respective facilities 
giving little room to CHSB and HFCs. There is no official link between WHC and HFC. The 
WDC and HFC had common objectives but officially report to different higher structures. The 
WDC is a more political organ that reports to the DC, while the HFC reports to the DMO.  
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Figure 6-2: Relationship between health governance structure and local governmentn 
Source: Ifakara Health Institute, 2011 
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From member‘s perspectives, the repeated role of the HFCs mentioned was to mobilise the 
communities to join community health insurance funds. In some facilities the HFC members can 
influence the collection of the CHF and its utilisation to purchase stock-out drugs: 
… as a member of the  HFC, our role is to ensure that the funds that have been contributed by the service 
users are kept in the facility account. Also, to ensure that the amount collected has been retrieved for the 
facility to use (FHC-02). 
 
However, the HFC members were not in a position to decide on how to spend the CHF and user 
fees revenues. A substantial amount of CHF was held in facility bank accounts at the council 
level, while the facilities are running out of stock. The health managers assert that the funds 
belong to facilities but the facilities do not request:  
… most of the facilities did not understand the procedures to request back their funds. They are supposed 
to plan and budget for the amount requested, then CHSB scrutinises their plan and, if feasible, they sign for 
the release of the fund. The majority just write a letter to request, rather than providing a plan (FCH-04).  
Only two HFCs of the four interviewed committees had managed to mobilise communities to 
contribute their labour to construct a dispensary. However, they should ask permission from the 
village government since it is the village government that links communities with the facilities:  
… time to discuss some issues with the communities is minimal due to workloads. We convey the 
messages to the communities, like to provide their labour during construction, during the village meetings 
(FCH-01, FCH-03). 
 
At the communities, HFCs were not seen as a structure through which they can present their 
views and grievances concerning health service delivery matters. The communities felt that 
HFCs were government officials enforcing their enrolment. Likewise, the HFC members felt that 
they are serving the government rather than communities. They assumed that they would be 
treated as other government civil servants with allowances when they assembled for meetings. 
Given this situation, the question is how far the HFCs can monitor the functioning of the 
providers and/or promote accountability to the service users. Similarly, the extent to which the 
representation of the elected government representatives was responsible to the primary 
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healthcare facilities was minimal. It seems to be important if the facilities are to mobilise 
additional resources from the citizens, such as the construction of facilities using local funds. 
 
When asked about their roles, the HFC members frequently mentioned their role was to reinforce 
the implementation of the CHF policy. They did not see their role as promoting accountability to 
citizens, monitoring the work of the providers or monitoring access to health benefits by various 
groups. Some of the HFC members felt that their role was to improve infrastructure and not 
health services. The village health committee members argued that their role was to promote 
preventive health interventions, such as sanitation and hygiene in the village, and to call for an 
ambulance in case of emergency. The HFC and VHC visited were not performing accountability 
roles. The current structure doesn‘t promote policy accountability to citizens. 
 
(a) Answerability of health facility committees 
Regarding answerability, HFCs have more direct links to the councils than to the local 
communities they are supposed to represent. These structures are failing to hold government 
institutions to account in case of malpractices. In terms of resource mobilisation, committees can 
influence the use of CHF funds, especially in relation to supplies. In one of the health centres the 
HFC managed to collect enough funds to purchase drugs. Only two out of six facility HFCs had 
managed to retrieve the CHF. One decided to buy drugs and the other facility decided to buy 
cleaning equipment such as buckets, brooms, etc. In these facilities the HFCs at least know their 
roles: 
… is to ensure the collected funds from the CHF and user fees have been deposited in the bank by our 
cashier. Then, to ensure the amount contributed has been utilised for the benefit of our facilities (FKI-04, 
FKI-06). 
 
Contrary, the HFCs did not mention about conveying the community messages to the providers 
to whom they can present their grievances concerning health service delivery. When asked about 
their roles; the HFCs members mentioned ‗convincing communities on benefits of community 
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health insurance fund‘. Four HFCs members said that their key role is to ensure the communities 
receive good health services by monitoring the provider‘s behaviour while dealing with the 
clients. The HFC in only one facility was involved to monitor the new drug kits delivered to 
check if the drugs that were procured are there. After cross-checking all powers are left to the 
providers. None of the members interviewed mentioned the role of representing the communities 
rather than convey the provider‘s messages to the communities. 
 
(b) Scope and intensity of accountability 
Both CHSB and HFCs were located inside government structures, with an element of external 
accountability through the inclusion of representatives from the communities and private health 
providers. However, the attachment to the accountability bodies within government led to 
questioning the decision-making powers of the CHSB and HFCS. The CHSBs were not seen to 
have a crucial role in decision making on health-related matters at the council. The CHTM had 
more power as stressed by one of the participant ‗we seek blessings from the CHSB, just to 
follow the procedures‘. The private sector representation is only seen in the budget meeting to 
share their plans for the preparation of the council health plan, but not as a part of the CHSB 
consultations. The capacity of the private sector to articulate accountability demands to 
government officials cannot be answered in this study. 
 
Likewise, the HFCs cannot ensure proper representation of the service users, because they do not 
understand their roles. As a result, community inputs and membership in the CHF and user fees 
are likely to remain low. The informal chats with the facility providers revealed that the use of 
market incentives as one of the strategies to improve accountability has led to a number of 
patients seeking care from other sources, like traditional healers, or stay at home if they do not 
have sufficient funds. 
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From the findings presented a number of conclusions can be drawn on how service users‘ 
representation and accountability are organised through CHSB and HFCs. The intention of 
government to give service users a voice in and responsiveness to health service delivery has not 
had the desired impact. The selection process of the members of the committees and boards was 
dominated by the government. The views of the members on their role are mainly government 
focused to implement CHF policy. Community representation came out clearly as they do have a 
forum for consultations to raise their complaints and/or provide their ideas. However, private 
provider‘s representation was low. Usually, the HFCs members work as individuals rather than 
representatives of the service users.  
 
It was found that acts of accountability were directed upward than downward accountability 
HFCs have not pledged to go to the community hence decisions were made without community 
consultations. Furthermore, lack of elections of HFC members questions their legality to be 
considered representative. In addition, the council has the power to dissolve the structure. It is 
obvious that councils have more control over health governance structures than the communities. 
 
From the users‘ perspectives, contributions through CHF provide inspiration for providers to be 
accountable and responsive to service users. In some of the facilities visited, service users were 
ready to enrol in the CHF if the services were made available. The challenge has been in the 
representation and accountability structure, which does not provide sufficient incentives for the 
communities to question the service providers in the case of poor service delivery.  
 
In relation to the short and long routes of accountability, the CHSB and HFCs are placed in 
between these routes. Both the CHSB and HFCs can reinforce the voice of service users and the 
responsiveness of the service providers and make policy makers and politicians more 
accountable to the service users and hold service providers accountable for the quality of service 
they provide to the communities. At present none of the two are working. The support of the 
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long route is lagging behind because the CHSB and HFCs are weak in decision-making powers 
and the members cannot facilitate the short route. 
 
The ability of the HFC members to play their role effectively is also questionable under the 
current selection procedure, which is greatly influenced by the government. Is it possible for the 
government to choose individuals who will challenge the government? Government bureaucrats 
have a position that can influence CHF dynamics. On the basis of the findings, the study gives 
the following sets of messages: first, on the accountability to service users of any services; 
secondly on the accountability to service users of health services; and thirdly, on accountability 
to service users of reproductive health services.  
 
Structures concerned with accountability cannot promote acts of accountability, since the service 
users are not aware of and do not mobilise around this structure; if the structures are headed by 
the service providers themselves and if capacities are not built into the HFCs with regard to the 
monitoring and accountability role. The HFCs, while strengthening service provision at facilities, 
their emphasis has been on community contributions and not holding providers to account for the 
services. The systems should be set up for committees to engage with communities in responding 
to their needs and to make service providers answerable to service users. At current such systems 
are absent. Thus, for service users to be able to push their accountability they need to know the 
services that they are entitled to. This could empower them to demand their rights (Loewenson et 
al., 2004) 
 
Lessons on accountability  
Above all, there are some lessons learned about community participation in accountability in 
health services delivery. Unlike other social services, such as sanitation, water and hygiene (to 
mention a few), there is a huge discrepancy in knowledge between service providers and the 
users on the technical issues of the healthcare service (George, 2003). This makes it difficult for 
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service users to push for accountability with regard to availability (they might not know what 
services are needed for their health problems) or quality of the health services (they might not be 
able to categorise what health services are of good quality). They might, though, push for 
affordable health services, in particular stopping the informal payments for health services meant 
to be provided for free. Unless adequate budget is allocated to the health sector, it is difficult to 
address the emerging needs from community demands. For example, one of the participants 
claimed that council should employ qualified pharmacists, for efficiency in procuring drugs and 
other supplies, but there was no budget for the same. On other hand, when council manages to 
allocate a budget, the qualified health professionals do not want to serve in rural settings. 
 
6.4 Discussion and conclusion 
The chapter has evaluated the effects of the three dimensions of decentralisation on health 
services delivery. Generally, the findings in this chapter support the importance of accounting for 
all dimensions of decentralisation while investigating its outcomes. As said previously, 
decentralisation reform that is executed only in one dimension may produce fewer positive 
results in improving service delivery than a multi-dimensional execution. However, current 
decentralisation efforts in Tanzania have remained theoretical policy designed by government to 
convince donors that they decentralise, while actually they have not. This was articulated by one 
of the national participants, who said that ―decentralisation is a means to snatch donor grants but 
it is not really the intention of government to grant councils all powers‖(NKI-02).  
 
The evidence presented in this chapter shows that some aspects of decentralisation have 
progressed more significantly than others. When compared to the stated goals of devolution, the 
process of true devolution has been slow. However, LGAs have some discretionary power but 
little has been achieved with regard to fiscal and administrative decentralisation. This is due to 
the lack of enthusiasm of central government to allow full decentralisation to happen (Tidemand 
and Msami, 2008, Braathen and Mwambe, 2007, URT, 2007:4, Tidemand and Dege, 2010, 
Boex, 2008).  
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From the results presented, all three dimensions of decentralisation were seen as important, for 
improved health outcomes. However, additional value is added from interactions of the two 
forms of decentralisation dimensions on improving health system performance, which in the end 
improves reproductive health delivery. For the decentralisation to improve health outcomes, 
interaction of the three dimensions of decentralisation is important. For example, community 
engagement in construction of the facilities improves physical coverage, but this was not enough, 
as some of the constructed facilities lack personnel to render services. Thus, although one 
dimension of decentralisation can lead to a desirable output, on its own it is not enough to 
improve health outcomes. For this case administrative and fiscal decentralisation was needed to 
supplement community initiatives. Council still has to wait for the central government to post 
health care personnel as they don‘t have power to hire. 
 
It was observed that interactions of the three dimensions of decentralisation are important. For 
example, administrative (autonomy to hire and fire personnel) and fiscal decentralisation was 
found that the large share of LGA are intergovernmental transfer mainly for the recurrent 
transfers for the personnel salaries. Staff recruitment and deployment have remained centralised 
functions. The process is not carried out for the benefit of the LGAs, and staff are transferred 
under the central directives without local consultation, leaving gaps in key positions (Manzi et 
al., 2012, Mshana and Petit, 2011). Also, it has not been possible to apply the formula-based 
allocations of recurrent grants in practice. As a consequence, financial allocations to LGAs are in 
many cases unequal and funds are released in places where health personnel have been posted. 
This leads to inequities in resource distribution, both in human and budget allocation. The urban 
councils receive higher allocations of funds than remote councils. The allocation for recurrent 
funding (personnel budget) is not allocated by need, but based on where personnel are stationed. 
This favours urban councils, because urban postings are more desirable and personnel posted in 
rural councils very often do not take up their posts. This affects both the quantity and quality of 
services provided in remote councils.  
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With regard to fiscal decentralisation, central control of LGAs, as shown by central government 
oversight, is necessary in ensuring that LGAs use financial and other resources in an efficient, 
effective and transparent way (Azfar et al., 1999). There is little local discretion over the 
recurrent budget, since the highest proportion is spent on salaries and central government 
determines both the quantity and structure of LGA personnel. With regard to the development 
budget, the discretionary fund, in particular LGCDG, which provides the council with more 
autonomy in budget prioritisation, comes with central instructions for the defined activities from 
the PMO-RALG. This undermines local autonomy and prioritisation. It was observed that funds 
under LGCDG were directed for the construction of a secondary school, which was not the role 
of the LGAs. This interference is not in the spirit of devolution. Similar studies have found that 
financial transfers to the LGAs are controlled by the centre through budget ceilings, guidelines 
and approvals (Mubyazi et al., 2004, COWI and EPOS, 2007, Yoshida, 2008). It was noted that 
local health plans have to comply with national priorities in order to receive fund allocations, 
(Maluka et al., 2010b).  
 
In regard to administrative decentralisation, councils have very narrow choices as they can only 
employ less skilled staff. Government documents admit that ―reluctance of central government to 
devolve autonomy for human resource management to local authorities is one of the bottlenecks 
in implementing decentralisation‖ (URT, 2009a:7). As a result, councils lack qualified technical 
health personnel. Shortage of skilled staff, inequitable distribution of the existing workforce, 
with more health personnel in urban than in rural areas and bureaucratic recruitment processes 
stand as major challenges to council health care delivery (URT, 2009b, COWI and EPOS, 2007). 
The re-centralisation procedures which aimed at assisting councils to have highly qualified 
personnel have failed to address the current crisis of health care personnel shortage particularly 
in rural councils (Munga et al., 2009). It is evident in this study that council has a shortage of 
more than 50% of the required personnel. This affects the quality and quantity of health services 
provided to the communities.  
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The study found little evidence that political decentralisation has increased local autonomy in 
prioritising, and planning of health care services according to local needs. The linkages and 
deliberations between communities and facility health committees were limited, bottom-up 
planning was typically viewed as wish lists by council health officials, and council priorities 
were typically set by the central government. In this study local health needs were not reflected 
in the CCHP. Similarly Mubyazi et al. (2004) found that ward and village leaders commonly 
complain about failure of the LGAs to respond to local priorities. Diseases that were identified 
by community members as major health problems were not reflected or were given a low priority 
in the CCHP. Similar studies as per (Per-Tidemand and Jamal, 2010, Chaligha, 2008, Odd-Helge 
et al., 2010, Molel, 2010) arrived with at the same conclusion observing that community 
involvement in local planning and delivery was limited, and council plans do not reflect 
identified community needs  
 
According to Conyers (2007), the effectiveness of user committees depends on their structure, 
composition, motivation and the capacity of their members; and how they are linked to the local 
and national structures. In the case of Tanzania, the presence of service boards and committees 
does not appear to alter the existing power relations between technical staff and communities. 
Among the key challenge was the selection of HFC members: The absence of community 
involvement in the process has had a direct impact on HCF roles. In many instances, the member 
selection process has been carried out quickly and without following correct procedures. 
Members are often selected according to the discretion of people in-charge, instead of the 
community. This results in questions of legitimacy and accountability of the HFCs members. 
Other studies (Loewenson et al., 2004, Macha and Borghi, 2011, Kessy et al., 2008)have found 
that health committees were not functioning properly. Confusion about their roles and 
responsibilities also obstruct the full participation of HFCs in health related activities (Boon, 
2008). 
 
Generally, the current status of decentralisation shows that there is a principal-agent problem, 
whereby central government (principal) exercises more power over LGAs (the agents). As others 
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have stipulated, this problem is characteristic of decentralisation in many developing countries. 
Local institutions are frequently given power to make decisions but not control the resources 
needed to implement those decisions (Conyers, 2007; Ribot, 2002). Tanzanian health sector 
decentralisation is more top-down, and included all forms of decentralisation including 
deconcentration, delegation with limited devolution. Similar to (1990) Masanyiwa et al., (2013) 
all forms of decentralisation can be found in the health sector. 
 
Conclusion  
Government has not really given a fair trial to health sector decentralisation as it has failed to 
devolve significant powers to LGAs. Government hardly devolved the key functions of financial 
and human resources. The findings in this chapter support the claim that ‗each dimension of 
decentralisation individually is highly relevant to produce health outcomes‘. It has been observed 
that, inter-linkages between decentralisation dimensions generate additional benefits for 
improving health services. Thus, when one single dimension of decentralisation is implemented 
without applying all three dimensions some of its potential to improve health outcomes might be 
lost. 
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Abbreviations for Chapter 7 
ANC  Antenatal clinic 
C-FGD Community focus group discussion 
CHMT  Council health management teams  
CKI  Council key-informant interview  
FKI  Facility key-informant interview 
FP  Family planning 
ICPD   International Conference on Population and Development  
ITNs  Insecticide-treated nets  
IUD  Intrauterine devices 
MCH   Maternal and child health  
MMR  Maternal mortality rate  
MNCH Maternal and new-born child health  
MoH  Ministry of Health 
MoHSW Ministry of Health and Social Welfare  
NEHP  National Essential Health Package  
NGOs  Non-governmental organisation 
NKI   National key-informant interview  
NPEHI  National Package of Essential Health Interventions  
NPERCHI  National Package of Essential Reproductive and Child Health Interventions 
PMTCT Prevention of mother-to-child transmission  
RCHS   Reproductive and Child Health Section   
RHMTs Regional health management teams  
RHS   Reproductive and Health Services 
RKI  Regional key-informant interview 
STDs  Sexually transmitted diseases  
URT   United Republic of Tanzania  
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CHAPTER 7 
IMPLICATIONS OF DECENTRALISATION ON REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH CARE 
SERVICES IN RURAL TANZANIA 
7.0 Introduction  
This chapter presents findings on the council case based analysis, in understanding the impact of 
decentralisation on reproductive health service delivery. There are two main areas that were 
explored in an attempt to realise the implications of decentralisation on reproductive health 
service. This chapter also looks into how fiscal, administrative and political decentralisation 
empowered council health staff in deciding on health resource transferred from the central 
government for the council health service provision. Generally, there were mixed opinions to the 
effect that decentralisation has brought on the health care delivery. Some participants argue that 
there is a positive impact on the delivery of health care, while others felt that there is still a long 
way to go to actually say that decentralisation will improve the delivery of health services. 
 
The chapter is divided into four sections: the first section gives a general overview of the of the 
reproductive health indicators of the case analysis council. The second section analyses 
administrative decentralisation looking on the number of health facilities and human resource 
situation of the case council. The third section presents the impact of fiscal decentralisation on 
health service delivery while the fourth section presents political decentralisation and the last 
section presents discussion and conclusion of the chapter  
 
7.1 Council reproductive health services indicators  
Analysing the effect of decentralisation on reproductive health (RH) brings to a question on how 
does RH indicators looks before and after implementation of decentralisation. However, this 
question was not achieved in the current study as data were not available. Thus, it was not easy 
for the study to track changes of RH indicators over time. The data presented are based on 
secondary data collected from District Medical Officer (DMO) offices and from the visited 
facilities.  
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Basically, National Package of Essential Health Interventions (NPEHI) of 2000 contain a list of 
priority health interventions that informed health planning at all levels (MOH, 2000b). 
Reproductive and child health services (RCH) is among the six priorities of the NPEHI. Specific 
components for RHS that are included covers services for family planning, maternal care-
including antenatal care, provisional of basic and emergency obstetric care at all levels, post-
natal care, gynaecological diseases, sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), post-abortion care and 
post-partum care, adolescent reproductive health care, other maternal health conditions, 
including infertility, rape and female genital mutilation and reproductive system cancer (MOH, 
2000b). 
 
The National Package of Essential Reproductive and Child Health Interventions (NPERCHI) 
were formulated in 2000 to give detailed guidelines for RCH component from national to facility 
levels (MOH, 2000a). The aim was to address the reproductive health needs of both women and 
men according to their needs. Regional health management teams (RHMTs) and council health 
management teams (CHMTs) were tasked to train staff at facility level on the utilisation of 
NPERCHI guidelines. It is assumed the RHMTs and the CHMTs should use the NPERCHI 
guidelines to plan for reproductive health training and supervision (MOH, 2000a). Unfortunately, 
during the field visit neither the RHMTs nor the CHMTs were found to have these guidelines. 
 
The national reproductive health programs adopt the International Conference on Population and 
Development (ICPD) definition of reproductive health that defines reproductive health as ―a state 
of complete physical, mental and social well-being in all matters relating to reproductive system, 
its function and process. Reproductive health, therefore, implies that people are able to have a 
satisfying and safe sex, life and they have capability to reproduce and the freedom to decide 
when and how often to do so‖ (MOH, 2000a).  
 
However, in this study it has been proved that there is a gap in terms of the existing policies to 
realise individual‘s rights to RHS. In particular, young people are marginalised in the current 
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polices and laws as the documents rarely talk about of them. For young people, documents 
mention about access to friendly services like information and education but not how to achieve 
the goal. This makes it more vagueness when it comes to implementation. In this study it was 
observed that young people were denied their access right to family planning services and 
providers were firm with this decision. The next section analysis the extent to which key RH 
elements that are stated in national policies are taken into council health plans. 
 
The service mapping was done to identify the elements RHS that were readily available at the 
visited facilities. Table 7-1 present number of health facilities that are offering reproductive 
health. It was found that most of the health facilities had either fixed clinics, or mobile and/or 
outreach services, in which basic RHS were provided at free of charge. However, not all RHS 
that were identified at the national level were available at the Primary Health Care (PHC) 
facilities. 
 
Table 7-1: Number of health facilities offering reproductive health services 
RH component Health centres n=6 Dispensaries n = 30 
Family planning 6 30 
Sexual transmitted diseases (STI/HIV/AIDS)-related services 6 30 
Prevention of Mother-to-child Transmission (PMTCT) 
services 
6 30 
Antenatal care 6 30 
Postnatal care  6 30 
Delivery services 6 30 
Post-abortion care 6 1 
Basic obstetric care 6 30 
Emergency obstetric care 1 - 
Infertility treatment  - - 
Reproductive cancers (cervical & breast cancer screening)  - - 
Harmful traditional practices - - 
Adolescent reproductive health 1 1 
DMO‘s office, 2011 
In each of the Council facilities at least some components of RHS were available. Services 
provided were related to ANC covering screening and treatment for syphilis, HIV counselling 
and testing, family planning, child delivery and referral for the risky pregnancies. Post-abortion 
services were available in all health centres, while at dispensary level post abortion services were 
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limited to one facility. Other services for short term family planning are more available than 
long-acting and permanent methods. The FDG discussion noted that pills are always available at 
the health facilities but this is not the case with implants, IUDs and injectables. However, the 
services were available through outreach arrangement with an international NGO called 
Population Services International (PSI). Services for infertility, menopause and management of 
reproductive system cancer were not available. Furthermore, programmes targeting adolescents 
were limited, being offered by one facility. 
 
Services for STIs like HIV/AIDS were vertically managed. In Tanzania pregnant women are 
given a compulsory HIV test during their first visit to the ANC. Those who tested positive were 
enrolled in prevention mother to child transmission (PMTCT) services. Generally, RHS were 
provided for 9 hours from 8.00 am to 4.00 pm. It was noted that, some clinics were not providing 
services during the official time as the provider was sick and the other provider was called to 
submit the monthly report to the council. In addition, some of the clinics closed earlier than 
stipulated. This was revealed by service users during discussions: 
… Clinic services are supposed to start at 8.00 am but usually the nurse opens at 9.00 am. She usually finds 
us waiting for them. This has been a barrier to some women who come from far away. Long hours of 
waiting have made some women to seek traditional birth attendant rather than facility delivery (C-FGD-
07). 
… one day we went to the facility for family planning around 2.00 pm. The provider told me I was late; she 
said ‗Come back tomorrow, I am tired‘. These are not good words … it discourages one a lot. For someone 
who walks a long distance to go back without having received services (C-FGD-09). 
Some providers turn back family planning clients claiming that they came on the wrong day. 
This was expressed during community discussion as some of the participants argued: 
We are not satisfied with the services … some providers make their own arrangement like they set a day for 
pregnant women, a day for family planning, but they don‘t give us the information … so you have to come 
back on the right day … some might know, but for someone who doesn‘t know it is a problem (CF-FGD-
07).  
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The next section below presents council reproductive health indicators since 2007 to 2011. The 
data relied on the available data at the facilities. As some of the services were not made available 
in many of the facilities thus the data is limited to safe motherhood indicators including maternal 
mortality, family planning services among others. 
 
(i) Maternal mortality  
Council data on maternal mortality indicates that there were 57 per 100 000 live births in 2010. 
But, maternal data in a case council should be treated carefully as deaths that occurred outside of 
the health facilities were not reported. The council has been using MMR as a RHS indicator to 
measure women‘s health status. The data indicates that MMR is one of the most alarming health 
problems, as shown in table 7-2. 
Table 7-2: Case council –MMR from 2007 to 2011 
Year Maternal mortality rate 
2007 197/100 000 
2008 49/100 000 
2009 27/100 000 
2010 21/100 000 
2011 57/100 000 
Source: DMO‘s office, 2011 
There is a decrease and at the same time an increase in the trend in maternal deaths as table 7-2 
shows. Council health managers were aware of the trend and one of the Council‘s priorities is to 
have zero maternal death. As one of the participant insisted: 
Every life counts … the goal is to see that all women are receiving high quality maternal health services. It 
is my wish to see that all facilities are well equipped to provide basic and emergency obstetric care to 
ensure that all women are passing through safe delivery (CKI-04). 
 
The construction of maternity waiting homes known as Chigonella was one of the initiatives 
taken by council to reduce MMR. Expectant mothers who live far from the facilities spent their 
last few weeks in these homes before delivery. This is to overcome geographical and/or transport 
barriers during the rainy season. However the availability of the maternity homes was said to be 
inadequate to meet the demands. Out of 39 council facilities only four had maternity waiting 
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homes. This implies that facility delivery is not accessible as during rainy season some part of 
the council can be disconnected up to three months. Some facilities were also located very far. 
This was revealed during the interviews: 
….Some of the communities lives far away from the facility (approximately 50 Km). As it is a pastoralist 
community; the population is scattered and others live far away. They are accessed through outreach 
services particular once per month. The program aimed to provide mother and child services (FKI, 03). 
The case council lacks hospital referral from the health centres and dispensaries and cases were 
referred directly to Regional hospital. Lack of transport and other associated costs affects access 
to RHS. One community group discussion noted that: 
The main issue that affects people in this locality and impacts on services including facility deliveries is the 
transport and distance from the facilities.  …we don‘t have ambulance at our facilities if a patient needs 
emergency services we asked for the God‘s mercy (CFG-04). 
 
(ii) Family planning services 
Contraceptive counselling and services are part of primary health services and were available 
during post-natal and ante-natal visits. Short acting FP services are more readily available to all 
health centres and dispensaries. One of the key informants at the council stressed that: 
Most family planning services are available ……..if you want FP it is there at the RCH clinic.  When you 
go the health facilities, you get pills and injectables but in the case of implants and IUDs one has to wait for 
the outreach services from PSI as our RH providers lack skills concerning them(CKI-05).  
The type of FP services provided were injectables, pills and condoms. The Intrauterine Devices 
(IUD) insertions for women and male sterilisation were not available since providers lack skills 
on how to insert the IUDs and implants as well as perform sterilisation. Such services were 
available at the regional hospital since the council has no hospital. One of the participants 
claimed: 
I wouldn‘t say long term family planning methods like IUD or sterilisation are not provided to our clients. 
It‘s only that our communities are not well motivated about them. Today, as you see on this poster, one of 
our partners, PSI, came for IUD insertion for free as well as sterilisation for those who need it. 
Unfortunately no one came for the services, even though women asked for these services at the clinics 
(FKI-05). 
The outreach services were advertised through posters, the local radio and announcements over 
loudspeakers around the village. Despite publicity for the services, no clients turned up. It was 
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noted that the use of loudspeaker spread the information to men as well. As a result they refused 
to let their wives attend. One of the providers claimed that:  
… when men heard about the IUD services they refused to let women get out of their homes, some of the 
women were given duties outside the village, while others just remained indoors the whole day … you 
won‘t even see them fetching water as they usually do. The issue is not availability, but rather utilisation 
(FKI-05). 
Male condoms were available but were not used as a family planning method. The reason was 
that men were hesitating to use them, the assumption being that, when you ask to use a condom 
in a union, it implies there is no trust between the partners. Asking for a condom breaks the 
supposed trust and intimacy. Participants argue that a spouse asking for condom use is unfaithful. 
Married couples were not in support of condom use, claiming that they were not meant for them. 
Frequently, women felt uncomfortable to talk about condoms use in the presence of men. This 
implies that they rarely negotiate for their use.  
…..using a condom with my wife? In marriage there is no need to use condoms, even though they claim 
that condoms can be used for the prevention of STIs including HIV (C-FGD-08). 
 
… We cannot argue with our men about the use of condoms … this can be a source of violence and of 
course we cannot negotiate even though we know they have extramarital relationships … we are very 
worried if we will survive in this battle of HIV/AIDS (C-FGD-10). 
 
In-depth interviews with the RH providers revealed that availability of contraceptive methods 
was not a problem although stocks of specific methods like injectables were not available. All of 
the visited health facilities were able to provide some of the FP methods. Analysis of the council 
trend in contraceptive users as presented in Figure 7-1 indicates that condom use increased from 
time to time. There is overall increase in the contraceptive prevalence rate between 2007 and 
2010, but a decrease in pills and injectables. Injectables were the preferred contraceptive method 
because of its conveniences. Lack of freedom from their partner made the women give up the 
pills. Women had to hide their pills under the mattresses and/or in kitchen lockers. In addition, 
injectables were not available in some of the facilities, which hindered their utilisation.  
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Figure 7-1: Council trends in contraceptives use from 2007 to 2010 
Source DMO Office, 2011 
 
Council unmet need for FP was high as women who want to postpone or to stop child bearing 
failed to do so. This was revealed during discussions with a group of women as some confessed 
they wished to be on FP but were not using any of the methods. Two myths and misconceptions 
about FP methods widespread among service users and providers were wrongly informed or 
misunderstood facts about FP commodities. They had a belief that the use of FP may cause 
infertility in the near future and cause giving birth to abnormal children. Other reason mentioned 
were the side effects associated such as over-bleeding and headaches. In some instances men do 
not allow their women to use FP methods. Injectables, is one of the desirable methods but were 
not readily available in some health facilities especially during the rainy season. FP services 
were appreciated by some of the community members, while others were against them. This was 
expressed in the community discussion groups: 
FP helps us with child spacing. They are available in our facilities. We like injections because they last 
three months before I have to come for it again. We don‘t prefer pills because our partners don‘t support 
the use of the contraceptives. They just want many babies to take care of their cattle (C-FGD-07). 
One of the participants expressed her concern about provision of RHS as she compared it with 
her past experience: 
We used to have family planning cards with everything written there … We don‘t have such cards now. 
You find women are just given pills…. or injections and it is noted on a piece of paper which method is 
2007 2008 2009 2010
Pills 1026 4052 2688 2691
Injectables 9453 4215 1909 7600
Implants 180 263 817 1105
Condoms 120 5099 6204 10690
% of modern contraceptive use 26 28 39.3 44.2
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prescribed … when the client goes, that is the end of it. So we cannot follow up the clients properly. We 
wouldn‘t even know how long this client has been on this pill. When was she diagnosed? You know, I‘m 
really not happy (CKI-04). 
To address unmet need, FP education to the wider community is important so that it should not 
remain women‘s business. In addition, it is important to deal with the attitudes of service 
providers as some were against the use of FP. 
 
(iii) Ante-natal services  
Ante-natal (ANC) services were available in all facilities while outreach services were provided 
once a month to the villages far from the health facilities.  Women were given basic information 
related to delivery such as delivery preparations, pregnancy danger signs, nutrition and family 
planning.  During their clinic visit they were also provided with safe delivery including tetanus 
toxoid, iron supplements, assessment of blood pressure, anti-malaria drugs, and de-worming 
tablets to prevent maternal anaemia. Laboratory tests were provided and this included urine test 
and screening for STIs. Women found to have risk pregnancies like high blood pressure were 
referred to the Regional hospital for specialised physicians. 
 
Table 7-3 indicates a positive increase in the number of women attending ANC. However, the 
proportions were below the council‘s target of 78%, while, national coverage is 98%. This 
implies that ANC services were under-utilised. There were several reasons linked to low 
utilisation of ANC services. Women were dissatisfied with the attitudes and behaviour of 
providers as they faced verbal attack while seeking RHS. 
 
The ANC services in the visited facilities were not satisfactory. Some laboratory tests for the 
pregnant mothers were not performed due to lack of test kits. The equipment required to provide 
assisted vaginal deliveries (forceps) were absent from all the surveyed facilities, and test kits for 
syphilis and HIV had not been available in some health facilities for the past three months. In 
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some facilities, laboratory technicians were not available; pregnant women were referred to the 
higher levels.  
 
Table 7-3: Council antenatal clinic attendances from 2007 to 2010 
Year  No of women 
expected  
First visits Overall 
attendance  
  < 16 weeks > 16 weeks Total  
2007 8 133 4 717 3 417 8 134 (58%) 60% 
2008 8 267 5 042 3 224 8 266 (61%) 61% 
2009 8 297 5 816 2 440 8 256 (70%) 70.1% 
2010 8 170 5 882 2 275 8 157 (72%) 72% 
Source: DMO‘s Office, 2011. 
 
(vi) Facility delivery 
Table 7-4 indicates positive trend towards facility delivery which increased from 54% in 2007 to 
81% in 2010. Home delivery is increasing and poor transport system, providers attitude was 
mentioned to be a barrier. However, the data should be treated with care, as only 70% of women 
attended ANC. 
 
Table 7-4: Council- Place of delivery 2007 -2010 
Year Total no of deliveries Home deliveries Facility deliveries 
2007 4 579 124 (1.5%) 4 423 (54%) 
2008 6 614 386 (5%) 6 134 (74%) 
2009 7 470 816 (10%) 6 590 (79.4%) 
2010 7 062 433 (5.2%) 6 587 (81%) 
Source: DMO‘s Office, 2011 
 
A restriction to extending delivery services in some clinics was noted by some participants. The 
providers argued that reforms are not improving the working environment to provide quality 
services, especially at the PHC level. They complained about the lack of premises, which 
interfered with the privacy of the patients. In some facilities, only a single room partitioned by 
curtains was used as the outpatient section, and for counselling and drug dispensing. This 
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affected the client‘s confidentiality, in particular those who were coming for delivery and 
HIV/AIDS counselling and treatment services. The HIV-positive mothers had to wait until the 
outpatient clients had all been served. This was stressed by participants claiming that:  
… I have never delivered women at this facility during the day for the five years working in the facility. I 
came to realise that women fear to be heard during delivery, as some cry a lot. If they are heard, their 
fellow women will intimidate them as not being brave. Thus, those whose labour pain started during the 
day opt for TBA. Those who started their labour pain during the night come for facility delivery (FKI-03). 
Absenteeism of personnel was noted during the facility survey, with some facilities having only 
one staff, even though they were supposed to have two or three. This led to delays in the 
provision of ANC services, which made the clients, wait for as long as four to five hours to get 
family planning. Some complained about this: 
…we don‘t have an option; we have to wait until the nurse is finished with other clients who come with 
serious conditions. We are waiting for the family planning services. Others have already left without 
services, fearing to be seen by their husbands. If we take too much time, husbands might follow us and we 
end up being beaten sometimes (C-FGD-07).  
 
(iv) Sexually transmitted infections 
All council facilities provided some services for STIs.  However, facility data for STIs shows 
that there was a decrease in the number of new HIV infections among women while there was an 
increase in syphilis cases as data in table 7-5 indicates. HIV counselling and testing is now 
compulsory for all women during the first ANC visit. Women were tested without pre-test 
counselling, providers claiming that they had to attend to large number of women but they are 
few to perform all the duties for all women. Women who tested HIV positive were referred to the 
counselling and testing centre (CTC) where they received post-test counselling and other 
services including anti-retroviral drugs. One of the participants said the following about the 
services: 
Shortages of staff made us go for HIV testing without counselling, which is against the policy and 
guidelines. But what can we do? The government adds more programmes with the same number of people. 
Here we have out-patient clients, immunisation, family planning, deliveries and clinic. We are only two … 
How can we deliver full packages to those entire programmes? (FKI-02). 
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The CTCs were located outside the RCH clinics. This type of arrangement was not seen to be 
convenient to HIV positive women, fearing their HIV status will be disclosed. Others decided to 
change their clinic location. Nevertheless the HIV/AIDS data in 2010 should be taken with 
precaution because HIV test kits had not been available for the past six months. Data for 2010 
could either increase or remain the same if HIV testing was conducted.  
Table 7-5 Case study of council – pregnant women tested for STI infections 2007 to 2010 
Year  No of women tested 
for HIV 
HIV-positive women  No of women tested for 
syphilis  
Syphilis-positive 
women 
2007 604 136 3 299 11 
2008 8 269 22 1 638 139 
2009 8 412 20 3 485 67 
2010 7 787 8 5 248 121 
Source: DMO‘s Office, 2011  
(v) Adolescent services  
Young people are finding it difficult to access reproductive health services due to lack of youth 
friendly services as they fear to be seen by their parents at clinics. Providers were calling for the 
government to establish centres for young people to access their reproductive health needs. As 
one of the participants claimed: 
…Young girls and boys rarely come for the reproductive health services, as they are shy and fear to be 
seen by adults, including their parents. Unfortunately, most of the facilities don‘t have youth services to 
make services friendly and accessible to them. Maybe the government can think about having youth health 
centres (CKI-04). 
Providers‘ attitudes influence decisions of young people to use modern contraceptives. They 
discouraged young people from using contraception as it might reduce their fertility. Participants 
from the community discussion were repeatedly quoted as saying: 
… nurses are biased towards young girls when we ask for contraceptives. Nurses are not cooperative, they 
tell us that we are   prostitute … For instance when we ask for family planning … they laugh at us  and ask 
why are you coming for contraceptives while you are not married? They forget we are sexually active and 
having sex doesn‘t mean you have a husband (C-FGD-07, C-FGD-08). 
However, other community members believed that modern contraceptives services are for 
women who have children already and not for young people who don‘t have children. .One of 
the participants from the community discussion said:  
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Family planning methods are good for people who have children already not for young girls. Pills and 
injectables are not for young people as they need to have children. Some of the family planning methods 
reduce fertility…we don‘t want barren girls in our community in the future (C-FGD, 04). 
 
The findings presented in this section have shown that there is a low utilisation of the available 
services such as low uptake of modern contraceptive methods. This is contributed to by the 
erratic supply of contraceptives with limited range of choices, inadequate skills of providers and 
provider bias affecting informed choices especially for the young people, limited partner support 
for married women, lack of young people friendly health services and misconceptions about 
family planning methods. Low facility delivery was due to poor quality of services provided and 
mistreatment by some of the providers which discourages women from seeking to deliver in the 
facility. Other factors were associated with poor transportation which hinders access to health 
facilities. Postnatal services were not made available due to lack of premises. Women after 
delivery usually stayed up to six hours and were then discharged. Other services including 
abortion services were limited to few health facilities.  
 
Although RHS are mandatory services at the health facilities, individual rights to access and use 
are not well established. This can be one of the reasons for the unmet need for the family 
planning as individual choices cannot be made available. During the interview some participants 
from MoHSW believed that there is a policy commitment towards RHS as implied in several 
policy documents. However, it has been noted that political leaders rarely advocate for RHS in 
their speeches. For-example, during the budget session 2012/13, the Parliamentarians Family 
Planning Club (PFPC) observed Government did not allocate any fund for family planning 
commodities. The PFPC signed a petition to the President, Prime Minister, Madam Speaker, 
Ministers for Finance and the Minister for Health to demand allocation for contraceptives. From 
this case it is evident that policy champions are important at all levels to ensure RHS receive 
funding. In the case of Tanzania, Council RHS coordinators indicated that they are not, by law 
members of the CHMT; this makes RHS invisible under decentralised health care. 
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7.2 Impact of decentralisation on reproductive health services 
Before examining the link between decentralisation and RHS in Tanzania, there is a key issue 
that should be highlighted. The analysis of the association between decentralisation and RHS 
delivery should not be understood in isolated fashion. Decentralisation has a broader impact on 
the health care system so that it is likely to have an impact on RHS. It has been suggested that 
decentralisation should not be viewed as an end in itself, but as a means to enhancing health 
system performance and responsiveness to local health needs (Gilson and Mills, 1995, Bossert 
and Beauvais, 2002). Thus, the impact of decentralisation has to be viewed in the broader 
perspective of the health care system. This opinion will be taken up again below. 
 
This section therefore explores the implications of the health sector decentralisation for RHS 
with respect to effects on: (i) human resources (administrative decentralisation), (ii) local 
finances availability for RH delivery (fiscal decentralisation) and (iii) local decision-making 
regarding use of resources and on community (political decentralisation). Some of the impacts 
are based on evidence, and others are premises based on the understanding that changes in health 
system performance would affect the delivery of health services, including those of reproductive 
health. 
 
7.2.1 Implications on human resources  
In provision of the health services availability of well trained and motivated personnel are the 
most significant. However, the scope of decentralisation of human resource for health (HRH) 
functions has been limited. Participants were asked to mention some specific administrative and 
managerial roles being evidence of the administrative decentralisation. Participants at the council 
managed to identify set of indicators as gesturing administrative decentralisation: decision 
making with regard to council health care planning, mobilisation of funds, human resource 
management, and control of finances.  
 
The evidence shows that council health management team (CHMT) members assume more 
responsibility with regard to the council health care personnel. Some of the participants (four out 
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of nine) said that the CHMTs are now managing transfer of personnel, placing, appraisal and 
promotions of the council health personnel. Another important observation was that CHMTs 
were granted authority in the management and control of the council health funds and decision 
making powers regarding health services planning, design and execution of health interventions. 
These represent some progress towards administrative decentralisation although the key 
functional role for the civil services management is centrally controlled. 
 
The effect of administrative decentralisation; it is noted to have aided to reduce bureaucracy in 
implementing health activities. It was explained that decentralisation has made it easier to 
implement a set of plans and objectives, because major decisions are currently made by the 
CHMTs at the council; they do not have to go through the bureaucracy of the MOHW and at the 
regional secretariat. This is noted to have given districts the opportunity to improve the quality of 
health services including reproductive health services. With the district health officer (DMO) 
being an accountable officer with full responsibility and control of health resources to run the 
council health services, resources are readily available and easy to secure. It was also noted that 
decentralisation has improved donor coordination, with a comprehensive district health plan, and 
donors operating in the council, all work together in ensuring what is set out in the plan is 
achieved: 
 
….with decentralisation it has been ease for us (council health management team) to plan and realise 
council health plans…..if we want to go for supervision we now have our own transport …in the past we 
shared transport with other departments and it took long process before you could essentially get a car for 
supervision (CFG, 01). 
 
The council was trying to improve reproductive health service delivery within the decentralised 
context, but inability to hire qualified staff at the health facility level. HRH allocation is still 
controlled by civil the service department under the President‘s office, making it difficult for 
councils to recruit trained personnel according to their needs. It was found that many health 
facilities are managed by medical attendants who are not trained to deliver health services, let 
alone reproductive health services.  
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A criticism from the council participants about administrative decentralisation was on filing the 
empty post. They perceive that decentralisation has had a negative impact on distribution of 
health personnel between urban and rural areas and unfairness in training decisions like 
prohibiting the use of council funds. It was noted that the council is currently facing a shortage of 
staff in the health sector. Available data showed that that overall the council has a deficit of 175 
(51%) of the required HRH personnel. And the available staff had inadequate skills. The deficit 
was higher in the lower cadres where 21% of nursing officers and 13% of clinical officers were 
not available. The council lacks a pharmacist and the position was seconded with unqualified 
personnel (URT, 2011:6). The shortage is triggered by low output of qualified staff, poor 
distribution, poor remuneration, poor infrastructure, lack of attractive retention schemes with 
international migration after training and inter-sectoral movement and/or retraining to other 
disciplines (Musau et al., 2011). This huge deficit threatens the quality of health services 
provided to the communities. It was observed that for the past four years the district did not have 
the services of a gynaecologists and obstetricians. Some of the participants had a view that: 
… I am not against decentralisation, the idea is a good one, but how long does decentralisation take to 
happen? The process is taking a too long to materialise. There is some reversal of the process in terms of 
some council personnel … that‘s one typical example … central authorities claimed decentralisation of the 
human resource personnel was not the best thing for equitable distribution of health personnel. To date we 
have had the same crisis of health personnel, especially in rural councils (CKI–03).  
Another participant commented on a similar issue: 
… Decentralisation came with changes in programs but they never took into consideration the existing 
capacity in terms of human resources. They never cared who is going to provide those services. Staffing is 
a problem as it imposes a heavy workload on the existing staff thereby compromising the quality of 
services provided (CKI-05). 
Repeatedly, concerns of council health managers were related to inadequate competencies of the 
available health care personnel to provide quality of the RHS. Rarely professionals posted in 
remote areas hardly stay even for three months. This was stressed by one of the participants: 
…..the problem with decentralisation is it fails to address the problem of human resources for health crisis 
… the council personnel deficit is about 57%. This implies that existing personnel are overstretched. How 
we can deliver the quality services? (CKI, 04). 
 
It was also noted that shortage of staff affect facility supervision. When the supervision is carried 
out, the CHMTs find it difficult to carry out their supervisory roles when they find the clinics are 
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busy served by one or two personnel. Some assisting the providers with the waiting queue of 
patients and thereafter do their supervision tasks. This decreases time available for the 
supervision and time spent with the providers. But, managers expressed the opposite opinion; 
that health care providers do not appreciate supervision as it is seen as policing activity. One of 
the participants insisted that: 
…..they do not value supervision at all. They see it as labelling, as the policing – they haven‘t seen it in a 
positive way… there is no need to change at all (CKI, 02). 
 
The inability of council to recruits trained and competent personnel has affected the quantity and 
quality of health services provided. Health care providers argued that more investment in 
particular on skilled personnel is important to improve service delivery. Evidence indicates that 
the shortage of skilled staff in health facilities particularly at the dispensaries undermine the 
quality services provided. Health care providers complained understaffing as a fact and that they 
regularly work double shifts: 
There is a critical shortage of staff, for example in our dispensary, we are only two, medical attendant, and 
we have delivery services and other services. We are supposed to take care of all other units in the 
dispensary such as injection, antenatal care, children, and dressings. It is not easy to provide adequate care 
(FKI-07). 
Because of staffing shortages we are forced to work every day …..as well we have few trained experts in 
reproductive health. Really, it is hard work and you are forced to do everything by myself as I am the only 
trained nurse. It is too much work and you don‘t even have time to rest… (FKI-09). 
… Most of the clinics lack qualified staff and they are greatly understaffed … I think there is a need for 
more qualified nurses. Services are provided by attendants who in urban setting are just cleaners. Whom to 
blame in the case of emergency? Women opt for traditional deliveries rather than at facilities since they 
know the providers are not qualified. And at dispensaries there is one member of staff who usually takes all 
responsibility because there is not enough staff. … there is a big staff shortage and I think that makes them 
incompetent to handle all the responsibilities, from the outpatient to antenatal services (CKI-05). 
 
Providers were unhappy with the quality of services they provide. Some of them complained 
bitterly over the poor working environment. They did not appreciate the current status of the 
service. Reproductive health providers at each of the four visited facilities complained about 
poor infrastructure and supporting services including water and electricity, space in the delivery 
room, beds in the maternity ward, sanitation and waste disposal facilities, and transport in case of 
emergency. All this were found to diminish the capacity of health workers to provide women 
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with safe delivery. Health staff revealed that the working space was too small to cope with any of 
the relative during delivery, and frequently referred to the lack of supplies including gloves, 
delivery kits, disinfectants, oxytocin and HIV/AIDS test kits, and family planning injections, 
chlorine and functioning latrines. The two photos below reflect a delivery room in one of the 
visited remote health facility (left), compared to another in a semi-rural facility in a council. 
Privacy and confidentiality of the services were not addressed in most of the facilities. Delivery 
room in a remote health facility (left) compared to another in a semi-rural facility in a case 
council. The following response reflects the providers‘ claims:  
Changing names is not enough, we are seeing new posters are brought from the ministry, this is not our 
claim. We need to be equipped with enough supplies to provide quality care to women. We don‘t have 
wards for post-natal services, delivery beds are of poor quality, water supplies and electricity are not 
available. All this is important for us to improve the quality of our services (FKI-07, FKI-09, and FKI-10).  
 
Photo 7-1: Conditions in the delivery rooms of some of the facility visited  
Source: Field survey, 2011 
 
Communities viewed that health provider as uncaring and not providing quality of care. They felt 
services provided were inadequate and do not meet their health needs. For some, services were 
better in the past than present. There were several comments from community members 
expressing dissatisfaction, as the following narration cemented: 
… … services, like diagnostic services, are not available at our dispensaries … drugs usually are not 
available. Nurses give us prescriptions and direct you to their drug shops but the medicines … I think they 
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are stealing the medicine from the facilities and sell to us through their drug shop … there is nothing we 
can say is changing (C-FGD-03, C-FGD-08).  
…..providers are prescribing without giving us drugs discourage many people from seeking formal health 
care. Spending your money on transport and ending up buying drugs from drug shops does not worth. We 
better serve time by buying drugs from pharmacies (C-FGD-04).  
… Drugs are not available but I wonder why the same provider will direct you where you can buy the same 
drug from a private pharmacy. The government made a mistake to return to the policy of private provision 
of health care. Drugs are transferred from public to private hospitals and pharmacies (C-FGD-01). 
 
7.2.2 Implications on council finance  
The driving force for fiscal decentralisation is to grant council power over the transferred funds 
and raise their own revenues to be able to support their budgets including health. However, the 
findings from the council own sources were inadequate which contributed to less that 3% of the 
total council health spending. The sources of the council health services funding is through 
central transfer. And the finding has shown that resources allocated to supports councils‘ health 
needs have never been adequate. The government provides a ceiling point which the council‘s 
health plan has to budget within that limit. This implies that councils are given boundaries on 
how much they can budget for. They must abide to the ceiling points because this is one of the 
criteria for the assessment of their health plans before it is approved by the MoHSW. One 
participant commented that: 
 Basically councils might have more health care needs than those planned for. But our resources are 
constrained, and then there must be a limit on how much can be allocated to councils. MoHSW cannot 
allow each council to plant without budget ceiling points (NKI, 02).  
 
Central transfers frequently come with delays in the disbursement of funds The CHMT were 
claimed that the implementation of health service activities sometimes delayed because of the 
excessive delays over funds from the central government, particularly basket funds: 
It happens we receive the first quota of the funding at the time we were supposed to receive the second or 
the third quota. This affects very much the implementation of health service as some of the planned 
activities are delayed to start or shifted to following quarter of other the year (FGD, 02) 
 
As well, there are some positive contribution of the fiscal decentralisation including increased 
autonomy in local resource mobilisation and utilisation, as illustrated by the council health 
mangers. The following quotations reflect their views:  
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With decentralisation council can solicit funds to improve district health delivery. For example last year 
council held stakeholders meeting to solicit fund to construct council hospital. We secure some funds to 
start up the construction by 2013 e. The hospital shall reduce the distance barrier   (CKI-06).  
council decided to allocate funds to build houses for health workers. We told the councillors if they don‘t 
have accommodation facilities for  providers, it won‘t help since it is too remote in some villages with poor 
housing condition for providers to rent … I know one of the villages built a house for their providers 
through their own efforts … this is encouraging (CKI-08).  
 
Some of the participants interviewed consider fiscal decentralisation of reproductive health 
services to be good. However, one of the council health managers expressed the opinion that the 
preventive and promotive aspects of reproductive health would be better managed centrally: 
Preventive services responsibilities should be re-centralised because out there is direct attention and 
therefore pull in resources…if you have somebody central that is now responsible for making sure that 
those programmes are going on and those programmes will go on irrespective of anything else that happens 
(FKI, 04). 
 
Purchasing of contraceptives should remain centralised for better negations and to guarantee the 
availability of the service. If decentralised, council may persuaded to divert funds to purchase 
antibiotics that are needed for urgent use; following the thinking that contraceptives are not life-
saving and the patient can come back for it: 
If purchasing of contraceptives left to the council…..they would rather buy antibiotics than to buy Depo 
Provera because they are in immediate use to serve lives. Whereas somebody comes in for contraceptive, 
they can still come back without any impact. If someone with fever misses the drugs means s/he is going to 
die next morning (FKI, 05) 
 
In the community discussions, majority of the participants contended that the effect of the fiscal 
decentralisation was the introduction of the user while seeking public health care. Others 
appreciate improvement in health services delivery. The following quotations reflect their views:  
… we really see changes in our healthcare system. Health services are no longer free of charge; we are now 
paying for the services otherwise you must enrol to the community health insurance fund to access the 
public health services (C-FGD, 08). 
…I saw some changes related to the way we access services compared to the past. We now have our own 
facilities at our localities. Services are closer when compared to past, when we used to walk up to 40 
kilometres to access health services (C-FGD-01, C-FGD-04).  
The community views concluded that poor availability of medicines is a major problem in the 
health sector, thus, affecting accessibility. The poor quality of services can also explained by the 
low financial priority given to the health sector. Decentralisation affects local funding 
availability for health care spending as council own sources have been limited.  
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Funding for the reproductive health was included within essential health service packages, and 
inclusion is based on criteria driven by principles of cost effectiveness and disease burden rather 
than on need. It was found few components of the reproductive health were allocated funds. The 
assumption is that most of the RHS components such as family planning were funded through 
vertical program. Thus, CHMT did not allocate funds for the most of the reproductive health 
interventions. Detailed analysis of RHS funding has been provided in chapter 6. 
 
7.2.3 Implications on local decision making and community participation  
Political decentralisation was analysed based on its effects on local decision-making concerning 
priority setting while allocating resources and community participation. Findings show that some 
of the health managers did not feel empowered to set priorities according to local needs or to 
take autonomous management decisions. It was found that involvement of reproductive health 
coordinators were limited. It was found that observed council reproductive and child health 
coordinator (RCHCo) hardly participate in the district health planning and priority setting 
processes. Principally, they are not a member of councils‘ health planning they are neither 
represented in the council health planning team (CHPT). They are not invited into full council 
meetings where the council‘s health budget is decided. This limits their participation and 
opportunities to understand what has been approved for the RHS budget. Generally, RCHCo 
were facing restrictions on influencing priority setting procedures. One of the participants 
explained: 
RCHCo prepare plans and send them to CHMT to be included in the comprehensive council health plans. 
The CHMT passes through the suggested plan from RCHCo. Depending on how much money is available, 
some of the RHS interventions can be included and others will not. Very often, many of the RH 
interventions that are important like promotional services are not included in the final council health plan. 
The CHMT favours health plans that are coming from their unit (CKI, 06).. 
 
The involvement of the communities to set their own health priorities was not very limited as the 
governance structures which are supposed to represent communities were not functioning. When 
functioning, their roles were to mobilise communities in the enrolment to the CHF than 
organisation forums for communities to air their voices. Thus, the assumptions that the council 
health priorities would be a reflection of community needs has not been realised in the case of 
Tanzania. The established health management structures has failed to facilitate the participation 
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of the local communities in setting health priorities and decision making related to health. And 
women who face the most serious reproductive health problems are not well represented in the 
council deliberations. Hence, decisions on which public health services should receive funding 
are mainly decided by the CHMTs. 
 
Views about the impact of political decentralisation on RHS some participants appreciate the 
positive outcome while others criticised the process. There were those who believed that services 
were improving as communities are their partners in enhancing service delivery. Providers 
contented that communities were involvement with the patients care before and after discharging 
from the facilities. Providers encouraged traditional birth attendants to escort pregnant women to 
the facilities for delivery, especially those who stayed far from the clinics. This kind of 
participation was taken as a positive impact.  The quotation below reflect some of their views: 
…….decentralisation has improved some areas of RHS including reduction of the maternal mortality. 
Communities are our partners; we encourage them to escort mothers to the facilities than past where 
women were taken to traditional birth attendants Without community support  may be number of maternal 
deaths could be much higher (CKI-03, CKI-05).  
Some of the community members come and report at the facilities a health problem in their locality. For 
example, there was a man who used to provide services and was not a medical expert. They report and we 
followed up and we took the man to court (FKI-06).  
… In the case of women who need ambulance services, one of the community members calls us and asks 
for help. If we are in a position to help we help. If we don‘t have fuel we ask them to contribute for their 
patient to access the hospital (FKI-04). 
 
In some instance providers, think that planning and management of the health service activities is 
sole responsibilities of health experts. Thus; communities cannot take part during planning 
process. One of the participants insisted that: 
Some of the health care providers are preoccupied with the idea that community members do not know 
their health needs and priorities because they are less skilled and knowledgeable about health issues (FKI, 
03). 
However, some of the providers appreciate the improved physical access to health services that 
has come with decentralisation. Government‘s goal of having a facility in each village brings 
health services closer to the communities:  
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I think decentralisation brings services closer to the communities … People are coming in, they are no 
longer staying home. They are using the facilities more than in the past, when women used to deliver with 
traditional birth attendants … I can see those who can access the facilities use modern services (FKI-08). 
In the community group discussions some members had mixed reactions about the changes in 
RHS as a result of decentralisation. Some had thought services are not improving, while others 
were supportive of the changes. Their views depended on the level in which service was 
accessed. Those who accessed the health centres said there are some improvements but those 
who accessed the dispensary level claims the service were poor. Those who appreciated the 
changes related that the improvement also came with the availability of drugs when they visited 
the facility. Those who complained about the services as only prescriptions were provided 
without medication. With regard to RHS, some participants claimed that women were charged 
fees for the ANC cards which were supposed to be free of charge. Some had decided on self-
medication using traditional herbs or purchasing drugs from shops without consultations as they 
trust with the system has varnished. Table 7-6 summarised the views of the participants about the 
implications of decentralisation on RHS delivery in Tanzania. 
 
7.3.3 Decentralisation and its impact on reproductive health services 
In this study, communities were the key judges of the impact of decentralisation in relation to the 
health services that they have been received from the facilities. In group discussions, community 
members had mixed reactions about the changes in health services. Some thought they were 
worse off, while other were supportive of the changes. Their views differed depending on the 
level of access to care. Those who accessed health centres said there was some improvement, 
while those who accessed dispensaries claimed poor quality of the services. In many instances, 
communities referred to the introduction of the fee for service as a major change in service 
delivery. Those who appreciated the changes related the improvement in the quality of health 
services with the availability of drugs and the use of the revenues collected through the user fees 
for the rehabilitation of the facilities. In some villages, residents complained that they only got 
prescriptions from the facilities. Some participants added that, women were charged fees for the 
ANC cards. It was added that some of the villagers had decided on self-medication using 
traditional herbs or purchasing drugs from shops without consultations.  
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It was observed that all eight focus group discussions mentioned service charging as a major 
change in health services delivery. Although they appreciated the availability of services like 
antenatal clinics, they wanted these to be free of charge despite irregularities. 
… we really see changes in our healthcare system. Health services are no longer free of charge, we are now 
paying for the services (C-FGD, 08). 
Other participants appreciated some of the changes: 
To be honest I saw some changes related to the way we access services compared to the past. We now have 
our own facilities at our localities. Services are closer when compared to past, when we used to walk up to 
40 kilometres to access health services (C-FGD-01, C-FGD-04).  
At clinics we receive all the services under one roof unless you need to go for laboratory tests. This makes 
the services convenient to us. In the past we had a different unit for family planning (C-FGD-03).  
There were some divergences in attitudes between health providers and communities. Service 
providers and facility managers felt that the community was often demanding from them what 
was beyond their capacities: 
We are just doing what we can within our capacities … the communities thought that we are selling their 
drugs … We are just workers and other functions are out of our control. For example, drugs stock-outs; we 
usually place the order at the national medical store, and they just deliver what they deliver without 
considering our needs. When the clients come and we tell them we don‘t have stock they think we hide the 
drugs (C-FGD-11).  
 
Oppositely, communities viewed that health provider were uncaring and not providing quality of 
care. They felt services provided were not inadequate and do not meet their health needs. For 
some, services were better in the past than present. There were several comments from 
community members expressing dissatisfaction, as the following narration cemented: 
We walk long distances to the facilities with someone who is very sick and the providers will tell you go to 
the hospital. If you asked for the ambulance they will tell you that the ambulance is not there. In most of the 
clinics you always find that the drugs are not available. In the past drugs were available … we wonder what 
went wrong (C-FGD-14).  
….....usually the clinics open at eight, but they don‘t start right away and their closing time depends on who 
is on the roster that day, some providers turn people home and say the clinic is closed even though it is 
working hours. Others they close and go to do business at the local markets, as we meet them there (C-
FGD-12).  
… some of the services, like diagnostic services, are not available at our dispensaries … drugs usually are 
not available. Nurses give us prescriptions and direct you to their drug shops but the medicines … I think 
they are stealing the medicine from the facilities and sell to us through their drug shop … there is nothing 
we can say – it is changing with regard to service delivery (C-FGD-03, C-FGD-08).  
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I think this trend of doctors prescribing medication discourages many people from seeking health care. 
Spending the whole day and ending up buying drugs? People are buying drugs from the pharmacy without 
consulting healthcare providers (C-FGD-04). 
… Drugs are not available but I wonder why the same provider will direct you where you can buy the same 
drug from a private pharmacy. The government made a mistake to return to the policy of private provision 
of health care. Drugs are transferred from public to private hospitals and pharmacies (C-FGD-01).  
In an emergency situation, ambulances were available; however, delays in response hindered the 
reliability of the services. The concern was to improve access to ambulance services: 
We can wait for an ambulance but in the end they say there is no fuel. Hence the women end up giving 
birth at home and sometimes if the traditional birth attendants cannot handle the case you hear she died (C-
FGD-13).  
 
Despite of the efforts in the expansion of services closer to communities, in some places services 
were not available. In rural communities, public transport is important to access health facilities. 
There was a concern about transportation, especially during rainy season, when roads were not 
passable. This hinders access to healthcare facilities despite having ambulance services. This was 
noted during discussions with the community group: 
… Most of us who are living in the rural areas have problems with transport, even the ambulance is not 
coming to our places because of the poor roads. We asked for the government to improve the roads for our 
communities to be accessible. Sometimes you might have money to hire a private car, but they won‘t come 
to places because of poor roads (FKI-05). 
To reach clinics one needs to use transport … and in our area transport is a problem. Our roads are so 
rough. The mobile clinic comes once per month … all other days, if a woman needs services she has to 
walk or hire a motor cycle to the nearest clinic. This costs money and some people don‘t have money and 
some women decide to walk … others give birth on the road (C-FGD-14). 
The quality of services was not impressive, facilities lack basic supplies such as disinfectants 
gloves, test kits, anti-malaria drugs and some had only one delivery bed in poor conditions. One 
of women shared her delivery experience:  
I was in a labour room where there was only one nurse. And we were four expecting women and 
the labour pains started with two of us while the nurse was alone with one delivery bed. She 
assisted both of us at the same time. I thank God it went well. I don‘t know how she will manage 
if the case becomes complicated. Thus, since then I never go for facility delivery (C-FDG-06).  
Access to hospital was mentioned to be a problem, especially in case of referral. The council 
lacks a district hospital; hence referral had to be made at the regional hospital, which is far from 
the users (75+ km). Community members said they would like to have a hospital closer: 
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… we must travel to Dodoma regional hospital in the case of referral … it is better to have a hospital in our 
location. Transport cost is a problem to many of us … this has made some women opt for home deliveries 
when referral is given, especially teen mothers during their first birth, which they call a risky pregnancy (C-
FGD-11). 
There were disagreements regarding the improvement of the quality of services. Those who 
access health centres said there had been some improvements, while those who access the 
dispensary claimed services were still of poor quality. The FGDs (eight) agreed that quality had 
not yet been achieved, despite some improvements. The lack of drugs, test kits and injections 
were mentioned to affect service utilisation. 
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Table 7-6: Implications of decentralisation for reproductive health services in Tanzania 
Element of  health systems  Unintended consequences  Implication for the RHS  
Financing of services •Resource allocation  
based on central transfers accompanied 
with delays in disbursement  
• Curative care bias of the council 
spending not addressed. 
• Under funding of preventive 
reproductive health care; and 
• Council authority did not invest 
in RH priority areas such as family 
planning  
Human resources  •Low motivation  of health care 
personnel 
• More workload increased for the 
frontline personnel. 
•Inadequate training and supportive 
supervision  
• Health care providers were 
unable to meet the RH care needs 
of the communities and 
• Quality of RHS adversely 
affected; 
Local participation and 
accountability  
• health committees Local representation 
for communities in decision-making and 
health planning was not functioning  
•Capacities of the health committees to 
influence health decisions and priorities 
is limited  
• Limited voice from the 
communities in decisions taken on 
RHS 
•Limited voices form the 
reproductive  health coordinator in 
council priority setting process   
Quality of care •Under funding of RHS, low personnel 
morale, increase in workload of the 
health care providers; 
•Cuts for training; and 
• Supervision by CHMT is inadequate • 
• Negative implications for 
quality of health drugs, test kit are 
not available ; 
• Reproductive health care 
skills weakened; and 
• No clinical support for devolved 
health personnel  
Source: Compiled by author  
 
7.5 Chapter discussion and conclusion 
The findings presented shows that, to some extent there are some linkages between dimensions 
of decentralisation process and health services delivery was evident in this chapter. Nevertheless 
the scarcity of evidence, in this chapter highlights that the numerous potential benefits posed by 
decentralisation may not always materialise. Interpreting the theoretical concepts of 
decentralisation into practice; presents a number of challenges to both central and local 
government levels. In the fulfilment of the ICPD promises in the context of decentralisation is an 
extra challenge, since the ICPD also necessitates RHS to undergo a particular re-orientation and 
restructuring. 
Since reproductive health is concerned with access to high quality RHS care it is likely for 
decentralisation to advance these ideas by enhancing decision-making power at local level. In in 
this chapter it was possible to establish improved access to reproductive health services as a 
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result of local innovation as well as increased discretion over financing and use of resources at 
local level. For example, the case of construction of the maternity waiting homes as a result 
jointly efforts of the council and communities. This provides an opportunity for women to access 
facility delivery. 
 
Though some of the experiences drawn in this chapter are not specific to reproductive health, it 
is reasonable to assume that decentralisation has the potential to enhance access to reproductive 
health services. But, this is only if mechanisms to ensure resource allocation are deliberately 
established, including improving on human resources and finances redistribution among the key 
health interventions as identified in national health package for essential service delivery. As 
well, in advancing the comprehensive package for RHS by expanding the scope of RHS that is 
defined in NPERCHI into primary health care package that include RH component is important. 
Allocation of fund to finance that package may be essential to safeguard provision of 
comprehensive RH at the facilities. The CHMTs are currently facing a challenge of harmonising 
a comprehensive definition of RH that is identified in national polices into the reality of selective 
intervention that is implemented at the facilities. 
 
The fact is that reproductive health services have to compete for funding with other health 
intervention priorities at council level during planning. An excessive advocacy is required to 
ensure reproductive health issues are retained on the decision-making agenda. In this regard, 
reproductive health coordinators should be part of the planning team at all levels to ensure RH 
issues to reach the decision making organs.  
Reproductive health indicators of the case council support the Richey (2008) argument that 
women‘s reproductive health in Tanzania is a ―by-product of the state initiatives towards 
fulfilling the international agenda and not attempting to intervene in women‘s health and well-
being‖ (Richey, 2008:12). The ideology attached to reproductive health has always been 
provision of family planning services to regulate population control than provision of 
comprehensive packages of RHS as advocated at the ICPD. This was reflected in council 
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reproductive health indicators mainly focused on safe motherhood initiatives. There is a gap 
between RHS components specified at policy documents and components available at facilities 
which compromise the individual choices in particular the long term family planning services. 
 
In Tanzania, decentralisation has impacted on the supply chain of family planning delivery. 
Following decentralisation, it was found that authority and the roles and responsibilities for 
supply chain management were not clarified between different levels of government. Thus, 
facility managers and health management structures did not know who was responsible for 
overseeing the various supply functions. As well, skilled workers were not available at council 
and facility levels to manage the contraceptive supply chain. Thus, decentralisations disrupt 
contraceptive commodities and reduce visibility of family planning in council health plans. Thus 
contraceptive stock outs were not replaced following decentralisation (Pile and Simbakalia, 
2006). 
 
The premise of decentralisation, to make health packages more responsive to local needs and 
allow a greater sense of local ownership than centralised programmes, is far from the reality in 
the case of Tanzania. For decentralisation to be responsive to service RH needs, localities must 
be in a position to express their reproductive health needs directly through community 
participation or indirectly through councillors and/ or health committees. This is to ensure their 
RHS needs reach the council health managers during planning and to enhance accountability in 
service delivery. Additionally, local decision-makers lack reliable health information and 
knowledge of reproductive health. This impedes their ability to identify interventions that are 
urgently needed by communities. Thus, the contribution of decentralisation to reproductive 
health is the improvement of the health system performance that will enhance improvement of 
the RHS (Leslie et al., 2007), in case of Tanzania it looks like decentralisation has not able to do 
so. 
Some of the participants at the communities expressed their doubts about the effectiveness and 
outcome of decentralisation. Whether communities could be judges of the health sector 
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decentralisation, it is fair to consider their opinions which are embedded into their conceptual 
feelings. This is important to be assessed systematically and critically so that measures can be 
taken to make daunting communities to cooperate toward making decentralisation policy 
success. Community willingness to participate through user fees and CHF was seen to be 
positive with regard to local resource mobilisation. Yet the communities lack control over those 
funds. This was reflected in the allegations against the CHF and user fee schemes that had failed 
to complement local health services delivery like purchasing of stocks out supplies. This made 
the communities to have low trust towards health care providers and health committees. 
 
Basically, the quality of the reproductive health care in the many of the visited facilities in 
particular dispensaries are of poor quality. Both health providers and health care users 
experienced poor quality working environments and caring in the health facilities. This has made 
the women to bypass the primary facilities and to look for the care at higher levels. But the 
challenge has been to the majority of women who cannot afford even the transport cots to access 
the higher level services. This finding is similar to other studies which shows that women are not 
satisfied with the reproductive health services delivery care because of staff attitudes, lack of 
privacy and high costs for supplies, which women have to bring when delivering in a health 
facility(Mselle et al., 2013, Kruk et al., 2014, Kruk et al., 2009a, Kruk et al., 2009b, Duysburgh 
et al., 2013, Nyamtema et al., 2012). Investing in improved quality of care in primary care 
facilities may improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the health system in providing 
improved reproductive health services. 
 
As well, the quality of reproductive health services provides also depended on availability of the 
skilled professionals to deliver the required services. As the case council had a deficit of 50% of 
the health care personnel it is obvious quality of care is severely compromised. Thus, more 
trained staff need to be deployed with a focus on expanding coverage in remote and underserved 
areas. Studies have documented that providing adequate salary and incentive packages attract 
and retain qualified health staff in rural facilities (Manzi et al., 2012, Djibuti et al., 2008, Gerein 
et al., 2006, WHO, 2009). Therefore, substantial improvements in reproductive health services in 
251 
 
rural council can be realised through improving health system performance. Addressing shortage 
of trained health care personnel through professional development including supervision and 
training could increase provider‘s self-confidence and self-esteem of and may contribute to 
retention of skilled professionals (Van Dormael et al., 2008). A review of decentralisation in 
Asia revealed that decentralisation failed as a result of inadequate training of professionals. This 
led to negative impact on human and technical skills for reproductive health services delivery 
(McIntyre and Klugman, 2003). 
 
In Philippines by Lakshminarayanan‘s study in 2003 found that, following decentralisation local 
governments did not prioritise reproductive health hence decrease financial resources for the 
services. Local government were not prepared to deliver family planning. While contraceptives 
were provided by the central government; some of the local government denied family planning 
services due to religious beliefs. Furthermore, the poorest local government authorities suffered 
severely because of decentralisation. This was caused by inadequate finance resources allocated 
and their restricted ability to generate own income. Thus, economically better-off local 
authorities achieve better the increased responsibilities brought by decentralisation. While the 
poor local authorities were constrained by the new added demands of decentralisation 
(Lakshminarayanan, 2003b). Thus, there were different levels of RHS delivery among local 
authorities which adversely affected health equity. In Mexico, states health managers did not 
improve FP service provision and contraceptives as a priority (Beith et al., 2006). Many states 
did not allocate funds for the family planning commodities due to lack of commitments. 
 
In conclusion, health sector decentralisation was designed to improve quality of the health 
service delivery, including reproductive health. However in this chapter, findings have shown 
that decentralisation do not always achieve its stated theoretical benefits. Service organisation 
reform has proved to be a failure when is implemented without prior training of the local 
government officials and health care providers. This slow implementation of the key reform 
components such as involving communities in identifying their health needs. The study calls for 
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understanding of the health sector decentralisation as a basic ingredient for the successful 
implementation.  
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Abbreviations for Chapter 8  
CHMTs Council health management teams  
DPs  Development partners  
HFCs   Health facility committees 
HIV/AIDS Human immunodeficiency virus/Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome 
ICPD   International Conference on Population and Development  
LGAs   Local government authorities  
MoHSW Ministry of Health and Social Welfare  
PMO-RALG  Prime Minister‘s Office – Regional Administration and Local Government  
PO-PSM  President‘s Office – Public Services Management 
MoFEA Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs  
RHMT  Regional Health Management Team  
RH  Reproductive health  
RHS  Reproductive health services  
URT  United Republic of Tanzania  
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme 
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund 
WHO  World Health Organisation 
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CHAPTER 8 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
8.1 Introduction  
This chapter provides an overview of the main points that have emerged from the research. The 
trend towards health sector decentralisation in Tanzania has been supported by donors as a key 
strategy to break the tendency of the central control on local public service provision, and as a 
response towards the neoliberal economic policies that encourage health system reforms since 
the 1980s. In Tanzania, the decentralisation of government/ public sector has led to the 
decentralisation of health service, with the aim of bringing greater efficiency in health care 
delivery. The national decentralisation policy of 1998 proposed significant institutional changes 
to support decentralisation changes which were expected to transfer fiscal and administrative 
powers to locally accountable local government authorities (LGAs) that could be sanctioned by 
the communities. 
 
The aim of this study was to analyse the impact of the three dimensions of decentralisation on 
reproductive health services (RHS). The assumptions made were that (i) higher autonomy of 
LGAs in decision-making on council resources led to a better match of resources and local 
needs, and (ii) better matching of local health needs and local public spending increase 
accountability and hence improves RHS delivery. The findings in this thesis show that 
decentralisation is progressing, but not according to its vision. It was found out LGAs have 
limited local autonomy over fiscal and human resources. The thesis argues that all the three 
dimensions of decentralisation, that is, political, fiscal and administrative powers are essential for 
the successful implementation of decentralisation. Thus, in judging the impact of decentralisation 
LGAs should practice the assumed decentralised power.  
 
The decentralised power was measured using a modified decision space (Table 8-1). The results 
indicate that the Tanzanian health sector is more centrally managed which limits the LGAs 
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decision space on the devolved functions. The allocations for financial resources and 
management of human resources are centrally controlled which resulted in no decision space for 
the decentralised agents (LGAs). Narrow decision space was created in the service organisation 
functions like priority setting process, with limited decision space created health governance. 
 
The current trend of decentralisation in Tanzania reveals that, while the key responsibilities for 
health care delivery has shifted from the central Ministry of Health and Social Welfare to the 
LGAs and further to the health facilities, it has been done with limited transfer of administrative, 
and fiscal authority. This propose Tanzania is implementing a deconcentration form of 
decentralisation than the advocated for devolution, as the transfer of responsibilities of decision-
making in the key functional areas has remained mostly centralised. Thus, the benefits of 
decentralisation like improved reproductive health outcomes are likely to be limited. This is 
elaborated in the next section which presents summaries of the key findings on the current status 
of the health sector decentralisation in Tanzania. Further analysis was carried out to see how 
decentralisation has impacted on the delivery of health services including reproductive health.  
 
8.2 How much power has transferred to local government authorities? 
The decision on what model of decentralisation the health sector should adopt depends on the 
country‘s contextual issues, objectives, political vision and the actual needs of the citizens. In 
defining the form of decentralisation which is found in practice, the key question is, who has 
more choices over the decentralised functions (Bossert, 2004). Is it the council health managers, 
or facility managers or services users? How much choice do they have/ how big is the decision 
space? Basically, the form of decentralisation found in practice influence decision space found at 
the level of implementation and therefore how LGAs can deliver their roles (Mills, 1990). For 
real decentralisation to be realised decentralised ―functions are supposed to be performed by the 
council itself‖ and not otherwise (Mills, 1990:11). 
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Decentralisation basically implies expansion of local choices. Decision space defines various 
functions and activities in which LGAs have increased their choice through decentralisation. 
Table (8-1) presents a matrix map of decision space over devolved health functions. The vertical 
axis represents a series of functional areas in which expanded choice can occur and the 
horizontal axis represents an estimate of the range of choices or discretions, which are defined as 
narrow, moderate or wide for a given function. The assumption of decision space is that 
performance of LGAs in executing new functions depends on decision space open for each 
function. Thus, decision space is used to analyse three important elements of decentralisation, 
namely, (i) amount of choice transferred from central government to LGAs, (ii) decisions local 
officials make with their increased choices and (iii) the effects of the choices on the performance 
of the health system (Bossert, 1998). 
 
Tanzania‘s health sector decentralisation policy is based on a public administrative approach that 
adopts four different forms of decentralisation: de-concentration, delegation, devolution and 
privatisation. In each forms of decentralisation significant authority and responsibilities remain at 
the national government. In some cases, a shift from less to more radical forms of 
decentralisation redefines the functional responsibilities in a way that the CG level retains policy 
making and monitoring roles and the LGAs advance operational responsibility and management.  
 
A number of policy reform initiatives were undertaken by the government to improve health 
system performance. The current decentralisation policy was guided by sector devolution after 
the adoption of local government reform paper in 1998. The findings show that, at the very least, 
decentralisation has taken place although the LGAs power over the key functions for service 
delivery is limited. The deconcentrated system usually restricts decision space for the LGAs. The 
results suggest that the current decentralisation reforms do not fit well to the evaluation criteria 
of the well-designed decentralisation systems. Thus, the most important question is whether such 
limited decision space can produce the intended benefits of decentralisation of improving health 
outcomes such as reproductive health. The sections presented below summarise the key findings 
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from the documentary review, council key informant interview and community discussion about 
how much did they feel they had over decentralised functions.  
Table 8-1: Decision space of Council decentralised functions 
 Range of choices  
  Narrow Moderate Wide 
Function No choice     
Finance 
Source of revenues 
 
Allocation expenditures 
Income from the fees 
CHMT and facilities depend entirely on 
central transfers  
High % earmarked by MoHSW & MoFEA 
Determine by legislation but the CHMT has 
power to set the fee prices according to their 
local context 
√ 
 
√ 
 
 
 
√ 
 
 
 
Human resources 
Salaries  
Contracts  
Civil services 
Determine by PO-PSM 
Determine by PO-PSM except for the lower 
cradles of personnel 
Determine by PO-PSM 
√ 
√ 
 
√ 
  
Health governance  
Management structures -health 
boards and committees  
Community participation and 
accountability  
 
Prioritisation of service  
Service package  
 
Defined by legislation 
 
Size and composition of the boards and 
committees are defined by the legislation  
 
Centrally defined priority services  
Basic service package is centrally defined by 
the MoHSW but Flexibility is allowed to 
add local priority 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
 
 
 
 
√ 
 
 
Source: Field survey, 2011.  
 
8.2.1 Fiscal decentralisation and council health care delivery 
The local government policy paper of 1998 states clearly that the goals fiscal decentralisation in 
Tanzania based on a definition of the principles of financial discretionary powers that gives 
authority to LGAs to raise local revenues, and that the central government has an obligation to 
supply LGAs with sufficient unconditional grants (URT, 1998a). However, the findings 
demonstrate that council do not sufficient and consistent own sources of revenues that could be 
used to support the delivery of reproductive health services. At current, LGAs are not permitted 
to have substantial own sources of revenues as well as autonomy to determine their health 
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expenditures. The permitted sources of revenue in particular rural councils cannot contribute 
significantly to supporting health service delivery (Masaki, 2015). 
 
The evidence presented in chapter 6 revealed that there are some benefits of decentralisation, 
including increasing accessibility of central resources through intergovernmental transfer. The 
LGAs are often financially incapable of providing basic public services without support from the 
central government (Masaki, 2013). Thus, central transfer has improved the capacity of the 
LGAs to provide quality public services to their citizens (Caldeira and Rota-Graziosi 2014). In 
Tanzania LGAs own resources are less than  10% of the total spending which is insufficient to 
support public services delivery including health care. Under this condition, central transfer is 
important to provide quality public services. However, the challenge is that CG funding has been 
mainly for the personnel emoluments based on available number of staff employed in each LGA. 
This has led to very unequal resource allocation among councils as urban LGAs receive higher 
level of funding since they can attract more personnel than rural councils which also have high 
turnover of health care personnel (Sikika, 2010). 
 
The current challenge to fiscal decentralisation make the LGAs health services entirely depend 
on inter-governmental transfer. These grants are inadequate to support local health needs and 
priorities. Councils are given budget conditions, including a ceiling point on the allocation of the 
health budget. Usually, central government delays to disburse the funds which make it difficult 
for LGAs to provide adequate health service on time. Such delays are partly attributed to the late 
submission of  the LGAs technical and financial reports to donors before the realising of funds 
(PMO-RALG, 2008). At the facility level, no financial information exists and managers cannot 
speak about their budget. Similar findings have been noted in other studies in Tanzania which 
found that councils depend on central government grants for more than 90% of their budgets and 
that such grants are accompanied by strict and conditional guidelines, directives and instructions 
(Mollel, 2010, Frumence et al., 2014a, Venugopal and Yilmaz, 2010, Kessy and McCourt, 2010, 
Tidemand and Sola, 2010b).  
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The case of Tanzania is similar to other studies that have been carried in Africa. In Africa, most 
LGAs are highly dependent on financial support from the CG to perform their day-to-day 
activities including administrative and public service delivery (Masaki, 2013). Gideon and 
Alouis (2013: 234) highlight that ―over reliance on external revenue sources increases the 
supremacy of the central government on local authority, reducing them to mere talking shops 
without finance to implement their decisions‘ A study from the United Nations on fiscal 
decentralisation in Africa shares a similar view:  
The financial dependence of the Local authorities upon the centre...breeds an unhealthy reliance upon the 
government, forcing local authorities to look to the centre for advice and direction even on the smallest 
matters. It reverses the direction of accountability, making local authorities less responsive to the demands 
of their paymasters (United Nations Human Settlements Programme 2002, 6) 
 
A study in Uganda found that, central government transferred insufficient funds for the districts 
to implement their health plans. At the same time districts lacked reliable local sources to 
generate resources to support the execution of the health plans (Jeppsson, 2001). A study carried 
out in Ghana on the barriers to the implementation of the health sector administrative 
decentralisation found out that the lack of adequate financial resources was the main challenge 
facing health decentralisation (Sakyi et al., 2011). 
 
In other circumstances fiscal decentralisation has seen improving equity in the allocation of the 
healthcare funds (Bossert et al., 2003a, Bossert et al., 2003b, Bossert and Beauvais, 2002, 
Bossert and Mitchell, 2011). Faguet (2004) analysed the fiscal decentralisation reform in Bolivia 
in 1994. The findings show that decentralisation doubled the share of public revenues allocated 
to municipalities and expanded their expenditure responsibilities. In addition; decentralisation 
was associated with a high increase in local public investment in education and health. These 
investments were more responsive to the local needs (Faguet, 2004). Similarly, Kis-Katos& 
Sjahrir (2014) found that expenditure decentralisation to sub-governments in Indonesia has led to 
higher investments in public infrastructures in districts with lower levels of infrastructure. After 
decentralisation, large parts of education, health, and infrastructure exclusively became the 
obligation of the local authorities hence they  started to invest more in these sectors (Kis-Katos 
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and Suharnoko Sjahrir, 2014). These results support the Oates (1972) and Besley & Coate (2003) 
arguments that suggest there are some opportunities from decentralisation.  
In Tanzania fiscal decentralisation changes are targeted to improve equity in resource allocation 
by using a formula-based allocation for the recurrent grant and the local government capital 
development grant (LGCDG) (MoFEA, 2010). The ineffectiveness use of the formula was due 
more to its population criteria than the health needs. For instance, the population of a council has 
a weight of 70% in the formula for allocation of health sector block grant, (MoFEA, 2013b). As 
populations are not always homogenous, health needs differ from one locality to another. The 
efficiency use of the formula can be improved if the health needs of the localities could be 
included. One of the health manager participants insisted that: 
… Despite use of the formula, some LGAs are disadvantageous due to its geographical location and 
population. Having small population doesn‘t mean health needs are less. It‘s better to allocate resources 
according to the needs than population criteria (CKI-04). 
 
A study on the use of the formula-based allocation of resources carried by Ministry of Finance 
(2013) in Tanzania shows that its use has been declined considerably. The mention reason is that, 
the formula is not well-known at the council level and does not reflect a rational and equitable 
allocation of resources. Another country study conducted by Sikika (2011) in 122 councils 
revealed that formula allocation for the health resources has not been applied efficiently. 
Furthermore, formula allocation of drugs to the health facilities has not been used. Facilities with 
a large numbers of clients received relatively fewer resources for drugs compared to those with 
smaller numbers of clients Another study done conducted by the National Audit Office on the 
application of the formula to the health sector revealed inefficiencies on its use. The formula fails 
to link to the actual workload or performance of each health facility or local burden of disease 
(BoD) or poverty indicators (URT, 2008b). Likewise the study conducted by Policy Forum in 
(2010), found out that allocation formula has not consistently been applied in the allocation of 
the health resources. This led to inequities in health funds allocation among the LGAs (PF, 2010, 
MoFEA, 2010). 
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Another challenge for the decentralisation is the untimely disbursement of funds from the CG 
and insufficient funds limiting LGAs‘ capacity to provide adequate public services. The same 
claim has been made by other country studies including (Frumence et al., 2012, Frumence et al., 
2014a, Tidemand and Sola, 2010b, Per-Tidemand and Jamal, 2010). Likewise in Ghana, Kojo 
(2011) study observed that lack of adequate financial resources was among of the challenges to 
the effective implementation of the health sector decentralisation. In Uganda, Jeppsson and 
Okuonzi (2002) found that central government transferred insufficient funds to the districts to 
implement the health responsibilities that had been transferred to them, while the districts did not 
have adequate and reliable local sources to generate additional resources to support the execution 
of health services.  
 
In Tanzania funding for the RHS is funded within the general public funding for primary health 
care services. The analysis of the policy documents shows that RHS is stated as a priority both at 
national and council levels. Yet, the proportional of national budget that is allocated for RHS has 
constantly remained at average of 1% of the total health expenditure in the FY 2011/12 
(Mungure and Owaga, 2014). This limited number of RHS that are provided at the facilities. The 
council shows clearly that unmet needs for families were not addressed as many of the facilities 
could only offer limited services like dispensing pills. Women‘s preference was on injections and 
implants which were available during outreach services through mobile clinics. In summary two 
main factors influence the utilisation of the available RHS: namely that service users do not trust 
the reproductive health care providers due to in-competencies, and the quality of the services 
provided.  
 
Inadequate funding impacted on the general supplies of the drugs and other commodities like test 
kits among others. There were community complains about persistent shortage of drugs and 
supplies have been reported from the facilities. Facility managers criticised the collection of 
funds through user fees. In addition community health insurance schemes are not well utilised to 
improve health services. They complained that that they did not have the power to utilise the 
funds they collected according to facility priority needs. This discouraged them as they are the 
ones who are collecting the money from the services users and which are then sent to the council 
headquarters. When funds are needed to address facility problems, the providers fail to retrieve 
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them back because of the bureaucratic procedures. This is similar to the previous studies that 
have been conducted in Tanzania which found that facility managers failed to retrieve back 
locally collected funds (Nanda et al., 2005, Frumence et al., 2014b). Therefore, fiscal 
decentralisation does not make sense where own-source revenue generation cannot fill the 
resource gap.  
In addition, the budget allocated to the sector has remained below the 15% of target of the Abuja 
declaration. According to Society for International Development (SID) report on health care 
spending for the East African countries published in 2012, Tanzania lags behind other East 
African countries. Rwanda ranked number one with US$ 48 spent on health care per capita, 
whilst Uganda was the second highest with a per capita healthcare expenditure of US$43, 
followed by Kenya with $33, Tanzania fourth with US$25 and Burundi last with US$20 per 
capita health spending in 2009 (SID, 2012). 
 
8.2.2 Administrative decentralisation and health care delivery  
The intention of the administrative decentralisation in Tanzania is to de-link local authority 
human resources from their respective ministries and directly work under LGAs. This implies 
that LGAs are granted power to recruit their own personnel who will be accountable to the local 
residents, which at the end improve service delivery (URT, 1998a). It is assumed that by giving 
LGAs power to recruit, LGAs will ensure sufficient availability of competent staff according to 
their human resource demands.  
 
The case of Tanzania shows that, the role of recruitment, distribution and remuneration of the 
skilled health personnel is centrally organised, leaving LGAs with a very narrow choice to 
employ and reward health care personnel. This is similar to Bossert and Beauvais (2002) who 
found that, LGAs in many developing countries have little or no control over human resource 
management (Bossert and Beauvais, 2002). Usually, CG practices restrictive policies by setting 
ceilings for central funding over LGAs personnel. This can be interpreted as part of 
government‘s restructuring macroeconomic policies. The study on the decentralisation-
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centralisation dilemma and its implications on recruitment and distribution of health workers in 
remote districts of Tanzania; found that neither centralisation nor decentralisation of the human 
resources recruitment process has aided the LGAs to secure highly qualified health workers 
(Munga et al., 2009). But, the centralisation of the human resource for health (HRH) denies 
LGAs administrative power and authority that have transferred under devolution. LGAs have 
remained with a narrow choice over human resource management functions. 
 
The issue of human resources issue has emerged as a barrier to the decentralisation process in 
various forms including lack and inadequate of the qualified personnel and lack of incentives to 
motivate council health workers. This findings confirmed by other country studies that has 
identified several factors that demotivate health workers in the implementation of the (Manzi et 
al., 2012, Munga and Maestad, 2009b, Munga et al., 2009, Sirili et al., 2014). A critical shortage 
of the skilled health personnel over the years together with the failure to fill established posts 
pleads the question of whether LGAs are in position to realise the benefits of decentralisation 
(Ramji, 2009). Lack of locally generated resources restricts local hiring as LGAs failed to hire to 
low skilled personnel. As well, Bartley and Labri, (2004) and Mills et al., (2001) have questioned 
the capacity of human resources available in the health sector to implement decentralisation. 
 
Inadequate HRH affects other supporting services include supportive supervisor. Supervision 
was limited within the council and from the regional levels. Regional heath managers did not 
conduct supportive supervision to CHMTs. Likewise; the CHMTs are not conducting facility 
supervision, which is contrary to service delivery guidelines. Inadequate human and funding 
resources are the mentioned for poor supervision. This has been noted in other studies in 
Tanzania (Munga et al., 2009, Manzi et al., 2012, Mæstad, 2006)  
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8.2.3 Political decentralisation and community participation  
Community participation has long been advocated as part of decentralisation in Tanzania (URT, 
1998). The deconcentration form did not provide mechanisms for community participation. Each 
health care facility is supposed to have a health committee which has limited influence over key 
health care delivery decisions. The facility managers, not local communities usually, appoint 
members of the committees, thus, members are accountable to the managers (Boon, 2008, Kessy 
et al., 2008). Legislation empowers the committee‘s decision space over management of the 
health facility including planning, maintenance and repair of the facility to ensure that the health 
service delivery is of good quality (URT, 2001a). This gives the committees some degree of 
influence over the decisions that are made at each health facility  
However, the current position of the health sector decentralisation has not flowed to expand 
community participation. There are mixed views about community participation through service 
user‘s committees. In many instances, participation is used as a means to mobilise resources 
from the services. Community participation in managing service delivery through health 
committees is very limited as other country studies confirmed (Frumence et al., 2012, Molel, 
2010, Shayo et al., 2013). On other had the level and value of community participation through 
committees is questioned matter (Boon, 2008). As the result of the above limitations, community 
participation is hardly strengthened accountability with regard to provision of comprehensive 
reproductive health services. Similar findings were noted in community studies in Asia which 
found that limited gains has been achieved with regard to reproductive health service 
accountability.(Murthy et al., 2005, Murthy and Klugman, 2004)  
 
The practice shows that the CHMT members are more active in health service planning, thus 
dominating the process with limited involvement from health care providers, communities or 
their representatives. Studies on decentralisation and the health care prioritisation process in 
Tanzania (Maluka et al., 2011, Chitama et al., 2011) jointly  reported that health experts have a 
tendency to dominate priority settings for the council, making it difficult for management 
structures like HFCs and CHSB to make them accountable. Some of the country studies has 
found out that that most of the community members or their representatives, particularly in the 
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rural areas, cannot participate fully in the planning and prioritisation of the process at the 
grassroots because they lack formal training in planning skills and knowledge (Odd-Helge et al., 
2010, Massoi and Norman, 2009). The findings from the current study has also noted that 
communities members had a view that health plans and prioritisation demands people with a 
professional skills to be able to participate in the process. However, this is contrary to what 
political decentralisation which advocated for the community participation in planning the 
matters that affect their lives including health (MoH, 1994). 
 
However, there are some benefits of community participation in designing and assessing of 
primary health care is an ingredient for the successful implementation of health programmes 
(Preston et al., 2010, Gilson et al., 1994). But capacity building at all levels by equipping health 
care providers and service users with planning skills and knowledge, participation is important 
for its  efficiency otherwise it will remained a vague process under decentralisation (Kilewo and 
Frumence, 2015). Otherwise, health care providers at the facilities and communities shall remain 
with a narrow choice in terms of making priorities and plans on health care services. More 
efforts has to be made to enhance the performance of the existing management structures for 
them to full participate fully in district health programmes (Mubyazi et al., 2007). 
 
As national level priorities are council level priorities pointed to conclude that the thrust of 
activities at the council level is about building capacity to implement national priorities rather 
that selecting local driven priorities. This finding is similar to other country studies which found 
a number of shortfalls in the council‘s priority setting processes and criteria lead to inefficient 
and unfair priority setting decisions in RHS (Chitama et al., 2011, Maluka et al., 2010b, Mubyazi 
et al., 2007). In Ghana, Mayhew (2003) found that reproductive health was mentioned to be a 
priority at both the national and district levels but national level sets priorities and districts 
implement (Mayhew, 2003) . Thus, the health care priorities were not emanated from the 
districts per ser. 
266 
 
Nonetheless, the findings support the argument that states each dimension of decentralisation 
individually is very pertinent in its effect on healthcare service delivery. Furthermore, there is 
trust that inter-connections between two decentralisation dimensions generate more benefits for 
improving access to health services than one dimension. Thus, it looks as if those governments 
that are not applying all three dimensions comprehensively during the design of decentralisation 
reform would lose some of the prospects that decentralisation can offer with regard to the 
improvement of access to basic services such as health care. Admitting each individual 
dimension of decentralisation has its own impact on healthcare delivery, the following section 
summarises the findings on LGA discretionary power over revenue sources and expenditure 
(fiscal decentralisation); management of human resources (administrative decentralisation); and 
community participation and accountability and their impact on service delivery (political 
decentralisation). 
 
8.2.4 Implications of decentralisation on reproductive health outcomes  
Does decentralisation have resulted into health gains in particular reproductive health? The 
findings in this study observed that decentralisation is a complex process which is associated 
with several issues including local capacities. Decentralisation implementation in the case 
council did not show impressive changes in the health services indicators including outpatient‘s 
services among others. However, the implementation progress in priority health care services 
including safe motherhood, family planning, facility delivery, family planning in terms of 
centrally defined priorities through national essential health package. 
The analysis of the data from 2008 to 2010 of the case council showed an increase trend of 
reproductive health service indicators (see table 8.2). The achievement could be attributed by 
both government and donor efforts to safe motherhood priorities. Linking decentralisation and its 
impact on reproductive health services was difficult as the improved RHS depends on several 
factors, including function of the basic supportive services at different levels of the health 
systems such as referral systems, quality of services, availability of commodities and supplies; 
available among others.  
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Table 8-2: Council health indicators  
Health Indicators 2008 2009 2010 
Outpatient attendances (persons attending) (in %) 68% 73% 72.1% 
ANC new attendance rate (in %) 61 70.1 72 
ANC clients receiving Tetanus (%) 96.3% 98.6% 95.3% 
Proportion of births attended at health facility 74% 79.4% 81% 
Community delivery 6.1% 11% 6.2% 
Proportion of FSB among reported births (in %) 0.1 0.05 2.2 
Caesarean Sections per expected births (in %) 0 0 0 
Number of maternal death per year (give full number) 3 2 4 
Number of TB cases diagnosed in the last 12 months 285 225 211 
Proportion of TB patient offered HIV testing 0.4 0.3 0.2 
Proportion of People living with HIV screened for TB  0.6 0.7 
Proportion of under 5 deaths due to malaria 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Severe malnutrition rate (in %) 3% 2.3% 1.1% 
Moderate malnutrition rate (in %) 20% 14.1% 14% 
Proportion of low birth weight (in %) 1.4% 0.9% 0.7% 
No. of PLHIV cases recorded 0 0 463 
No of PLHIV  patients on ARVs 0 0 201 
HIV Prevalence among Pregnant women (PMTCT) 3.3 0.9 3.7 
Prevalence of HIV among people tested through VCT 3.3 2.9 2.8 
Source: Council District Primary Health Care reports of 2008, 2009 and 2010. 
 
 
Inadequate financial and human resources were obstacles to council health service delivery. In 
this study council capacity was negligible; most of the health care funding came from central 
government and was not enough to fund all activities. In addition, central transfers, come with 
directives which hinder local autonomy. Funding for supervision and training was not made 
available and this compromises the quality of the service given. As well limited availability of 
data on reproductive health indicators has made impossible to analyse changing in RH indicators 
over time before and after decentralisation. It was noted that, context in which decentralisation 
and other policies is being introduced effects the ability of Councils to respond to the demands of 
a decentralised health services. This in turn seems to impact on the implementation of 
reproductive health policies and the outcomes for reproductive health. The findings illustrate the 
difficulties of attribution of the decentralisation on reproductive health outcomes. There is some 
insight into factors requiring consideration before and during implementation if there is to be a 
positive outcome from policy changes. 
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8.3 Conclusion of the study 
Despite its limitations in terms of scope and depth, the findings of this study articulate several 
significant challenges to the current practice of health sector decentralisation and its impact on 
reproductive health service delivery. The main lesson of this study is that, implementation of 
changes resulting from the decentralisation policy, is likely to meet resistance from individuals 
and groups that have benefited from the centralised system. This means that the involvement of 
those who are likely to oppose the policy during designing is important. In Tanzania it has been 
very clearly there is more resistance from the central authorities to let decentralisation to pin 
down to the councils and then to the communities. Decentralisation involves significant changes 
in fiscal, administrative and political powers.  
In the process of change, the following points are stressed by the study: 
(i) Consultation during the policy processes is crucial 
Decentralisation is hampered by the perception gap between the policy makers, service providers 
and services users. Policy makers recognised that decentralisation grants council more power 
over finances, i.e. improving local mobilisation and control of resources, and service providers 
believe that decentralisation has not improved their autonomy, while on the other hand, service 
users perceive that health services have not improved. The information gap is due partly to poor 
dissemination of central policies to all levels.  
Extensive policy consultation is important and should be done at all levels across government, 
within health sector departments, with health sector staff and with local actors. The decision 
space of health sector decentralisation has to be monitored. A monitoring system of the impact of 
health sector decentralisation has to be set up, consisting of a network of institutions co-
ordinated by the MoHSW and PMO-RALG and using input, output and outcome indicators, 
operating over the short term to the long term. This enables a process of learning in the 
implementation process. 
 
(i) Inter-sectoral coordination  
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Decentralisation policy was developed and coordinated by the PMO-RALG but its 
implementation needs collaboration with other government institutions (MoHSW, PMO-RALG, 
MoFEA and PO-PSM) and LGAs. Communication of policy from central and line ministries to 
council is needed. Weak coordination between the central agencies and the councils has been 
observed to affect decentralisation implementation. A lack of consensus among the government 
agencies has been noticed in staffing and recruitment processes. For example, the PMO-RALG 
can recruit the DMO, similar to the MoHSW. Thus consensus and coordination between all 
responsible institutions are important in identifying common challenges, resolutions and actions.  
Likewise, inconsistent timing of fund disbursements was partly caused by poor coordination and 
communication between the MoHSW, PMO-RALG, MoFEA and the councils. The council 
health managers often face situations where there are no funds to carry out planned activities for 
up to three months. This has an impact on the quality of health service delivery. However, 
improvement can be done to inter-sectoral collaboration through action learning, facilitated by 
the MoHSW and PMO-RALG.  
 
(ii) Capacity  
At policy level, the capacity of the key actors including ministries and agencies should be 
enhanced to have in-depth knowledge of the concept of decentralisation to facilitate its 
implementation and monitoring. At the implementation level, most key actors, in particular 
healthcare providers, have limited information on the on-going decentralisation reforms. As a 
result there were no significant changes in the ability of health personnel to relate service 
delivery to that of decentralisation. These constraints are in turn the result of the several factors. 
The government‘s own assessment of the successes and challenges regarding the implementation 
of decentralisation is instructive. It states in part that: 
Notable progress has been made in increasing the profile of D by D in government, best illustrated by the 
implementation of the strategy through the national planning and budgeting system beginning in 2007. 
Related activities in that direction include support for the Local Government Development Grant system, 
on-going restructuring and capacity building initiatives for LGAs and PMO-RALG. Implementation of D 
by D has, however, faced a few challenges mostly in the form of lack of progress on human resource 
decentralisation, incomplete legal harmonisation across sectors, LGAs revenue assignments and persistent 
governing by directives from the central government. It can therefore be concluded that the strategy to 
institutionalise D by D in the government was not adequately embedded across Ministries, Departments 
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and Agencies and LGAs due to a number of reasons including lack of knowledge on vision, reluctance and 
fear of devolution and policy and legislative bottlenecks‘ (URT, 2008:10). 
From the above statement, it appears that there are number of issues the government needs to 
address. These include harmonisation between the laws governing LGAs and CG governing by 
directives; and incomplete fiscal and human resource decentralisation. Critically, government 
should at the persistent denial of the central ministries and agencies to the vision of D by D. 
 
(iii)  Community participation and accountability 
Community participation, both in the management and planning of healthcare services, is an 
important aspect of decentralisation. The case of health sector decentralisation has failed to 
create a participatory environment at the lower levels. The process is vague, health governance 
structures are disconnected from the community, and hence community voices do not reach the 
policy planning level. The case of the health sector shows that decentralisation has failed to 
bridge the gap between discretion and accountability. The findings show that the nature of 
accountability is more often upward towards the government than to the service users. The 
initiatives to strengthen service users‘ voices and participation ostensibly failed to open up space 
for service users‘ communities to monitor the provider‘s performance and provide feedback for 
better service delivery. 
 
While the government has created a number of policies, guidelines and laws, the staff at the 
lower levels within the health system often is not aware of them. This was reflected in the 
answers to the first research question, which showed that a significant number of participants at 
the lower levels had failed to spot decentralisation policy goals. Participants recommended mass 
awareness about government policies, including decentralisation. If the providers and service 
users do not understand decentralisation, effective organisation and advocacy are a challenge. 
Communities do not know that they have a right to ask for better quality health services as well 
as the right to challenge unethical practices. They just feel comfortable with what is given to 
them since they do not have other options. For example, the findings have shown that it is 
common for providers to charge delivery fee for free services. Although the communities know 
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the practice is unethical, they do not believe that they have right to complain. Despite of those 
challenges that have been argued to be obstructing effective service delivery in Tanzania and in 
consideration of the benefits of decentralisation, the study concludes that, if such challenges 
could be addressed, decentralisation has possibilities for improving health services delivery. 
Attaining capacities and accountability would lead to the effective implementation of 
decentralisation and efficient service delivery. Thus, RHS can only progress if the entire health 
system improves.This study suggests that there is a need to draw lessons from existing initiatives 
in the area of community participation. In this study, some participants, in particular service 
users, were against the prioritisation of reproductive health needs. The argument put forward was 
that health needs need technical expertise, which they do not have. However, more studies are 
needed to find out what service users think about their participation in health-related activities, 
including the prioritisation of health needs.  
 
Generally, the findings in this thesis show that decentralisation is progressing, but not according 
to its vision. There are two substantial constraints on LGAs autonomy that remain unsettled. 
Firstly, there is the persistent influence of central government‘s on local affairs through the 
regional structures. Secondly, there is council‘s greater dependence on central revenues with 
limited capacity to raise their own local revenue. The dependency on central government makes 
local authorities to lack motivation to collect their own revenues, and even when they collect 
there are no local accountability measures and this creates a sense of dilemma among the citizens 
who end up blaming the central government which is very far from them and having no clear 
grounds to make local leaders accountable. The central governments use their fiscal strength to 
influence decisions at the local level. This led to discrepancies between the decentralised 
functions stipulated in the policy and what has been implemented. Decentralisation has not 
matched with changes in the processes, guidelines and attitudes of central and local actors that 
would facilitate the implementation. While the role of CG is supposed to be limited to policy 
making, regulation, monitoring and quality assurance, (URT, 1998; 2008a; 2009), in practice 
there is a degree of central government involvement in LGAs‘ affairs (Kessy and McCourt, 
2010; Venugopal and Yilmaz, 2010). This mirrors what Blair (2001:120) alludes to as 
‗distributed institutional monopoly‘ where CG decentralises authorities and responsibilities for 
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certain functions, but maintains control in the form of deconcentration or delegation. This 
hinders the benefit of decentralisation. 
 
The study suggests that improving mechanisms through which policy makers and service 
providers could be held more accountable would lead to improved health service delivery. In the 
case of the health sector it is important to recognise that devolution, which is seen as a more 
democratic form of decentralisation, may not improve health system performance more than 
other forms, like deconcentration or delegation. Devolution may enhance responsiveness to local 
preferences more than deconcentration or delegation. However, deconcentration and/or 
delegation may be more responsive to the overall health sector priorities set by the national 
government. From the perspective of health system performance, policy makers therefore should 
critically consider the advantages and disadvantages of each form of decentralisation, i.e. fiscal, 
political or administrative or some combination that is best positioned to improve health system 
performance and ultimately improve health service delivery including reproductive health. 
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Annex ii: Research protocol 
 A consent form 
Title of the Research: health sector decentralisation and its impact reproductive health services 
in Tanzania  
 
Hello, my name is Cresencia Masawe, and I am conducting research towards a doctoral degree. I am 
researching on the women‘s reproductive health services in rural Tanzania under decentralisation 
reform policy and would like to invite you to participate in the project. 
 
Brief information on the study 
This is an academic study. I am interested in studying how reform policy has been implemented in 
Tanzania and its impact on reproductive health care delivery.  The key question is to investigate 
policy and practice on the reform process. I want to understand whether the reform impact positively 
or negatively on women‘s reproductive health care delivery in rural settings. You are selected to 
participate in this study because you are among the stakeholders in the reform process. 
 
Mode of Participation 
Please understand that your participation in this study is voluntary. The choice to participate is yours 
alone. If you choose not to participate, there will be no negative consequence. If you choose to 
participate, but wish to withdraw at any time, you will be free to do so without negative consequence. 
However, I would be grateful if you assist me by allowing me to interview you. 
 
You will answer some questions which will take you a maximum of 40 minutes.  I would also like to 
tape-record this interview. Should you have no objection to this, please tick in the box below. Please 
understand that you may choose not to be tape-recorded.  
I agree 
 
Reimbursement, Costs and possible harm  
Kindly understand that this is just an academic study, you will not receive any payment for your 
participation. Please also understand that you will not directly benefit by taking part in this research. I 
do not anticipate that you will suffer any kind of harm or incur any cost for participating in this study.  
 
Anonymity and confidentiality 
Information collected shall be kept with high secrecy and accessed by the researcher only. Your 
personal particulars will not be used in the report without your consent. Please understand, you have 
no obligation to provide your personal particulars (name, occupation, title). However, if you have no 
objection, your personal particulars will be recorded on a separate sheet which will be kept separately. 
Please kindly note that information collected from you will be used only in compiling the final report 
and discarded after the production of the final draft.  
 
I regret it may not be possible to give you the final report. However, I will deposit copies at the library 
of the University of Dar es Salaam, and National Institute for Medical research and the Ministry of 
Health. As well the Regional and council library shall receive a copy. 
 
Signature of Participant: _______________________Date: _________________    
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Key Informant interview guide 
Objective of the study: To understand the implementation of health sector decentralisation 
and its impact on reproductive health care delivery in ruralTanzania  
 Interview check list  Coding  
 Date and place of the interview   
1 Policy formulation  
 Who formulated the decentralisation policy? Probe on consultation    
 Why did the government decide to decentralise health sector 
decentralisation? Probe on:  availability of services according to the local 
needs, better management of health resources at the local , community 
participation of the local communities in local health plans  and 
accountability on service delivery 
 What are the features of decentralised health care delivery? 
 How does policy formulation process proceed?  
 
Context, Actors 
knowledge and 
objective  of 
decentralisation   
2 Policy implementation  
 What changes were made in the organisational structure to implement 
decentralisation? probe on the functional of facility health committees or 
councillors  
 How do changes in decentralisation influence the implementation of 
reproductive health programs?  
Organisational 
structure 
3 What are the changes made in community participation and accountability 
How does local health plan take place? Who participate? What is the basis of 
planning? Who set the service targets for the health programs? What are the 
differences do you noticed in planning practices? Does the local plan gives any 
special focus to reproductive health? 
Decision space for 
the political 
decentralisation   
4  What are changes made in health financing and expenditure? Probe on budget 
guidelines, source of local health funds, expenditure patterns ,funding  for RH 
programs,  health facilities responsibilities for their budget, timely release of fund, 
council decision to  allocate funds according to the local needs 
Decision space for 
the fiscal 
decentralisation  
5 What are the changes made in human resources management in the council? 
Probe on: civil services arrangement , council authority on hiring staff according to 
the need,  authority to approve  and transfer staffs 
Decision space for  
administrative 
decentralisation  
6 Decentralisation and its implication on reproductive health 
 
 What are the changes of reproductive health programs brought by the 
implementation of decentralisation policy? 
 To what extent are the key changes of health care decentralisation has 
impacted on the implementation of the reproductive health programs? 
 Which features of health system decentralisation are beneficial and or not 
beneficial to sexual and reproductive health?  
 What is your opinion regarding decentralisation and it impact on RH 
programs? ( probe on service organization, priority setting , community 
participation and accountability, human resources, funding) 
 Comment over general changes of decentralisation in relation to RH 
programs 
 
Decentralisation 
outcomes on 
reproductive 
health 
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Decision space mapping table for the health managers and LGAs officials  
Decision space mapping 
Selected functions Range of choice 
Narrow Moderate Wide 
Finance 
 Source of revenue 
 Allocation of expenditure 
 Income from fees 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Service organization 
 Health facility autonomy 
 Insurance plans 
 Payment mechanism  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Human resources 
 Recruitment  and contracts 
 Salaries 
 Transfer  
 
 
 
  
Governance 
 Facility boards  
 Community participation in planning 
 Local accountability  
 Prioritisation of local health needs  
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Focus group discussion guidelines 
Focus Group Discussion guidelines with the RHMTs and CHMTs 
1. What are your group‘s views about health sector decentralisation policy? Probe on 
their understanding, availability of policy documents)  
2. What strategies were taken to implement decentralisation policy? 
3. How does council health panning take place? Who are involved in the process? 
(Structures, criteria for participation,  service users representation) 
4. What is the group opinion with regard to the status of implementation of health sector 
decentralisation? 
5. What is your opinion regarding decentralisation and provision of reproductive health 
services?  (probe on changes  on services delviery) 
6. How facility health committees do works?  (Look on formulation process and its 
functionality, and the acts of accountability as service users representatives)  
7. What is the group‘s suggestion for decentralisation to be more effective? 
Focus Group Discussion guidelines with the Facility committees and facility managers  
1 What are your group‘s views about health sector decentralisation policy? Probe  on 
their understanding, availability of policy documents and implementation viability )  
2 How facility health committees do works?  (Look on formulation process and its 
functionality, and the acts of accountability as service users representatives)  
3 How does council health panning take place? Does council health plan address local 
needs?  (A copy of facility plan if available) 
4 What role did the HFCs played to address health matters?  (look on meeting agendas, 
answerability mechanism) 
5 What is the group opinion with regard to the status of implementation of health sector 
decentralisation? Is there any difference in practises before and after decentralisation? 
6 What is your opinion regarding decentralisation in relation to sexual and reproductive 
health?  
7 Is there anything further you would like to discuss? (recommendations) 
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Focus Group Discussion guidelines with men services users 
1. What is the group view about decentralisation objectives. (Probe about understanding 
of objectives for health sector decentralisation) 
2. What have been the changes on the decentralised health service delivery (in planning 
process, resource allocation/mobilization and formation of health facility committee) 
3. Have there been any significant changes on reproductive health care services after 
introducing the decentralisation? 
4. How would you describe the quality of health care services provided by the health 
facility? (probe on privacy, drugs, contraceptives availability)  
5. What is your opinion regarding decentralisation in relation to services delivery? 
6. Is there anything further you would like to discuss? 
Focus Group Discussion guidelines with women services users 
1. What is the group view about decentralisation objectives. (Probe about understanding 
of   objectives for health sector decentralisation) 
2. What are the changes that have been noted with respect to decentralisation /health 
reforms? Probe on participation in planning process 
3. What are the reproductive health problems in your community? 
4. Have there been any significant changes on the quality of reproductive health care 
services after decentralisation/health reforms? 
5. How would you describe the quality of reproductive health care provided in your 
local health facility? (Privacy, drugs, contraceptives availability)  
6. What is your opinion regarding decentralisation in relation to sexual and reproductive 
health?  
7. Is there anything further you would like to discuss? 
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Annex iii: List of persons interviewed 
Name of the title Organization Affiliation 
1)  District health coordinator Ministry of health  
2)     Basket fund coordinator  -Ministry of health 
3)   Reproductive health coordinator -Ministry of health 
4)  Communication officer -Ministry of health  
5)     Health sector secretariat representative -Ministry of health  
6)   Human resource director   -Public service 
management  
7)  Public policy director   -President‘s office  
8)  Council health services coordinator -Prime Minister‘s office 
9)   Social services coordinator -Prime Minister‘s office 
10)  ALAT representative  -Prime Minister‘s Office 
11)  Gender director  -Ministry of Gender 
12)  NGO‘s representatives  -SIKIKA &TGNP  
13)  Donor representatives  -UNFPA& USAID 
14)  Regional Medical officer -Region  
15)  Reproductive health coordinator -Region 
16)  Local government secretariat -Region  
17)  District director -Council   
18)  District commissioner  -Council   
19)  Council Administrator and human resource officer -Council   
20)  District medical officer  Council   
21)  District health secretary  -Council   
22)  Council reproductive health coordinator  -Council   
23)  Council member of the Parliament  -Parliament  
24)  Women member of the Parliament representative  -Parliament  
25)  Council chairperson  -Council  
26)  Women councillors (2) -Council 
27)  Men councillors(2) -Service Providers 
28)  Facility in-in charge (6) -Service Providers 
29)  Reproductive health coordinator at facility level (4) -Service Providers 
30)  Ward executive officer   - Ward  
31)  Village executive director  -Village  
LIST OF FOCUS GROUPS  
1)     Regional health management team (1)  
2)     Council health management team (1)  
3)     Facility health committees (4)  
4)     Community level (8)  
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Annex iv: List of the documents reviewed 
1. Community health fund operations and guidelines 2001 
2. DANIDA- Joint External Evaluation of the Health Sector in Tanzania 1999-2006 
3. Government of Tanzania  Local Government Reform Agenda 1996-2000 
4. Government of Tanzania Local Government  District Authority Act, 1982 
5. Government of Tanzania -Local Government Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) 
Act, 2006 
6. Government of Tanzania-National Development Vision 2025 
7. Government of Tanzania Public service reform program 2000 
8. Government of Tanzania- The Constitutional of the United Republic of  Tanzania 
1977 
9. Government of Tanzania-Community Health Fund Act 2001 
10. Government of Tanzania-Five Year Development Plan 2011/12-2015/16:Unleash 
Tanzania‘s latent growth potentials 
11. Government of Tanzania-Policy Paper on Local Government reform 1998 
12. Integrating reproductive health services in a reforming health sector: the case of 
Tanzania Ollif, 2003 
13. Local government District Authorities Act 1982 
14.  Ministry of  Finance and Economic Empowerment National Strategy for Growth and 
Poverty Reduction 
15. Ministry of  Finance and Economic Empowerment:  Five years Development 
planning 2011/12-2015/16  
16. Ministry of  Finance and Economic Empowerment: National annual budget speech for 
2012/2013 
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17. Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs-Assessment of the effectiveness of formula 
based budgetary allocation to local government authorities 2010 
18. Ministry of Health  and Prime Minister‘s Office-Regional Administration and local 
Government -Comprehensive Council Health Plan Guidelines 2010 
19. Ministry of Health  and Prime Minister‘s Office-Regional Administration and local 
Government -Primary Health Sector Development Program 2007-2017 
20. Ministry of Health  and Prime Minister‘s Office-Regional Administration and local 
Government-Joint Field Visits 19th- 23rd   September, 2011  Summary Findings 
21. Ministry of Health  and Prime Minister‘s Office-Regional Administration and local 
Government-Summary and analysis of comprehensive council health plans: 2011/12 
report 
22. Ministry of Health and Social Welfare  Annual Budget speech for 2012/2013  
23. Ministry of Health and Social Welfare - Human Resource, for Health Strategic Plan 
(2008–2013) 
24. Ministry of Health and Social Welfare Health- National Family Planning Costed 
Implementation Program (2010–2015), and the National Plan of Action for Orphans 
Vulnerable Children 
25. Ministry of Health and Social Welfare Health- National Road Map Strategic Plan to 
Accelerate Reduction of Maternal, Newborn and Child deaths in Tanzania (―One 
Plan‖) (2008–2015) 
26. Ministry of Health and Social Welfare Health-Technical Review Meeting: Public 
Expenditure Review 
27. Ministry of Health and Social Welfare -Summary and Analysis of CCHPs 2012/13and  
Progress Report 
28. Ministry of Health and Social Welfare-12th Joint Annual Health Sector Review 2011 
Main Meeting, 3 November 2011 
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29. Ministry of Health and Social Welfare-Health sector performance profile :Mainland 
Tanzania July 2009 to June 2010 
30. Ministry of Health and Social Welfare-Health Sector Performance Profile Report 
2011  
31. Ministry of Health and Social Welfare-Health Sector Public Expenditure Review 
2010/11 
32. Ministry of Health and Social Welfare-Public Expenditure Review for Human 
Resources for Health 2011 
33. Ministry of Health and Social Welfare-12th Joint Annual Health Sector Review 2011 
Main Meeting, 3 November 2011 
34. Ministry of Health and Social Welfare-Technical Review Meeting: Public 
Expenditure Review 2012 
35. Ministry of Health and Social Welfare- Summary and analysis of comprehensive 
council health plans 2011/12  
36. Ministry of Health- health Sector Reform Plan of Action July 199 to June 2002 
37. Ministry of Health -Health sector reform program of work 1998 
38. Ministry of Health -Health sector strategic plan ii (2003-2008) 
39. Ministry of Health -Health sector strategic plan iii (2009-2015) 
40. Ministry of Health -National Health policy 1990 last revised 2007 
41. Ministry of Health -National Package of Essential Reproductive and Child Health 
Interventions 2003 
42. Ministry of Health- National policy guidelines for reproductive and child health 
services, 2003 
43. Ministry of Health- Report on health sector reform dissemination workshop  1998 
44. Ministry of Health-Guidelines for the establishment and operations of Council Health 
Board and Health Facility Committees 2001 
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45. Ministry of Health-health  sector reform Plan of  Action 1996-1999 
46. Ministry of Health-National District Health Planning Guidelines 1998 
47. Ministry of Health-National Package of Essential Health Interventions 2000 
48. Ministry of Health-priority activities to be implemented by MoH July 1999- June 
2000 
49. Ministry of Health-Proposal for health sector reform  1994 
50. Ministry of Health-Strategic Plan for Integration of Health Services in Tanzania, 2003 
51. National Audit Office- Annual General Report of the Controller and Audit General. 
2013 
52. National Audit Office- Report of the Controller and Auditor General on Special Audit 
on Drugs Availability at Medical Stores Department (MSD), 2012 
53. President‘s Office, Public Service Management -Public Service Pay and Incentive 
Policy2010 
54. Prime Minister‘s Office-Regional Administration and local Government-Local 
Government Reforms Programme II, Decentralisation by Devolution, Vision Goals 
and Strategy 2009 
55. Guidelines for the establishment and operations of Council Health Board and Health 
Facility Committees 2000 
56. Government of Tanzania-Public Service reform programme 2000 
57. Government of Tanzania-Social Policy Formulation Process 1997  
58. Government of Tanzania-Evaluation of Local Government Reform Program 2007 
59. Government of Tanzania -Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania 1977 
 
 
